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THE RIGHT TO BE SILENT

George P. Rice

1.

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ON September 22, 1692, the defendant Giles Corey elected to remain mute, rather than give testimony in his trial for witchcraft in mossy Salem, was found guilty, and executed for his contumacy. "He was the first in New-England, that was ever prest to death."¹ Besides providing a notable exception to the rule that "silence is golden," Corey's was a case of first impression in America wherein the right of a party to remain silent was raised. Obviously, in 1692 there was no such right, but the existence of the Fifth Amendment is evidence that one did develop. Hundreds of extant cases prove it was widely relied upon until the legislative restrictions of 1954.

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Indeed, by 1953 it was reported that in the course of the year 317 persons, subpoenaed by special Congressional committees to testify on matters relating to national security, relied successfully upon the self-incrimination clause of

the Fifth Amendment and were covered by a cloak of immunity protecting their right to remain silent.² This state of affairs was held injurious to national security, and Congress responded with the Immunity Act of 1954 in order to restrict the circumstances in which a party could remain silent under legal protection. A principal, though not sole, reason for the passage of the Act was the intent to forge a new weapon against the threats of Communism to internal security.

The basic aim of the courts in fundamental liberties cases has always been to balance the individual freedom asserted against the public interest deemed to be involved. It is at least possible that, in the effort to protect the Republic, some legislation already passed has created an imbalance in favor of government and against the individual. Since the right to silence may be either general or specific, it has a wide application to speakers, auditors, and litigants. It follows that a review of the current status of that right has some merit since its exercise may upon occasion be equal in importance to that of free legal speech.³

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¹George L. Burr, *Narrative of the Witchcraft Cases* (New York, 1914), p. 367.

²*New York Times*, August 9, 1954, p. 4E.

³Leonard Levy, *Legacy of Suppression* (Cambridge, Mass., 1960), Chaps. I and V.

The principle that no man can be compelled to be a witness against himself is unique to Anglo-American law. Its genesis is found in the struggle between privilege and prerogative in Stuart England. One may in fact say that in the repeal of the odious Star Chamber lay the origins of certain specific rights to silence, e.g., protection against self-incrimination. Before the start of the eighteenth century the English had established the principle that no incriminatory testimony could be had from a defendant without his consent. The doctrine then made its way to the United States, primarily as a rule of evidence, rather than a matter of general right under due constitutional process.⁴

In searching for the ultimate sources of basic legal rights in a democratic society, one is struck by their positive and negative aspects. For example, one has the right to vote, but no law compels him to exercise that right. The position⁵ taken in this paper is that speech is the positive and silence the negative aspect of a fundamental human right. Puffendorf held⁶ that the origin of the right to free speech (and its corollary, the right to be silent) lay in natural law, reinforced by positive legal enactments. The theory of natural law further supposes that certain eternal rights belong to all men by virtue of their natural capacities as members of society.⁷ These basic rights include life, liberty, and privacy. It is held, too, that the power in the people is sovereign and that rights not delegated

remain in the people, or in the states.⁸

"Natural rights" are distinguished from "political rights," such as to vote or to hold office, and from "civil rights," such as to marry or to make a contract. The natural rights theory has other important postulates: that men have a right to govern themselves democratically; that the fundamental nature of man is good, rather than evil; that truth has an inherent power to prevail over error in a fair contest for public support; and that liberty of speech and its related freedoms are essential to the existence of the democratic process in a free society.⁹ However, the fundamental American social contracts give no express recognition to a general right to be silent. Save for the specific application set down in the Fifth Amendment, neither federal nor state guarantees have been defined in clear and narrow language.

The lack of positive pronouncement on a right so substantial as that of silence makes it necessary to utilize the resources of inference on constitutional, statutory, evidentiary, and case law, in order to determine what they spell out on the subject. This process yields a further dividend in terms of classification of case law laid down for varying factual situations involving the right to silence.

The federal Constitution is the proper starting point in this quest. The First Amendment says: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Here is no specific guarantee of the right to silence. But one may

⁴ *Twining v. New Jersey*, 211 U. S. 78 (1908).

⁵ For a comparative study, see Frede Castberg, *Freedom of Speech in the West* (Oslo, 1960). See also Thomas Emerson and David Haber, *Political and Civil Rights in the United States* (Buffalo, 1952) and Zachariah Chafee, Jr., *Free Speech in the United States* (Cambridge, Mass., 1948) for specific sections dealing with the right to be silent.

⁶ Samuel Puffendorf, *The Law of Nature and Nations* (London, 1717), Chaps. I, V, VI.

⁷ U. S. Constitution, Preamble.

⁸ IX Amendment.

⁹ See John Milton, *Areopagitica* (London, 1644).

argue with logic that the phrase "abridging the freedom of speech" includes the right to be silent, since speech is the positive and silence the negative of the right actually named. It might even be that the Founding Fathers took the right to silence so much for granted as to deem it unnecessary to make specific provision for it when drafting the Constitution. However, with the possible exception of the *Edward Yellin* case,¹⁰ now before the United States Supreme Court on certiorari, the writer knows of no litigant who has to date made successful use of the First Amendment in asserting his right to silence. Test cases are badly needed on implications of the First Amendment.

Now, assuming that silence is the correlative of speech, social contracts and decided cases reveal other facets of the nature of the right to silence. Thus, liberty to speak is a preferred but not an absolute freedom.¹¹ By analogy, the right to silence implicative under the First Amendment is also limited by the claims of public interest weighed against those of the individual. Concerns so fundamental as national security and the public peace and quiet will take precedence over it.

The Fifth Amendment is rather more positive than the First in its contribution, though severely limited in its application to the right to silence. It says specifically that no person ". . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." This is the common and generally known proviso relied upon by defendants when they refuse to testify on grounds of self-incrimination in criminal cases. But it is a specific right, limited in scope and

application to criminal actions and it is personal to the claimant.

Three other federal constitutional sources contribute to the case for an implied right to silence which may lie in the First Amendment. Of these the first is the Ninth Amendment: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights should not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." A not unreasonable inference here is that the right to silence remained in the people along with other rights not specifically named, ready to be spelled out by the courts in appropriate cases. The second support for the case for implied right is found in the language of the Tenth Amendment: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The inference based upon the Ninth Amendment seems equally permissible here.

The source of final support, and the most controversial, lies in the Fourteenth Amendment. It declares: "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States." This guarantee, linked to the Ninth and Tenth, and all three based upon a broad general inference supportable by the First, could provide protection of implied or reserved rights, including silence, from state invasion. Unfortunately, the *Twining* case,¹² the first and only decision of the Supreme Court which has squarely held that the states were free, notwithstanding the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, to extort evidence from a criminal defendant, stands in the way. Cogent reasons why *Twining* is not good law may be found in the

¹⁰ *United States v. Yellin*, *U.S. Law Week*, XXX (October 10, 1961), 3111.

¹¹ *Feiner v. New York*, 340 U. S. 315, at 319 (1951). See also: *American Communications Association v. Douds*, 339 U. S. 382 (1950).

¹² *Twining v. New Jersey*, above.

dissent of Mr. Justice Black in *Adamson v. California*.¹³

Besides the contributions of the federal Constitution, litigants may, as suggested previously, rely upon certain rules of evidence to protect the right to silence.¹⁴ These include the personal privileges common to fiduciary relations, such as husband and wife, doctor and patient, lawyer and client, and clergyman and parishioner.

2.

Do existing principles and cases involving speech and silence permit classification? If so, what do they reveal of the present legal status of silence and the extent to which it may be lawfully enjoyed or denied?

A survey of the cases suggests at least three categories of fact situations in which the right to silence has been litigated with interesting results for public speakers.¹⁵ They include: (a) the right *not* to say what one *does not believe*; (b) the right *not* to say what one *does believe*, that is, the right to keep one's own counsel; and (c) the right *not* to say what one *knows*. These groups are listed in the rising order of difficulty in their assertion by individuals. The test to determine whether or not the right exists is provided by Judge Learned Hand, late of the United States Circuit Court: whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech (read "right to be silent") as is necessary to avoid the danger.¹⁶

An example of a case in which the

right *not* to say what one *does not believe* is *West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette*.¹⁷ Here the issue was whether or not the state could expel certain children from school for refusal to salute the American flag, an act contrary to their religious beliefs. The High Court held the social interest in loyalty subordinate to the right of the children, as members of Jehovah's Witnesses, to refuse to recite a pledge they did not believe. The right to be silent in cases where facts fit this pattern is well established.

Less firmly buttressed is the freedom *not* to say what one *does believe*, an area in which religion, art, and science enjoy greater liberty than politics. The Taft-Hartley Act, for example, requires a statement of belief (or non-belief) in Communism as a condition precedent of officers of labor unions whose members desire to benefit by certain advantages conferred by the law itself. Section 9 (h) requires a non-Communist affidavit of officers on political beliefs. In upholding this proviso, the United States Supreme Court said: "We think it is clear . . . that the remedy provided by Sec. 9 (h) bears reasonable relation to the evil which the statute was designed to reach."¹⁸ Certain loyalty oaths required of members of the teaching profession furnish other examples of what is meant here.

Events since the passage of the Immunity Act in 1954 indicate that the greatest restriction on the right to be silent falls upon the third category, the right *not* to say what one *knows*. The ruling case law is expressed in the *Ull-*

¹³ Read the dissent and appendix of Mr. Justice Black in *Adamson v. California*, 332 U. S. 46 (1947).

¹⁴ John Wigmore, *Code of Evidence* (Boston, 1942), Sec. 2325.

¹⁵ Leo Pfeffer, *The Liberties of an American* (Boston, 1956), p. 38.

¹⁶ *Dennis v. United States*, 341 U. S. 494 (1951), citing an opinion of Hand.

¹⁷ *West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U. S. 624 (1943). See also: *Scopes v. State*, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S. W. 363 (1927) and *Minersville School District v. Gobaitis*, 310 U. S. 536 (1940).

¹⁸ *American Communications Association v. Douds*, above. See also: *In re Summers*, 325 U. S. 561 (1945) and *Hirabayashi v. United States*, 320 U. S. 81 (1943).

mann decision upholding constitutionality of the statute. But many other and more common limitations on the right have existed for a long time, such as the requirement to divulge personal data on financial affairs to Internal Revenue, biographical matter for motor vehicle licenses and registrations, and the like.

A detailed examination of the Immunity Act of 1954 and its application to a particular instance reveals the careful procedural protections erected by Congress while at the same time endeavoring to provide an instrument capable of combatting subversion.¹⁰ The bill was recommended by the Attorney General of the United States as a means of coping with the evasive tactics of individuals whose testimony was thought essential to the national security, but who avoided speech by invoking the Fifth Amendment. Many of these persons were suspected of Communist membership or sympathy.

The Act provided that if the witness claimed his constitutional privileges against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment before one of the Houses of Congress, the following steps could be taken to break his will to silence while providing him with immunity from federal prosecution: (1) the majority of the members present must have affirmatively authorized the immunity offered; (2) the Attorney General of the United States must have been notified of the proceedings; (3) the United States District Court having jurisdiction must have directed the witness to testify or to produce required evidence involved, provided, that an application had been made to the Court by a Congressional representative, and, provided, that the Attorney General had

been heard on the matter, and, provided, that the Court acted with sound discretion.

Where the proceedings took place before a Congressional committee, such as the House Un-American Activities Committee, the same steps were mandatory, save that a two-thirds vote of the members of the full committee was required instead of a majority of the members then present.

When proceedings were before a Grand Jury or in court proper, and it was thought by the Attorney General that the testimony or evidence involved the national security, that officer may through the United States Attorney in charge of the case and with the aid of the latter's on-the-scene judgment request the court to instruct the reluctant witness to testify or to produce. This order by the court costs the witness his privilege to decline on the ground of self-incrimination when accompanied by an offer of an affidavit of immunity. Refusal is contempt of court, punishable by fine, jail sentence, or both.

The trial of the Ullman case introduced two important elements which created widespread interest among lawyers and laymen alike. The first was the assertion that "gross infamy" would attach to witnesses who refused to testify under the act, or, who, testifying, gave testimony damaging to their own interests. It was argued, not without logic, that most of these witnesses would be Communists and that under the Smith Act of 1940, the McCarran Act of 1950, or relevant portions of Taft-Hartley, a serious deterioration of the political and economic status of the witness or party would follow. He could, for example, become unemployable in civil service, in defense plants, or he could be refused a passport, lose his job, and the like. The examples of Alger Hiss and Whittaker

¹⁰ Public Law 600, 83rd Congress: Ch. 769, and sec. Amending 18 U. S. C., Sec. 3486; 68 Stat. 745. Read *Adams v. Maryland*, 347 U. S. 179 (1954).

Chambers were cited to prove these contentions.²⁰ The second adverse criticism concerned the liability of the enforced witness to state prosecution, based upon charges reinforced by his own testimony given in federal court under affidavit of immunity. This appears to be a very real hazard.

The voice of the United States Supreme Court was heard to say on March 26, 1956, that the 1954 Immunity Act was good law as tested in *Ullmann v. United States*.²¹ The majority opinion held that the protection afforded Ullmann under the affidavit of immunity was sufficiently broad to guard him from all reasonable consequences. While the case suggests that the High Court believed Congress could provide immunity from state prosecutions where national security was a concern, it qualified its approval and noted:

Constitutional abolition of state power to punish crimes in violation of state law presents a more dramatic exercise of Congressional power than that we considered in *Adams*. In that case, only the use of the compelled testimony, not prosecution itself, was prohibited.

²⁰ Francis X. Busch, *Guilty or Not Guilty* (Indianapolis, 1952), p. 197.

²¹ *Ullmann v. United States*, 350 U. S. 422 (1956).

But it cannot be contested that Congress has power to provide for national defense. . . . We have already, in the name of the Commerce Clause, upheld a similar restriction on state court jurisdiction, *Brown v. Walker*, 161 U. S. at pages 650-651, 50 L. Ed. 819, and we can find no distinction between the reach of Congressional power with respect to commerce and its power with respect to national security.²²

3.

The present status of free legal speech contrasts sharply with that of the right to silence. Much litigation has come before the courts on issues of speech and assembly. The result is that rights and duties of speakers have been clarified in a wide variety of circumstances. On the other hand, legal aspects of the right to silence are largely unexplored. There is compelling need to develop a sound theoretical approach based upon existing social contracts, and to support it by a series of proper test cases to the end that the various aspects of the right to silence be clearly and narrowly established. These steps, and these alone, can provide a solid basis of theory and precedent to determine when and how the right to silence may be lawfully invoked by American citizens.

²² *Ibid.*

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ALEXANDER H. STEPHENS SPEAKS FOR THE UNION

James L. Golden

IN these centennial years of the War between the States, books and monographs have rolled from the presses describing in graphic detail the heroics of the gallant Union and Confederate soldiers. Subsequent works depicting the pageantry and military strategy of what is now viewed as a romantic war will also find a ready market. Almost forgotten in this present emphasis on the Civil War period is the role played by a group of Southern moderates who did what they could to prevent the war. Far-sighted, courageous, and often eloquent, they risked their political careers on the altar of unionism at a time when it was more popular and expedient to join the secessionists. Standing squarely among these unionists was Alexander H. Stephens—a small man with a “giant intellect”¹ and a talent for oratory.

That Stephens was one of the most persuasive orators in the ante-bellum South there can be little doubt. Whenever he spoke in Congress his colleagues on both sides of the House, observed one eyewitness, grouped around him, and watched “with eagerness every word that fell from his lips.”² Hours after Lincoln

had heard Stephens for the first time, he wrote Herndon: “I just take my pen to say that Mr. Stephens of Georgia, a little, slim, palefaced, consumptive man, with a voice like Logan’s has just concluded the very best speech of an hour’s length I ever heard. My old withered eyes are full of tears yet.”³

“Little Alex”—as Stephens was affectionately called—was a child of the South. Like so many of his contemporaries, he was an apologist for slavery and a militant advocate of states’ rights. Viewed from this perspective he was, therefore, an ideal Vice President of the Confederacy. To remember Stephens, however, as the eloquent defender of an outmoded social system and as a leader of a tragic revolution is to miss his principal contribution to history. In the decade preceding the Civil War, Georgia’s talented statesman used his rhetorical power to help preserve the Union. The nature and effectiveness of Stephens’ role as a spokesman for the Union is the theme of this essay.

A few months after Henry Clay presented his compromise resolutions to the Senate, opposition against the measures began to crystallize throughout the South. The strong emotional appeals

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¹During the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Douglas urged his listeners at Quincy to “Read the speeches of that giant in intellect, Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia.” See *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, ed. Roy P. Basler (New Brunswick, 1953), III, 269.

²P. B. Templeton, “Our Civil War: A Lecture,” *Southern Rebellion Pamphlets of 1861* (Boston, 1861), p. 17. Templeton was a reporter assigned to cover the debates in Congress.

³Lincoln to Herndon, February 2, 1848, *Works of Abraham Lincoln*, I, 448. Sharing Lincoln’s enthusiasm for Stephens’ speaking ability and political influence, a reporter for the *National Intelligencer* said (November 22, 1860): “Whatever falls from the lips of this distinguished statesman and recognized champion of Southern Rights is sure to command the respectful audience of his countrymen, and will be held to deserve more than ordinary consideration.”

which the Southern Whigs had used to force the North to accept Clay's resolutions appeared to backfire. When the congressional speeches were published in the newspapers, the people, unable to see or understand the strategy, were alarmed. Even before Congress adjourned, therefore, "the lower South was near the verge of secession."⁴ To stem this tide of sentiment, Stephens—who had said little on the compromise during the debates in Congress—hurried home and engaged in one of the most heated political contests of his career.

The key state in the early phase of the struggle in the South in the fall of 1850 was Georgia. As early as September Robert Barnwell Rhett boasted that the heart of Georgia was dead to the value of the Union, and confidently predicted that "Georgia would lead off; South Carolina will go with her."⁵ That Rhett underestimated the influence of Stephens and his colleague, Robert Toombs, later events clearly show. Stephens, a master political tactician, was spearheading the unionist movement at home even before the final vote was taken on the resolutions in Congress. He told a Southern Rights meeting in Warren County during the first week in September that there was no just cause for resistance. If Congress, he argued, votes for the compromise provisions we must remember that it has a clear "constitutional right" to do so.⁶

In November the people of Georgia went to the polls to elect delegates to a convention to be held in Milledgeville on December 11 for the purpose of dealing with the compromise. Led by Stephens and Toombs the union delegates carried the state by a majority of 30,000.

The disunionists carried but seven of fifty-three counties, and these by small majorities.⁷ The results of this election and the accomplishments of the convention which followed were to have far-reaching effects on the final outcome of the greatest slavery crisis since 1820.

In committee meetings and on the floor of the convention, Stephens and his colleagues meticulously worked out a plan of action known as the Georgia Platform. The first three resolutions of this historical document set forth, in general terms, Georgia's intentions to abide by the compromise as a final settlement of the sectional controversy. But the fourth and fifth resolutions drew a line beyond which the "North must not go if the compromise was to be maintained."⁸ The delegates enthusiastically adopted the Platform, and thus Georgia had stopped, at least temporarily, the drive toward secession.

As soon as the convention adjourned Stephens addressed a mass meeting which was held in Milledgeville for the purpose of forming a new political party in Georgia. Persuaded that the Whigs and Democrats in the audience must repudiate old loyalties and fuse into one great union party, he urged his listeners to "organize upon a principle as broad as the Constitution . . . and as wide as the Republic," and to continue the fight for Southern Rights within the Union. "Fellow citizens," he then said in closing, "that man who pursues a policy that will lead to disunion is a disunionist. I care not whether he be a Northern fanatic or a Southern impracticable. And between me and such, there is a great gulf as wide and as deep

⁴ Ulrich B. Phillips, "The Southern Whigs, 1834-1854," *Turner Essays in American History* (New York, 1910), p. 225.

⁵ *National Intelligencer*, November 28, 1850.

⁶ *Ibid.*, September 14, 1850.

⁷ *Harper's New Monthly Magazine*, II (December 1850-May 1851), 268.

⁸ Richard H. Shryock, *Georgia and the Union in 1850* (Philadelphia, 1926), pp. 331-332.

as that which separated Dives from Lazarus."⁹

Not content to aid the newly formed union party with his own speeches, Stephens helped other speakers prepare their addresses during the heated gubernatorial contest of 1851. While his frail body, plagued with sickness, kept him at home during the spring and early summer, his brilliant mind was engineering campaign strategy for Howell Cobb, the unionist candidate for governor. When your opponents ask you questions, he told Cobb, "give them short, explicit and unequivocal answers" which are "pointed not prolix." And when speaking of the compromise resolutions, he added, show that "the settlement is better than fourteen slave states asked. Show what Calhoun contended. Show what he said about the Mexican laws the last day he was in the Senate. Show what the Georgia Whigs and Democrats asked and show what they got." As Stephens concluded his advice he warned Cobb to treat secession as an abstract right of revolution, and to maintain that "no just cause for the exercise of such right exists."¹⁰ These suggestions Cobb followed well. When the bitter campaign was over he had carried seventy-four of the ninety-five counties in the state and had a popular majority of 18,000 votes.

As Stephens returned to Congress in the late fall of 1851 he could take pride in the fact that he had struck a decisive blow for the Union. Not without cause did he now believe that the dangerous sectional strife had come to an end. With extreme optimism he urged a Maryland audience, which had as-

sembled to commemorate the birthday of Washington, to "take new hope for the future." If we remain "ardent in our attachment to the Union," he confidently asserted, we will begin a rapid ascent. "Our forefathers and our fathers did much. But they got only slight glimpses of what we see around us. . . . Who can tell what wonderful discoveries and developments are yet to be attained by the present generation, or those who shall succeed them."¹¹

The fond hopes for peace and prosperity which Stephens so eloquently expressed in Maryland in February, 1852, were all but shattered two years later. The House, long accustomed to controversy, once again was in a blaze of excitement as it came to grips with a new and equally foreboding North-South crisis. The issue was the explosive Kansas-Nebraska Bill sponsored by Douglas in his quest for popular sovereignty. Convinced that the bill not only would protect the rights of the South but preserve the Union, Stephens—now a Democrat—happily stood with Douglas and other national leaders. In the committee room and on the floor of Congress he proved to be "the ablest advocate, both as debater and parliamentary manager."¹² On the 17th of February, 1854, he delivered the most effective address which he had presented in Congress up to that time.¹³ Amidst applause from the gallery he recalled Webster's Seventh of March speech. "I was there and witnessed the scene; and no one, I fancy, who was there can ever forget it." Would you not be wise, he taunted the ultras of the North, to follow the prudence of Webster rather than "the rav-

⁹ *National Intelligencer*, January 3, 1851; *Natchez Weekly Courier*, January 22, 1851.

¹⁰ Stephens to Howell Cobb, June 23, 1851, *The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb*, ed. Ulrich B. Phillips, Annual Report of the American Historical Association, II (1911), 237-238.

¹¹ Henry Cleveland, *Alexander H. Stephens* (Philadelphia, 1866), pp. 353-363.

¹² Allan Nevins, *Ordeal of the Union* (New York, 1947), II, 155.

¹³ John Savage, *Our Living Representative Men* (Philadelphia, 1860), p. 460.

ings of the infidel preacher Theodore Parker. . . ?" In a ringing plea for moderation Stephens concluded:

Mr. Chairman, I would today address this House, not as partisans—neither as Whigs, or Democrats, but as Americans. I do not know what you call me, or how you class me, whether as Whig or Democrat, in your political vocabulary, nor do I care. Principles should characterize parties, and not names. I call myself a Republican, and I would invoke you, one and all, to come up and sustain the great republican and American policy, established in 1850, for the permanent peace, progress, and glory of our common country. If any of you are convinced of its propriety and correctness, but are afraid that your constituents are not equally convinced, follow the example of Mr. Webster, after his 7th of March speech, when the doors of Faneuil Hall were closed against him. Meet your constituents, if need be, in the open air, and, face to face, tell them they are wrong, and you are right. I think, sir, that great man, on no occasion of his life, ever appeared to greater advantage in the display of those moral qualities which mark those entitled to lasting fame, than he did in the speech he made in an open barouche before the Revere House, in Boston, to 3,000 people who had assembled to hear what reason he had to give for his course in the Senate. He stood as Burke before the people of Bristol, or as Aristides before the people of Athens, when he told them, above all things, to be "just." . . . Imitate his example—never lose the consciousness that "Truth is mighty and will ultimately prevail."¹⁴

The combining force of Stephens in the House and Douglas in the Senate proved too much for the opponents of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill.¹⁵ In May the bill was passed, thus affirming the doctrine of popular sovereignty as the law of the land. As "Little Alex" reflected on his second great success within four years in helping to solve the

slavery crisis, he reaffirmed his devotion to nationalism. In June, 1854, he chided the editor of the *Columbus Enquirer* for suggesting that a ticket be formed comprised of Southern men for president and vice president. "What we want is a sound national organization upon broad, national-republican principles. We want no sectional men or sectional issues—at least so long as national men enough can be found to make a party on national issues and principles."¹⁶

During the remaining five years of Stephens' congressional career he held firm to the basic tenets of the compromise measures, the Georgia Platform, and the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. While the extremists of the South and the North threatened disunion during the Kansas crises of 1856 and 1858, and the Oregon controversy of 1859, Stephens continued to preach a moderate course rooted in the Constitution and designed to strengthen the Union. With these views he went to the podium on February 2, 1859 and delivered a passionate plea for justice even "though the heavens fall." Notwithstanding the fact that many of his colleagues from the South openly opposed the admission of Oregon because such action would inevitably increase the number of free states, Stephens was prepared to argue for it. Armed with facts which he had accumulated throughout the years, and convinced that "good ends never justify wrong means," he urged his auditors to forget their party loyalties and their locale. With his eyes upon his Southern friends he then observed: "Whenever any state comes and asks admission, as Oregon does, I am prepared to extend to her the hand of welcome, without looking into her constitution further

¹⁴ *Appendix to Congressional Globe*, 33rd Cong., 1st ses., p. 197.

¹⁵ In praising Stephens' role in the debates Nevins observes: "He was as much the dashing Marmion of the House contest as Douglas had been the Boabdil of the Senate" (Nevins, *loc. cit.*).

¹⁶ Stephens to W. W. Burwell, June 26, 1854. Phillips, *The Correspondence of Robert Toombs, Alexander H. Stephens, and Howell Cobb*, p. 346.

than to see that it is republican in form, upon our well-known American models."

In the closing moments of his address Stephens reminisced about the fifteen years he had spent in the House. During this eventful period, he pointed out, we added six states to the Union and twelve hundred thousand miles of territory. But this was only the beginning of what promised to be a future replete with glory and grandeur. Indeed, someday the nations "of the earth may look on in wonder at our career, and when they hear the noise of the wheels of our progress in achievement, in development, in expansion, in glory, and renown, it may well appear to them not unlike the noise of great waters; the very voice of the Almighty—Vox populi! Vox Dei!"¹⁷ With these words Stephens concluded his greatest congressional speech.¹⁸ A few months later he bade farewell to a Congress which he had come to love, and returned to Georgia as a private citizen.

But if Stephens no longer held an elective office, he was by no means removed from the political arena. As the heated presidential campaign began in earnest during the summer of 1860, he—unlike his colleagues who gravitated into the ranks of Breckinridge or Bell and Everett—announced his support for Douglas. A warm friendship between Stephens and Douglas developed throughout their cooperative action on the Kansas-Nebraska question in 1854. And these ties were strengthened in 1858 when Douglas, with little help from the Buchanan administration, defeated Lincoln in the senatorial contest in Illinois. This victory over the "abolition hosts," according to Stephens, was "unparalleled in the history of politics in

this country." Such a courageous leader, he argued, should have the support of the Georgia Democrats in the contest of 1860. Douglas was pleased to have an endorsement from the man whom he believed to be "one of the first intellects and purest patriots that this republic ever produced."¹⁹

Illness kept Stephens inactive throughout the early months of the presidential campaign. Not until September 1 did he deliver a political speech; it was his first public utterance since his retirement from Congress in July, 1859. Still feeble and weak from his lengthy sickness, he had to sit down in the middle of his address and rest a few minutes before continuing. But poor health did not prevent him from making two points with great emphasis. First, the secessionist movement in the South was a departure from the Georgia Platform, and from the long-established principles of the national Democratic party. Second, the Breckinridge-Lane ticket would serve only to increase the chances of Lincoln.²⁰

Stephens' next speech for Douglas was given in Dalton, Georgia, before a large audience. Again he had to rise from a sickbed to meet his appointment. Concerned that the nation would be destroyed if the South continued to follow a ruinous course toward secession, he spoke with prophetic Biblical language: "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, thou that killeth the prophets and stonest them which are sent unto thee, how often would I have gathered the children together, even as a hen gathering her chickens under her wings, and ye would not." As Stephens correctly prophesied the impending ruin which awaited the Union he was frequently interrupted by an unsympathetic audience which was in no mood to hear his counsels. These

¹⁷ *Appendix to Congressional Globe*, 35th Cong., 2nd ses., pp. 121-125.

¹⁸ Savage, p. 461.

¹⁹ *National Intelligencer*, September 12, 1860; Cleveland, p. 147.

²⁰ *National Intelligencer*, September 12, 1860.

interruptions, however, served only as a "fuel to light up the flame of his eloquence."²¹ Raising his thin hand toward heaven, he warned his people to prevent the calamities while they could.²²

Despite all that Stephens and other moderates in the South and North could do, Lincoln was elected. Although his popular vote was one million less than that of the combined opposition he received one hundred and eighty electoral votes—a majority of fifty-seven. As the news of victory reached the South the wheels of secession began to turn. On November 9, South Carolina, long the personification of ultra Southern Rights, passed a bill calling for a secession convention to be held in December. A few days later, on the evening of November 14, there was an air of frenzied excitement in the halls of the Georgia House of Representatives in Milledgeville. Most of the state senators and representatives—still under the hypnotic influence of the rousing Southern Rights speech of Toombs, delivered twenty-four hours before—talked freely of immediate secession. They had cheered Toombs' declaration that the Republican party, under Lincoln, would seek to destroy the institution of slavery. With equal fervor they had applauded his charge that no guarantee from such

a radical political party would be worth the parchment on which it was inscribed. All that remained for the legislators to do in the remaining sessions, therefore, was to work out some effective means of separating Georgia from a union which they had come to view as oppressive.

Against this background of uncontrolled emotion Stephens—long a personal friend of Toombs, and for years perhaps the most beloved political leader in Georgia—moved to the front of the hall to give his views on secession. The unusual appearance of the fifty year old speaker no longer shocked the audience. Through the years they had learned to accept his slender, fragile frame—which luckily had to carry but ninety-two pounds—his marked, careworn and "ghostlike features," his "broad forehead" and "consumptive look" as an inherent part of the man they called "Little Alex."²³ But if his appearance was that of one who was decaying too rapidly for his years, his brilliant intellect, broad knowledge, and nervous energy epitomized strength and virility, and made him a favorite with any audience. What he lacked in humor and literary grace he more than made up in directness, simplicity, and logical force. He was concise and pointed, often cutting through to the heart of a complex issue with amazing skill and rapidity. Not the least of his rhetorical virtues was his firm grasp of history and his

²¹ Alexander H. Stephens, *Recollections* (his diary kept when a prisoner at Fort Warren, Boston Harbour, 1865), ed. Myrta L. Avery (New York, 1910), pp. 218-219. See also Cleveland, p. 145.

²² Of another speech delivered by Stephens during the 1860 campaign, Cleveland (above), a contemporary biographer, observed: "His speech in Columbus, Georgia, was one of the grandest efforts of his life, and of most wonderful effect upon his audience. In the midst of his impressive appeal to 'Stand by the Constitution in any and every event,' the vast crowd arose to their feet, as one man; and while venerable ministers of the gospel, and dignified statesmen, and citizens seemed to vie with each other in enthusiasm, the prolonged shouts of applause stopped for awhile the utterance of the orator."

²³ For graphic descriptions of Stephens' unusual appearance, see Lincoln to Herndon, February 2, 1848, in *Works of Abraham Lincoln*, I, 448; Templeton, *loc. cit.*; Savage, p. 451; Henry Washington Hilliard, *Politics and Pen Pictures* (New York, 1892), p. 119; *New York Herald*, August 26, September 29, 1860; and *Richmond Semi-Weekly Enquirer*, March 19, 1861. Stephens' weight throughout his political career, according to reporters of the *Herald* and the *Enquirer*, varied from 84 to 100 pounds.

ready control of detail.²⁴ Nothing delighted him more than to impale an opponent on a little known or forgotten fact. In short, the range of his voice, the power of his intellect, and his courage presented a dramatic and fascinating contrast to his "bloodless, mummified" appearance.²⁵

Stephens began his remarks with a calm, logical plea which had so often characterized his speeches in Congress and on the hustings. "My object," said he, "is not to stir up strife, but to allay it; not to appeal to your passions, but to your reason. Good governments can never be built up or sustained by the impulse of passion. I wish to address myself to your good sense, to your good judgment, and if, after hearing, you disagree, let us agree to disagree, and part as we met, friends."

Stephens was now ready to turn to the question for which the legislators had journeyed to Milledgeville to find an answer. Does Lincoln's election require the people of the South to secede from the Union? "My countrymen," said he in a voice that was shrill, yet full and penetrating, "*I tell you frankly, candidly, and earnestly, that I do not think that they ought;*" for the "election of no man, constitutionally chosen to that high office, is sufficient cause for any state to separate from the Union." For those who

argued that Lincoln's policy and principles were against the Constitution, Stephens had these words: "Let us not anticipate a threatened evil." How can Lincoln, regardless of his spirit and intentions, put into practice those principles which might jeopardize our safety and security? Is it not true that a majority of the members of the House of Representatives and the Senate are opposed to him and the platform upon which he was elected? The hopes and aspirations of the South, he then added, can only be realized within the framework of a country which is the "Eden of the world, the paradise of the universe." And even if "our hopes are to be blasted, if the Republic is to go down let us be found to the last moment standing on the deck, with the Constitution of the United States waving over our heads."

Before concluding his address Stephens set forth a plan of action which he believed to be essential for Southern security. He urged renewed faith in the Georgia Platform which, largely through his ingenuity, had stemmed the tide of secession in the crucial year of 1850. More important, he reminded the Legislature that "it was not the proper body for severing our Federal Relations." Persuaded that the people alone were the sovereign rulers of the state, he called for a convention where the citizens could express their sentiments. And when they have done so, said Stephens, he would stand by their decision notwithstanding the fact that he might oppose it. It was his hope, however, that the people would vote to maintain the Union as it was.²⁶

²⁴ Even when arguing for a doomed social practice such as slavery, Stephen perhaps brought together the most convincing type of reasoning and evidence in its defense ever presented by a political leader in the South. The occasion was a congressional debate on Kansas in 1856, in which a group of Northern congressmen argued that slavery violates the laws of nations, the laws of nature, and the laws of God. At one point in the speech a Northern congressman, who doubted Stephens' Biblical citations, requested a page boy to bring him a Bible. Confident that his evidence was correct, Stephens remarked: "I have one here which the gentleman can consult if he wishes." *Appendix to Congressional Globe*, 34th Cong., 1st ses., p. 728.

²⁵ Nevins, *loc. cit.*

²⁶ Speech in opposition to secession, delivered November 14, 1860. The text appears in three places: *Augusta Chronicle and Sentinel*, November 25, 1860; *Speech of the Hon. A. H. Stephens, delivered in the Hall of the House of Representatives of Georgia*, November 14, 1860 (Augusta, 1860); Pamphlet No. 36, New York Publication Society, 1865.

When the speech had ended, Toombs, despite the fact that he had interrupted his great opponent numerous times, arose and said: "Fellow Citizens, we have just listened to a speech from one of the brightest intellects and purest patriots that now lives. I move that this meeting adjourn, with three cheers for Alexander H. Stephens."²⁷

Few speeches in the ante-bellum period made a deeper impression upon the country as a whole. Although it was entirely extemporaneous—as were all but two of Stephens' political addresses²⁸—it appeared in full in many of the newspapers on both sides of the Mason and Dixon Line. From all parts of the country Stephens received letters, including a note from George Ticknor Curtis and a printed testimonial of thanks from a group of Philadelphians.²⁹ Most important of all, Lincoln, who had read the speech in the newspapers, wrote his old congressional friend: "If you have revised it, as is probable, I

shall be much obliged if you will send me a copy."³⁰

Stephens' dramatic speech of November 14 unhappily brought to an end his role as spokesman for the Union. When the people of Georgia voted for secession in February he reluctantly gave his support to a movement which he had opposed for more than a decade. In doing so he felt secure in the belief that as a responsible citizen he must share the common destiny of his native state of Georgia. He served as Vice President of the Confederate States of America. At the end of the war, in 1865, he was incarcerated from May to October at Fort Warren, Boston Harbour. In his cell he found little solace in knowing that he had accurately predicted the tragic outcome of secession. But he did take comfort in the fact that he had used his remarkable rhetorical talents to speak for the Union during a crucial period in American history.³¹

³⁰ Lincoln to Stephens, November 30, 1860, *Some Lincoln Correspondence with Southern Leaders before the Outbreak of the Civil War*, 1909, Judd Stewart Collection, Henry E. Huntington Library. Also see *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln*, IV, 146. In view of this reaction it is not surprising that Republican leaders seriously considered Stephens as a possible member of Lincoln's cabinet (see *Works*, p. 155).

³¹ See Stephens, *Recollections*, pp. 115, 130, 147-148, 189, 219, 328.

²⁷ Cleveland, p. 149.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 150. On one occasion Stephens observed: "I never wrote a speech to be delivered in my life, except college essays or addresses. The union speech was extemporaneous" (*Recollections*, p. 328).

²⁹ Rudolph Abele, *Alexander H. Stephens* (New York, 1946), p. 185.

THE "UNPOPULAR THEATRE" OF W. B. YEATS

August W. Staub

TO read or produce a Noh play by William Butler Yeats is both an exciting and discouraging experience—exciting because some of the great modern poet's finest lines are to be found in his Noh dramas, discouraging because with all their fine verse the plays remain something less than satisfying. No one, for instance, can fail to be impressed by the beauty of the opening lines of *Calvary*:

Motionless under the moon-beam,
Up to his feathers in the stream;
Although fish leap, the white heron
Shivers in a dumbfounded dream.

Taken within the context of the play itself, however, these verses must be considered with the remainder of the play as far from successful. Indeed, as a group, the Noh plays—intended by Yeats to be the crowning achievement of his dramatic efforts—are decided failures. In terms of Western drama, they are undramatic; in terms of theatre, they are hardly stageable in the manner which the author wishes; in terms of influence, they have had little effect on contemporary dramaturgy. And yet, these plays were written with the expressed intention of supplying the modern stage with a new tradition, a tradition designed to enable poets to recapture their ancient and honored place in the theatre. This is an intention to be applauded. Still, it must be granted that in a theatre of prose realism, Yeats's goal of recapturing the stage for poetry was certainly one almost impossible to attain. On the other

hand, Yeats's talent was clearly equal to the task. In fact, it is precisely because the task and the talent were so commensurate that one is led to wonder why and how Yeats failed?

It would be simple, of course, to dismiss the whole matter by saying that Yeats was interested only in poetry, that it was of little concern to him whether his works were stage plays or closet dramas. Nothing could be further from the truth. Like Henry James, Yeats burned with a desire to be a successful playwright. On one occasion the poet was to cry out: "I need a theatre; I believe myself to be a dramatist; I desire to show events and not merely to tell them."¹ Yeats was, in fact, always a man of the theatre, not a "literary dramatist," as Eric Bentley has observed:

For all his remarks against closet drama, Eliot has remained to a large extent a "literary dramatist" in the vulgar sense. Yeats has not. . . . With the turn of the century and the establishment of the Abbey Theatre, we find Yeats thinking out his plays in theatrical terms. . . . It is not only that he wants the setting subordinated to the actor, it is that he never writes for the stage without knowing what he wants in visual terms. The "literary dramatist" sees the characters in his mind's eye moving about in their natural setting. The genuine playwright sees them in the highly unnatural setting of the stage.²

Not only did Yeats write for the theatre with a trained eye and a passionate heart, but also—and more important—

¹ Lennox Robinson, "The Man and the Dramatist," *Scattering Branches* (New York, 1940), p. 105.

² James Hall and Martin Steinmann, eds., *The Permanence of Yeats* (New York, 1950), pp. 239-240.

his love for the theatre was deep and abiding, no mere passing infatuation. The great amount of effort the poet expended in writing in and about the theatre serves as proof of his high regard for the art. It was no secondary art; it was to him the one medium in which the vigorous poet should write:

There are two kinds of poetry, and they commingle in all the greatest works. When the tide of life sinks low there are pictures, as in the "Ode on a Grecian Urn" and in Virgil at the plucking of the Golden Bough. The pictures make us sorrowful. . . . It is life in a mirror, and our desire for it is as the desire of the lost souls for God; but when Lucifer stands among his friends, when Villon sings his dead ladies to so gallant a rhythm . . . we feel no sorrow for life herself has made one of her eternal gestures, has called into our hearts her energy that is eternal delight. In Ireland, where the tide of life is rising, we turn not to picture-making but to the imagination of the personality—to drama, gesture.³

Or again, he was to say:

What attracts me to drama is that it is, in the most obvious way, what all arts are upon last analysis. A farce and a tragedy are alike in this, that they are a moment of intense life. . . . The characters that are involved in it are freed from everything that is not part of the action; and whether it is, as in less important kinds of drama, a mere bodily activity, a hairbreadth escape or the like, or as it is in the more important kinds, an activity of the souls of the characters, it is an eddy of life purified from everything but itself.⁴

Another possible answer to our original question about Yeats's failure can be found in the accusation that Yeats tended to write "Irish" drama rather than universal drama. There is some truth in this charge, but in the final analysis Yeats's dramas are no more Irish than Shakespeare's histories are English. Although both poets, quite naturally, write of the ways and mores they know

best, they are in essence far more interested in men than in nationalities. Yeats was a patriot, but he was too good an artist to be a propagandist. Writing in reply to a statement that Synge's slandering of the virtues of Irish womanhood disqualifies *Playboy of the Western World* as good Irish drama, Yeats says of Synge's critics:

They are preoccupied with the nation's future, with heroes, soldiers, painters, armies, fleets, but only as these things are understood by a child in the National school, while a secret feeling that what is so unreal needs continual defense makes them bitter and restless. They are like some state which has only paper money, and seeks by punishments to make it buy whatever gold can buy.⁵

On the basis of his own testimony, then, it can be concluded that Yeats's inability to construct significant poetic drama is neither the result of his lack of talent, nor of his disdain for the theatre, nor of any fixation with propaganda literature. Therefore, to answer the question as to why Yeats failed in the theatre, it is necessary to go beyond the basic prejudices and talents of the poet and to look at the broader constituents of all poetic drama.

To create great poetic theatre, three principal elements, among many others, are necessary: a talented poet who wishes to write plays; a theatre in which he may perfect his craft; and a group of contemporaries and predecessors who set a high standard of excellence. Thus, England had Shakespeare, The Globe, and a host of fine playwrights led by Marlowe and Jonson. Modern Ireland, on the other hand, had Yeats, and The Abbey, but it had little to offer in the way of exciting contemporary drama. Yeats was thus forced to search out his models elsewhere. The results of this search proved to be his undoing, for his lack of the-

³ William Butler Yeats, *Plays and Controversies* (New York, 1924), p. 115.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

⁵ William Butler Yeats, *Essays* (New York, 1924), p. 388.

atrical success seems in great measure to be directly attributable to those people who shaped his dramatic theories, and to his own stubborn refusal, in spite of repeated failures, to revise his approach to the stage.

According to Yeats, his first and earliest influence came from Shelley. As far as the Irish poet's dramatic writing is concerned, however, Shelley's influence seems to have been minor and can, therefore, be dismissed—not, however, before noting that Shelley's plays are rather poor models for any young dramatist. Of much greater importance was the influence exerted by the Belgian poet and playwright, Maurice Maeterlinck. Although their names are not often paired, Yeats, like a great many other playwrights of his generation, was aware, very much aware of the works and theories of Maeterlinck.⁸ As early as 1896, Yeats was quoting Maeterlinck's dramatic theories in an essay entitled "The Return of Ulysses." Yeats was ultimately to declare his intention to accept the dramatic methods and beliefs of the Belgian dramatist. In 1906 Yeats cried out:

There are two ways before literature—upward into ever-growing subtlety, with Verhaeren, with Mallarmé, with Maeterlinck, until at last, it may be a new agreement among refined and studious men gives birth to a new passion, and what seems literature becomes religion; or downward, taking the soul with us until all is simplified and solidified again. That is the choice of choices—the way of the bird until common eyes have lost us, or to the market carts. . . .⁷

There is no need to develop here the "ever-growing subtlety" of Maeterlinck. To us as to Yeats it was encompassed in the phrase "static drama," which as John Gassner points out, was based on the be-

lief that drama should deal with the "ultimate reality of the soul rather than with transparent physical reality. For this purpose, moreover, action was to be supplanted by states of feeling. . . . Conflict was unnecessary in drama, and there was no need for showing us the human will constantly engaged in battle."⁸

In brief, the characters in Maeterlinck's static dramas are not flesh and blood, but pure and tranquil spirits, conflictless souls on which the dramatist, as it were, has traced one or two super-refined and exquisite emotions. In such plays as *The Intruder* and *The Blind* what we witness is the gentle fluttering of souls, not the clashing interaction of characters. This theory of static drama was to form the very core of Yeats's dramatic philosophy.

Almost as influential as Maeterlinck was the English stage director and designer Gordon Craig. Moreover, Craig's influence was the strongest where Craig's beliefs dovetailed with and reinforced those of Maeterlinck. Yeats had been a long-time admirer of Craig. As early as 1901 he was moved to remark that Craig's settings for the Purcell Society's production of *Dido and Aeneas* were "the first beautiful scenery our stage has seen."⁹ From this time on, whenever Yeats speaks at length of his own theatrical beliefs, he almost always refers to those of Craig.¹⁰ When Craig began designing sets for the Abbey Theatre, his influence over Yeats seems to have increased considerably. Just how profoundly Craig shaped Yeats's approach to the theatre may be surmised from the following note on Yeats's *Deirdre*, taken from the poet's 1911 work, *Plays for an*

⁸ John Gassner, *A Treasury of the Theatre* (New York, 1951), II, 264-265.

⁹ *Essays*, p. 123.

¹⁰ See, for example, *Plays and Controversies*, p. 135.

⁶ See, for example, *Essays*, pp. 244-245; 266-267; especially 413-414.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 330.

Irish Theatre, a book which was illustrated by Gordon Craig:

Deirdre, like the other plays in this book, has been altered many times after performance, till at last I had come to think I had put all my knowledge into it and could not, apart from the always incalculable pleasure good playing brings, look for greater pleasure than it had already given me. But now because of Mr. Craig's scene which is fitted to so many moods and actions, and makes possible natural and expressive light and shade, I have begun to alter it again and to find in this a new excitement.¹¹

Probably Craig's major contribution to the Yeatsian theatrical canon was an idealistic and somewhat adolescent approach to the theatre, an approach which brushed aside all the practical limitations of the medium. Together with a general tendency towards impracticality, Craig seems also to have passed on to Yeats such ideas as the use of suggestive scenery and movement, the regarding of the actor as an inferior artist who was to be confined to symbolic gesture, hidden behind a mask, or replaced by some kind of super-marionette, and finally, and most important, the envisioning of the drama as a religion, the stage as "not only a place to show facts in a material way, but also *the* place to show the whole world of fancy, and in a spiritual way."

Yeats, then, was to construct his dramatic philosophy on ideas borrowed from Maeterlinck and Craig, both of whom can be considered, despite their widespread influence, more as visionaries than as constructive theorists. Still, visionaries can be immensely useful, if one is able to separate from their frantic maze of ideas and ideals a few sound principles. This Yeats seemed unable to do.

Scattered throughout the writings of the Irish poet are innumerable references

to the theatre, but the essence of his beliefs is found in two short essays—"The Reform of the Theatre,"¹² and "The Play, the Player, and the Scene."¹³ In the first of these essays, Yeats makes four points. First, "we have to write or find plays that make the theatre a place of intellectual excitement." Second, "we must make speech even more important than gesture." Third, "we must simplify acting, especially in poetic drama. . . . We must get rid of everything that is restless, everything that draws attention away from the sound of the voice, or from the few moments of intense expression, whether that expression is through the voice or through the hands; we must from time to time substitute for the movements that the eye sees the nobler movements that the heart sees, the rhythmical movements that seem to flow into the heart from some deeper life than that of the individual soul." Fourth, "it is necessary to simplify both the form and color of scenery and costume. As a rule the background should be but a single color, so that persons in the play, wherever they stand, may harmonize with it."

It might be easier to discuss what Yeats meant by a "place of intellectual excitement" if his latter three concepts are disposed of first. As is obvious, these principles come directly from Craig. In "The Play, the Player, and the Scene," Yeats treats them at some length. Consider the following:

That we may throw more emphasis on the words in poetic drama, above all where the words are remote from real life as well as in themselves exacting and difficult, the actors must move, for the most part, slowly and quietly, and not very much, and there must be something in their movements decorative and rhythmical as if they were paintings on a frieze. . . . Then, too, one must be content to have long quiet moments, long grey stretches, long

¹¹ William Butler Yeats, *Plays for an Irish Theatre* (London, 1911), p. 217.

¹² *Plays and Controversies*, pp. 48-53.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 116-137.

level reaches, as it were—the leisure that is in all fine life.

The background should be of as little importance as the background of a portrait-group, and it should, when possible, be of one color or tint. . . . Their [the flats] outline should be clear and not broken into windows and wainscoating, or lost into the edges of colors.

The inherent fallacies in the above ideas are easily discernible. The lines of a poetic drama are important, and a good play is a good play even when produced on a bare stage. But there is nothing innately evil in a stage setting, and when it functions properly it makes a good play better. There certainly is a need to eliminate the set which sins against the play, but it is difficult to accept Yeats's monochromatic and negative scenery as an adequate solution to the problem.

It is, however, easier to accept Yeatsian scenic theories than it is to grant any degree of validity to his vision of the actor. Most would be glad to join with Yeats in deploring the fact that realism and naturalism (and at present "the method") have robbed our actors of much of their ability to read verse, but to see reading as the basic function of acting and to strive to emphasize speech over gesture is to misunderstand the very essence of theatre. The art of theatre is a physical art, and this is the secret of its ability to synthesize. The visual and literary arts are not simply juxtaposed; they are fused in the physical presence of the actor, the living, *doing* being, and the living and the doing, by Yeats's own admission, are best expressed in gesture, movement. Anyone with a real regard for the theatre would rather see flesh and blood actors reading verse badly than watch super-puppets go through a series of living statuary poses to the accompaniment of well-read verse. Yeats's long grey stretches and movements that the heart not the eye sees are

all very well for the reader, for if he is bored he can skip over them or put them aside until a more sympathetic mood strikes him, but an audience is a different matter. If they are bored and polite, they will probably suffer through the evening; if they are bored and impolite, they will probably leave. In either case, they won't come back. Whatever Yeats's long grey stretches are, they are untheatrical. They are neither sight, sound, nor movement, and thus they have little or nothing to do with either the art of acting or the art of writing plays for actors.

As theatrically naive as Yeatsian thoughts on acting and scenery appear, they stand as sound and solid principles when compared to his idea of the play itself. The Irish poet's phrase "intellectually exciting," a restating of Maeterlinck's term "static drama," is inexact to say the least. Like Maeterlinck, Yeats's approach to drama is essentially anti-intellectual, for in place of a drama of ideas, he advocated an art of subtle subjective emotion and spirituality. The concept of character in the Aristotelian sense—that is, character revealed as an individual exercising his mind and will, amid a storm of basic emotions, in the making of moral decisions—was discarded by Yeats in favor of a drama of exquisite and usually obscure emotion—emotion as delicate, as intense, as super-refined as the flutter of an eyelash. Rational communication was of little or no import. As he says of one of his Noh plays, "I recommend *The Cat and the Moon*, for no audience could discover its dark, mythical secrets."¹⁴ Moreover, for Yeats there was to be little dramatic progression in the script, and the rhythm of the play was to be a reflection of a high and quiet spiritual plateau divorced from space and time:

¹⁴ William Butler Yeats, *Wheels and Butterflies* (New York, 1935), p. 121.

Yet when we go back a few centuries and enter the great period of drama, character grows less and sometimes disappears, and there is much lyric feeling, and at times a lyric measure will be wrought into the dialogue. . . . Suddenly it strikes us that character is continuously present in comedy alone, and that there is much tragedy, that of Corneille, that of Racine, that of Greece and Rome, where its place is taken by passions and motives. . . . In writers of tragi-comedy (and Shakespeare is always a writer of tragi-comedy) there is indeed character, but we notice that it is in the moments of comedy that character is defined, in Hamlet's gaiety, let us say . . . mainly in tragic art one distinguishes devices to exclude or lessen character, to diminish the power of that daily mood, to cheat or blind its too clear perception. If the real world is not altogether rejected, it is but touched here and there, and into the places we have left empty we summon rhythm, balance, pattern, images that remind us of vast passions, the vagueness of past times, all the chimera that haunt the edge of trance. . . .¹⁵

The drama that Yeats longed to write is perhaps best described in the following statement:

I desire a mysterious art, always reminding and half reminding those who understand it of dearly loved things, doing its work by suggestion, not by direct statement, a complexity of rhythm, colour, gesture, not space-pervading like the intellect but a memory and a prophecy: a mode of drama Shelley and Keats could have used without ceasing to be themselves, and for which even Blake in the mood of the *Book of Thel* might not have been too obscure. . . .¹⁶

The theatre, then, that Yeats envisioned, was as completely as possible in opposition to all forms of Western drama. Its plays were to be "static" in the Maeterlinckian sense, and they were to be devoid of the three essentials of Western theatre since the time of the Greeks—character, primitive emotion, and probability. The actors were to be ahuman to the point of immobility, and

the stage setting was to be composed of expanses of unbroken flats painted in a single color and washed in bright, white light.

In Yeats we find a man, tending to be radical and somewhat impractical in all his thinking, basing his dramatic philosophy on theories gleaned from two equally impractical idealists, Craig and Maeterlinck. In the very disciplined and technical art of writing and producing plays, all this uncontrolled idealism was bound to come to no good end, especially when we consider another aspect of Yeats's personality, his stubbornness.

Yeats's plays, even the less obscure ones, were never successes, and Yeats was aware of this. Much as we would like to think of the great poet as the playwright around which the Abbey company revolved as did the Globe company around Shakespeare, it was the plays of Synge, Lady Gregory, and the folk dramatists that formed the successful impetus of the so-called Irish dramatic renaissance. Yeats realized this, and he wrote to Lady Gregory: "We have been the first to create a true 'People's Theatre,' and we have succeeded. . . . Yet we did not set out to create this sort of theatre and its success has been a discouragement and a defeat to me."¹⁷ And yet, instead of making an attempt to alter his approach to the theatre, if only to learn through the experiment, Yeats continued to write along the lines he had first devised. When he met with more failures, he blamed the audience.

It is, of course, an easy matter to point one's finger at the audience, and there are many times when the audience's banality is the cause of a play's failure. But sooner or later every playwright must reconcile himself to the fact that a play is not a play without an audience, unless, of course, the work is intended

¹⁵ *Essays*, p. 297 f.

¹⁶ *Plays and Controversies*, p. 213.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 206.

only as closet drama. As has already been demonstrated, Yeats had no desire to write closet drama, and yet he was too stubborn to acknowledge that in drama as in poetry certain limitations are native to the medium, and the artist must make concessions accordingly.

Thus at the end of his first decade's work with the Abbey, Yeats remained a disappointed and discouraged playwright searching for a form which would satisfy his theatrical ideals. It was at this time that the fourth and perhaps most pernicious outside influence made itself felt: Yeats's sometime secretary, Ezra Pound, began to take an active part in the Irish poet's theatrical career, and, indirectly, probably ruined forever the playwright's chances of becoming a major dramatic poet.

Pound had been commissioned by the widow of Ernest Fenollosa to edit her husband's translations of Japanese Noh dramas. This was the sort of work that Pound could do well, and the translations turned out to be pretty fair literature. Yeats was enchanted with them. When the work was finished, he had the plays published by his sister's press, and contributed an introductory essay to the book. In this essay, "Certain Noble Plays of Japan," dated April, 1916, Yeats praises the Noh as an ideal form, indicates his debt to Pound for having introduced him to a new dramatic genre, and declares that henceforth he will attempt to introduce the Noh into Western theatre:

In fact with the help of Japanese plays "translated by Ernest Fenollosa and finished by Ezra Pound," I have invented a form of drama, distinguished, indirect, and symbolic, having no need of mob or press to pay its way—an aristocratic form.¹⁸

Considering Yeats's theories, it is not surprising that he so quickly embraced

the Noh structure. The aristocratic drama of Japan with its sense of religious ritual, its orientation towards a small and carefully educated audience, its use of extremely stylized scenery, costumes and acting, and its emphasis on super-subtle, exquisite emotion filled all of Yeats's requirements for a dramatic medium. Moreover, if he had any misgivings about devoting his considerable talents to the Noh, these must have been immediately dispelled by Pound, who, so often ready to decide what other artists should do, had already determined that Yeats should be a Noh playwright. In his introduction to the Fenollosa volume, Pound states:

It is a theatre of which both Mr. Yeats and Mr. Craig may approve. It is not like our theatre, a place where every fineness and subtlety must give way; where every fineness of word and word-cadence is sacrificed to the broad effect; where paint must be put on with a broom. It is a stage . . . where the poet may be silent while the gestures concentrated by four centuries of usage show the meaning.¹⁹

Going beyond recommending the Noh to Yeats, Pound, who had never been on stage before, actually consented to read lines during the rehearsals of Yeats's Noh dramas.²⁰ Pound became the last major influence on Yeats the playwright, and he may well have been the one who irrevocably cut Yeats off from any opportunity to achieve greatness in the theatre.

Perhaps Yeats can be excused on the grounds that he was seeking an ideal, searching out a better theatre. This, of course, is true, but if we excuse him, we must also dismiss him; Yeats's theatrical ideals virtually began and ended with him, and so are of little significance. Yeats cannot be dismissed because he was a great poet attempting to write

¹⁸ William Butler Yeats, *The Cutting of an Agate* (London, 1919), p. 2.

¹⁹ Ezra Pound and Ernest Fenollosa, *Noh* (New York, 1917), p. 6.

²⁰ *Plays and Controversies*, p. 214.

living drama, and he cannot be excused because he was guilty of withholding from our century his gift for dramatic poetry by failing to make an effort to understand the medium in which he worked. Behind this lack of comprehension lay two fundamental errors: one, a failure to realize that Western drama is concerned with characters who are beset by such basic drives as love, hate and greed, and who are engaged in exercising their wills in the making of moral decisions; and, two, a failure to understand that there is a difference between drama and religious ritual.

In the beginning the Greek theatre, like the Japanese Noh theatre, was based on religious ritual, but the Greek shed its primitive form and became universal and enduring because it managed to gain a certain amount of freedom from religious patterns. This was never true of the Noh. It never attained a secular level. Indeed, it looked with disdain on the Kabuki. It remained for five centuries a religious device much like the Catholic Mass, and, as in the Mass, there was no need to create a drama for the audience. The audience was created for the drama.

Yeats sensed something of this phenomenon, but he refused to face up to it, and he talks instead of writing for an "unpopular theatre":

I want to create for myself an unpopular theatre and an audience like a secret society where admission is by favor and never to very many. . . . I want so much—an audience of fifty, a room worthy of it (some great dining or drawing room), half-a-dozen young men and women who can dance and speak verse or play drum and flute and zither, and all the while, instead of a profession, I but offer them an accomplishment.²¹

It is easy to acknowledge Yeats's dream as a beautiful ideal, but such acknowl-

edgment does not remove the ideal's major shortcoming: the Yeatsian unpopular theatre does not take into consideration the possibility that most sensitive Westerners go to the theatre for art not religion. There is in the West no ready-made audience for a secret, ritualized theatre, and occidental worshippers are usually more comfortable in a church or a secluded retreat than in a playhouse, even a playhouse disguised as a great dining or drawing room. Yeats's refusal to accept this situation constitutes a major literary tragedy.

To view the work of Yeats the dramatist is indeed discouraging—so much beautiful poetry in such unsatisfactory plays. There is such a sense of great things lost. Ireland had its major poet, and that poet had a theatre in which he could perfect his playcraft. But in the end, Yeats rejected his theatre as it existed and wrote solely for a theatre which could be realized only in his dreams. It is likely that he did this because he was unlucky enough not to have models and contemporaries on which he could draw in the same fruitful manner as Shakespeare, Racine, and Sophocles drew on theirs. Good poetic dramatists were not common in Yeats's generation, and thus he was forced to turn to such radicals as Maeterlinck and Craig for his basic dramatic philosophy. In all probability this philosophy was the prime cause of his failure as a playwright, for his borrowed ideas were unsound enough to reject the very basis of Western drama, the conflict of the human will, and the struggle amid raw emotions to reach a moral decision.

When his audiences reacted unfavorably to his "static dramas," Yeats accused them of insensitivity, and he began to long for a dramatic form which would not demand a large and varied audience. The period of longing, just

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 214.

before the writing of the Noh plays, might well be considered the crucial time in the poet's theatrical career. If it had not been for Pound and his Fenollosa translations, Yeats at this time might have made his peace with his medium and have gone on to significant contributions to Western dramatic literature. Pound, however, introduced Yeats to the Noh play, and the poet knew that he had discovered his unpopular theatre. So snugly did the Noh fit into his dramatic thinking that it must have seemed to Yeats to have been a direct gift from his cherished spirit world. It was Pound, then, who gave Yeats the final push into failure.

However, all the blame should not be placed on Yeats's contemporaries. The man is as guilty as those who influenced him, for he displays an amazing reluctance to think logically in terms of theatre. If he had been a less intelligent man, or if he had been equally guilty of sloppy art in his poetry, he might be pardoned. But he was intelligent, and he

was a clear-thinking poetic craftsman, and, therefore, he must accept the blame for being either too stubborn or too lazy to develop competence in drama.

Of course, there is no reason for a good poet to be a playwright, but there is every reason for a good poet to be a good dramatist when he believes himself to be one. If Yeats could not write satisfactory plays, then it might have been better if he had followed the example of Henry James and ceased to write plays at all, for his dramas have set a poor example for young poets to follow. If there is one lesson that young poets can draw from Yeats, it is that drama is an art which, like every other art, must be met on its own terms, not on the terms of the artist. The test of a great artist is how well he works within the limitations of his art, not how violently he rebels against them. T. S. Eliot has remarked that in the Noh play Yeats discovered his perfect form. If there is a perfect form for failure, we cannot help but agree with him.

INTERIM SYMBOLS IN THEATRICAL ART

Willard F. Bellman

THE dramatic script is an unusual form of art; it is an art work for artists instead of audiences. Of course, there are many good play-scripts that have literary merit, an aesthetic excellence different from that of the produced play, but the main purpose of the dramatic script is to guide, inspire, and control the production of a play. One should not assume that the script is some sort of recipe for the production of a play; this is the sin of the hack, "reading the book." The purpose which the script fulfills is devious and often frustrating. A script is a subtle combination of indirect communication, literary devices and prose stage directions, all intended to guide a team of artists in the production of a play. In at least one sense, the script is an incomplete art work. It wants interpreters, and they must interpret, not merely "give voice," if the art work is to become complete. Artistic communication is complex enough when attempted by one artist, as for example, a pianist playing a sonata. It is vastly more complex when attempted by a team of artists, the theatre production staff. For example, a production team may be producing *Macbeth*. The director and the designer are engaged in a deep but seemingly unintelligible discussion of a drawing lying on the table before them. The drawing crudely depicts several characters obviously from *Macbeth* in a vague exterior setting. But over this vague scene is a transparent view

of three hugely distorted, enormously evil witches' faces.

Later, in the theatre on opening night, we look for this scene. It does not appear, nor does anything remotely like it. The production is tightly woven about the enormous evil that encompasses *Macbeth*, but there are no translucent witches anywhere to be seen. What has happened? Was the idea merely discarded after much controversy although the play seemed to achieve its powerful cohesiveness from something related to the sketch? What, if anything, was the effect of this discussion in terms of a drawing which apparently disappeared from the production before the curtain went up?

It is possible that the drawing was one of the many symbolic devices used by theatrical artists to accomplish the almost paradoxical teamwork of artists that results in a successful production. Since these devices usually vanish without any direct trace evident in the production, and since they are symbolic rather than discursive in nature, they may be termed *interim symbols*. In order to explain interim symbols, it is necessary to trace the symbolic nature of artistic communication in general and the special communication problems which face the theatre artists as they try to work together.

ART AS A SYMBOL-MAKING ACTIVITY

One modern way of explaining artistic communication is to study artistic activities as symbol-making activities, i.e. activities in which the mind of the artist

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creates from raw sensory data or out of other simpler symbols, linguistic, visual, auditory and other devices which "stand for the idea of" some complex of thought and emotion which is otherwise inexpressible. While not all symbol making results in art, it may be reasonably argued that all art is the result of symbol making.

To explain the vast communicative power of a symbolic device, it is necessary to examine a modern concept of the way we think. Susanne Langer, who has examined the murky areas of non-discursive thought as deeply as anyone, feels that the human brain is essentially an organ whose function is symbolic transformation (see her *Philosophy in a New Key*). The brain receives raw sensory data and makes abstractions from it by transforming sensory stimuli, e.g., "heat" from the nerves in the hand near the stove, into the symbolic abstraction, "hot stove." Only when this transformation has taken place can the brain think about what it might do with a "hot stove," e.g., cook on it. If the sense of this concept of human thought is acceptable, it follows that as reactions to sensory data become more complex and more sophisticated, the necessity to use symbols to "think about" them is even stronger. The vast complexity of artistic symbols reflects both the complexity and power of artistic content.

SPECIAL COMMUNICATION PROBLEMS IN THE THEATRE

Whatever the organization of the production staff may be, its artistic obligation is to the script. Each staff member must assimilate the script, making a symbolic transformation from it to his own understanding, and then help to re-symbolize the script as the produced play. As the producing artists do this,

they create a new symbol more complex, more powerful, and more meaningful than the script. Study of the play and the early stages of symbolization which result in symbolic transformation (the process by which each artist makes abstractions from the script) are strictly individual activities. There is no escaping the fact that the interaction between an art work and an individual is a personal affair. At this stage, no amount of group effort will help. The director, the designer, the costumer, and all other members of the production team start alone; it is only after they have symbolized the script for themselves in their efforts to make abstractions from it, that the unique teamwork of the theatre comes into play.

Unlike a violinist preparing a concerto, who would not perform after a few readings of the score, the theatrical artists are under immediate compulsion to express the results of their studies to others. The expression must be immediate and relatively effective if the work is to proceed. One of the results of this need for expression is the development of interim symbols, those symbolic devices created by the members of a theatre production team for the sole purpose of expressing the still nebulous and tentative concept of the artistic content of the script to one another. Interim symbols may be either verbal or non-verbal; they may be catch phrases, bits of pantomime, drawings, roughly modeled lumps of clay, lines from a play, or anything else that serves the purpose at hand. Usually they seem to be based on an analogy with some facet of the script, but "symbol" seems to be the only word broad enough to cover all the possibilities. Interim symbols are purely functional; they exist only for the purposes of the production

group and need not appear in the finished play, although they do sometimes evolve into something which does appear before the audience.

Interim symbols originate and function much like any other symbol. They begin with the selection of some bit of sensory data which seems to bear an analogical relationship with that which needs expression. This relationship becomes immediate: the artist feels he has hit upon a device which "means" the play to him. He has a "This is the play!" feeling about the symbol. This attitude on the part of the artist means that his symbol has grown from a referent for some bit of the play to one which carries the whole freight of idea and emotion which he has garnered from the script. In this growth the analogical relationship may be minimized or even lost; it makes little difference, because the artist has no intention of using the symbol literally, anyway.

The next step is crucial. The artist who originated the symbol attempts to use it as a device to communicate with others. Until now, it has served only its originator, but if it works for others it will grow by leaps and bounds. The moment an artist's interim symbol becomes effective as a device for getting someone else to even partially "think about" the play as he sees it, that artist feels he has a powerful communicative device. His self-conscious shorthand notion that "My production of *Hamlet* is to reflect the quandary of a man born one hundred years too soon," suddenly takes on new meaning. As the two artists find they are able to relate their concepts of *Hamlet*, for example, the symbol will grow rapidly as each augments the other's ideas and the interchange of ideas spurs insights.

It seems to be a characteristic of

artistic symbols that they either continue to grow with each use or wither away into uselessness by becoming mere repetitions of the obvious. This is usually the case with interim symbols. If the limits of the expression of a given interim symbol are reached when two persons find it useful, it will not serve the production staff for long. If, however, as the result of its success for two artists it now carries a still larger freight of ideas and emotion, and if it manages to communicate this to still other artists on the staff, it becomes a full-fledged interim symbol. It will serve a powerful purpose in the difficult task of getting artists' minds to meet and will contribute much to the eventual unity of the production. Unfortunately, things do not always move so easily and rapidly. Fusion of ideas through the interim symbol may come so slowly that the actual production becomes the fusing medium instead of the symbol. In this case the artists know all too well what they wanted to produce—just after the curtain is down!

Fortunately for the theatre, it is possible for a number of partially successful interim symbols to serve to much the same effect as one "perfect" one. Thus symbol "A" may serve the director and actors while symbol "B" is serving the several designers. Each symbol may be an enigma to the opposite group and only symbol "C" will serve to bring them together. This puts the director in the unenviable position of "translator" but it can produce productions.

While a successful interim symbol is a powerful unifying device, its value does not end there. In the hands of a skillful director, interim symbols are valuable as motivating devices and as communicating agents. The reasons are quite clear. Artistic inspiration, whatever its nature, is almost never the

result of outside force. Force may get the play on the boards, but it will not make it a work of art. The purpose of the script is to guide, inspire, and control. The director, as head artist, is at the very center of this triple effect and his success will depend largely on the degree of inspiration that can be generated. For example, a director may control the characterization in a part, but it is next to impossible for him to create characterization; that is the province of the actor. And the actor needs inspiration; he needs to be motivated to greater artistic efforts. The director cannot compel this, nor can he spell it out. His best device is the symbolic mode—the use of interim symbols. If he is aware of their effectiveness and can avoid their pitfalls, and if he is skillful at the linguistic art of making them grow with each use, he has a powerful device for inspiring and eventually guiding his team of artists.

The effectiveness of the interim symbol as a motivating device lies in its combination of vividness and incompleteness. It presents problems, not solutions, and thus calls for development on the part of the artist to whom it is directed. It is a clear cut invitation to create, not a half solution to a problem not yet stated. For example, the director and the designer may be trying to reach a meeting of minds concerning the appearance of the pre-battle scene in *Henry V*. The director says, perhaps almost to himself, "I want something like Millet's *Angelus*!" If the designer and director find that this interim symbol speaks the same language for both of them, they have the makings of a much clearer, more fruitful discussion of the proposed staging of the scene. Each will seek to clarify the analogous relationship between the painting and the scene and build the symbol to still

greater effectiveness. As they cooperate in this, the non-discursive content of the symbol becomes clearer and greater to both and the artistic nature of the staging problem becomes more and more vivid, more and more demanding of a solution.

The director will have done three things: (1) he has clarified his notions about the nature of the scene in a way that words could never do if used discursively; (2) he has reconciled his ideas of the scene with those of the designer; and (3) he has provided the strongest possible motivation to the designer to express these artistic matters in terms of stage design.

This is the limit of a discussion of the positive aspects of a specific interim symbol; if it were possible to detail the benefits derived from a successful use of this interim symbol, the symbol would not be needed at all. However the risks of error are more amenable to discussion; an unsophisticated designer might rush off to the art section of the library in search of a reproduction of the *Angelus* so that he might copy it for a backdrop. But if the director was using his statement as an interim symbol, our designer is wasting his time. He needs to look at the painting, to be sure, but not to make a stage copy. Probably the director had no such visual effect in mind at all. He was not even thinking of visual effects; he was considering an abstraction of a mood which he has tried to symbolize by an analogy with his reaction to a painting with a similar mood, the *Angelus*. He was expressing the hope that the audience may be made to react to whatever appears on stage in a way something like the reaction he had to the painting, and he hoped that the designer would follow him in his attempt to express this non-verbal artistic response. In brief, he was stating a

problem, albeit an artistic one, not offering a solution.

Of course our director was running a risk and if the designer makes copies of the painting, he knows that the risk was too great. The risk was that the interim symbol would be taken literally, that it would be interpreted as a solution, not a statement of a problem. There was another risk: The designer might see the painting and find only deep oppression without hope. He might fail to find the horrible threat to humanity that is often found in this painting. In this case, the director used a poor interim symbol; it did not communicate what he intended.

If the second risk seems obvious and easily avoided by verbal explanation, it is because the example of the *Angelus* can be at least partially verbalized whereas many of the explanations of mood that frustrate directors and designers cannot. It is not always so easy to check the results by asking the other party what he got from the analogy. His explanation, however fluent, may be irrelevant and tell you nothing reassuring. Only the designs, artistic solutions to the problem, will tell whether the interim symbol really worked. This accounts for some of the nasty surprises that sometimes mar the first rehearsal on set or with lighting. But surprises should not happen if the artists are aware of the dangers in their conversations, and recheck the moment there is a scrap of artistic production to look at.

Another type of interim symbol is the "sketch." A "sketch" is usually defined as a crude drawing intended to convey some meaning. For theatrical purposes it will be well to expand this definition to include such three dimensional "sketches" as a rough clay model and a crude bit of pantomime such as

that used by some directors to indicate their desires. The advantage of the sketch over the verbal symbol are obvious. Sketches can carry more meaning of a theatrical sort, they come easily to theatrical artists who are used to thinking in three or four dimensions, and they are far more vivid and compelling than just talking about it. Unfortunately the disadvantages also come in larger sizes. The most important one can be framed by a question: "Is this an interim symbol or a plan?" Interim symbols attempt to communicate; plans lead to permanent structures.

An example of difficulty in interpreting sketches and the power of them when understood is now almost a classic in the theatre. Many years ago Edward Gordon Craig published a series of sketches for *Hamlet*. They were relatively vague drawings of a minute figure almost lost in front of huge geometric structures. Probably every student of theatre history has seen reproductions of these sketches and has read the attack upon them based on the assumption that they were plans. But it is just as probable, if not more probable, that these sketches were interim symbols, that they expressed the mood of Hamlet as a human being overwhelmed by outward circumstances. This mood is surely expressible in the theatre without increasing the proscenium height to accommodate five story buildings. Other sketches by Craig which are plainly intended as plans show that he is quite aware of scale and knows how to suggest five story structures within normal proscenium heights.

In some ways theatrical production is like a session in problem solving. It will pay the artists to agree on the nature of the problem involved in producing *King Lear*, for example, before setting out possible solutions and

evaluating them. But the difference between theatre production and discursive problem solving lies in the manner in which the problem is stated and in the way in which the solution must be designed. Whereas "What can be done to help 'D' students in speech?" pinpoints an area for study, "How shall we produce *King Lear*?" only directs us to the place where the problem is first stated, the script. The problems to be found there are monumental, interlocked inextricably, and inexpressible in discursive language. The solution, if reached, will defy analysis. This is merely another way of saying that theatrical production is art

and that one of the devices of theatrical artists is to communicate with one another in the symbolic mode because simple discussion won't do to produce an art work.

The theatrical version of problem solving involves each member of the artistic team finding the problem for himself in the script, symbolizing it for himself, striving to communicate what he has found, and reconciling it with the findings of others through such devices as interim symbols. Finally comes the development by cooperative and inspired artistic teamwork of the final powerful symbol—the play in production.

MOTIVATION THEORY IN TEACHING PERSUASION: STATEMENT AND SCHEMA

Donald K. Smith and Robert L. Scott

At least since Aristotle observed that men in a state of emotion act differently than they do otherwise and postulated, therefore, that he who would persuade ought to know how the various emotions are aroused,¹ *pathos* has been considered an important part of rhetoric, or the theory of persuasive discourse.

Aristotle's concept of *pathos* is perhaps best thought of as a relational category designed to direct attention to the *interaction* of aspects of the discourse, states of emotion in the listeners, and the resultant persuasibility of the listener. Unfortunately, the concept has usually been translated as "emotional proof"; since the term "proof" seems to direct our attention to some statement or sequence of statements within the speech, the further notion of "emotional appeal" seems proper. By an all too easy process of linguistic seduction, the term "emotional appeal" has carried us from Aristotle's original concept of *pathos* into the position of perceiving any given instance of persuasive discourse as containing neat little passages which are "appeals." These appeals are designed to trigger responses called "emotions," which, since they can be named, must reside in small psycho-physiological packages in each listener, simply waiting

for the right button to be pushed to cause them to go into action.

Although this simplistic view of man's nature and the nature of discourse has been rather well discredited, speech teachers are still laboring to discover useful ways of talking with their students about the relationship between man's nature and the conduct of discourse. The theory of persuasion must include statements about why people behave as they do, and how such insights may be related to the analysis, planning, or conduct of discourse. But what kind of theorizing about the nature of man is reputable, appropriate, and useful for students of practical discourse?

One common answer given to this question is that of appropriating for texts in public speaking or persuasion certain bodies of material drawn from theorists in the field of psychology. The answer seems reasonable. Psychologists devote themselves to the study of behavior. They have asked repeatedly why people act as they do. They have sought to unleash the formidable instruments of science for the study of behavior, and thus to extend reliable knowledge of the nature of emotion and motivation. All this is so obviously relevant to the study of speech that whether the psychologist is William James or B. F. Skinner, James B. Watson or Gordon Allport, it is impossible to study his discussion of human behavior without the impression that much of what is being said ought to be useful to the student of persuasion or public speaking. In one sense teachers

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¹ See *Rhetorica* ii. 1. 1377b 30; 1378a 5, 20-25.

of speech have suffered the embarrassment of riches in dipping into psychological theory. The theorists are so numerous; their "systems" war with one another; terminology changes. In the midst of this profusion, the task of selecting categories for describing human behavior suitable to a course in persuasion or public speaking is almost intolerably complicated. If the study is decently attentive to the complexities of behavior, consideration of its relevance to the practical problems of conducting discourse may never be achieved. If the study of behavior is compressed to permit time for consideration of its relevance to discourse, it may simply perpetuate the mischief of such concepts as "emotional appeals," and "targets resting in the nervous system of the listener."

A reasonably accurate description of the solution sought by the most reputable speech texts and teachers would be as follows. The student is cautioned that the study of human motivation is important but complex. He is given a definition of motivation, and some accounting of how the internal structures which lead to goal-directed behavior are learned. He is cautioned not to believe that he understands a motive structure simply because he has named some general human goal. Then he is given a list of names for common human "motives." These often turn out to be the names of general goals sought by many people in our culture (the names may be of large categories of goals, such as "subsistence," or "mastery," or of somewhat more specific goals such as "profit" or "status"). The names of motives have the magic of seeming relevance to the conduct of discourse. The student now understands why he needed to study human behavior. If he promises his listeners "profit" or "status," the listener

will be motivated. The emotional appeal has been made. The button has been pushed. And we are back to a simplistic concept of behavior we started out to avoid.

Recently in this journal Otis M. Walter proposed a considerable departure from the analysis of motivation usual to speech texts or courses. Walter argued that theorists and teachers of persuasion must go beyond the generalized view of motivation which leads to the listing of names for motives. "We could assume that because so many rhetoricians use these lists," he writes, "they are considered of practical value in the teaching of speakers. It is not my aim here to suggest otherwise, but instead to show that motivation may be analyzed in a somewhat more detailed and perhaps more useful way."² Walter suggests the possible usefulness of abandoning the term motive in favor of an effort to identify the common "motivational situations" in which people disposed to act find themselves. He shows that by naming these situations, one can then propose "lines of argument" appropriately directed toward persons in these situations. Thus the study of motivational situations leads directly to practical consequences in the planning and conduct of discourse.

1.

Walter has taken a long step forward in analyzing motivation with reference to persuasive discourse. If any theory of motivation is useful in speech, it must be of value in the planning and conduct of discourse, or in the understanding of the speaker-audience-discourse relationship present in acts of persuasion. Although we applaud Walter's treatment of motivation as both more useful than

² Otis M. Walter, "Toward an Analysis of Motivation," *QJS*, XLI (October 1955), 271-278.

analyses which lead to the listing of motives, and as less subject to simplistic interpretation, we believe his concept of "motivational situation" may be too sharply removed from the characteristic psychological approach to human motivation. What we propose here is not a rejection of Walter's analysis of motivational situations, but an accounting of motivation which will supplement his analysis. We propose an accounting brief enough to be manageable, one which retains some of the characteristic terminology of psychology for the description of behavior, and one which can be linked rather directly to the problem of analyzing and managing persuasive discourse.

The study of motivation becomes initially a search for a set of terms, or categories, sufficient to give an accounting of human behavior which is consistent with what is known about such behavior, and useful to the uncovering of new evidence about such behavior. For the behavioral scientists, a test of such categories is the extent to which they cause questions to be asked which will be susceptible to scientific investigation. For the teacher of persuasion, a test of such categories is the extent to which they enable students to develop useful insight into the nature and conduct of discourse. This is not to suggest that the teacher of persuasion will necessarily want a different set of categories from those of the psychologist or sociologist; it is to suggest that he may want the simplest set of categories which are not at variance with the insights provided by the scientific study of behavior, and which will lead most readily into the consideration of the role of discourse in behavior.

In the search for such a set of terms, the term "motivation" can be used as a generic label for those factors internal-

ized by the individual which lead to different kinds of goal-directed behavior. The term "internalized" suggests that although internal structures of the organism lead to behavior (only the person can act), yet our understanding of the structures must always perceive the individual as responding or behaving in a situation. To view the study of motivation as situational is scarcely unique, since contemporary students of behavior are substantially in agreement that any accounting of behavior must view motivation not as a static property of the organism, but as a structure relating the organism to its environment.

If motivation is conceived as a situational structure, what is the minimal set of terms necessary for a description of this structure? Four such terms can be identified.

1. *Tension*

Although a variety of terms such as "drive," or "need" are used to account for stimulus elements incident to goal directed behavior, all of these terms proceed from a view of the organism as experiencing various conditions of internal tension which dispose it to action. Some deprivation, physiological or psychological, produces an imbalance which the organism strives to adjust. Physiological needs—food, regulation of bodily temperature, elimination, etc.—are the easiest to cite and are, hence, most often cited. That tensions arise not only from simple physiological needs but also from complex socially modified needs is quite obvious. Behavior which can be related to sex often grows out of tensions probably arising not from simply physiological needs but from tensions resulting from society's demands on its members to respond at given ages in given patterns.

2. *Learned Behavior Patterns*

Since the individual brings tensions

into balance continually, he will learn behavior patterns which are successful in relieving tensions. Customs in eating, courtship, and social amenities in general are readily accessible examples of this fact.

3. *Individual Interpretation*

But tension is not simply tension. It is possible to observe certain states of physiological or emotional deprivation which seem to produce similar tensions in all persons who experience them. It is equally possible to observe different persons in substantially the same environment experiencing different levels of tension, or giving quite different descriptions of the nature of the tension which they experience. The complexity of human behavior rests in the unique and central role of language in mediating that behavior. Thus tension, to a human being, is an occasion for interpretation, and the tension "is known" not simply through some physical reaction but through some verbal accounting of the situation. Having gone without food for some hours, one man may say simply, "I am hungry." Another may say, "My stomach aches because my wife has been nagging me." The first may walk to the refrigerator, or follow some other pattern of learned behavior relevant to his interpretation of his tension. The second man may seek to restore equilibrium in his environment with a martini, or a walk in the evening air. In even more complex constructs, the international problems of Russia and the United States may apparently pass unnoticed by one man. A second may find the nature of his discontent to be the presence of a powerful, dynamic and unfriendly Russian state which threatens his security. A third may believe that his experience with tension is the product of an excessive number of proto-communists among his neighbors.

It is uniquely the fact of human behavior that its most significant dimensions involve acts of interpretation on the part of the individual in which he uses language both to identify the nature of his sense of tension, and to identify the kind of learned behavior, verbal or otherwise, seemingly appropriate to the situation. Language is not only a form of behavior; it is uniquely the form which mediates, through acts of interpretation, the individual's perception of his condition within his environment. This fact provides the persuader with both his problem and his opportunity.

4. *Goals*

Understanding the central importance of interpretation in human conduct, we are in position to observe that the linguistic act of interpretation gives rise to the category of goals. Ordinarily motivated behavior has an end in the environment of which the individual is a part. This end is knowable and known to human beings simply as a verbal construct. Tensions may find their source either in verbal or non-verbal aspects of the person and his environment. Learned behaviors may be either verbal or non-verbal.

But goals rise only from acts of interpretation. They indicate a belief that human beings may select to some extent the end toward which their behavior is directed and may predict to some extent the consequences of their behavior. Man marshals both the past and the future in his acts of interpretation. He can do this only through language. In using language to denominate ends that he seeks, or changes in his environment he wishes to bring about, or actions in which he wishes to direct himself and others, man establishes those constructs we call goals.

Although it is useful to separate the

concept of goal from such concepts as tension or learned behaviors or interpretation, it is clear that the concept goal does not exist independently of these other categories used in a description of human behavior. Thus, when we interpret, or give a name to an experience of tension, we may also implicitly name a goal. "I am being hounded to pay my bills," we say; and implicitly we have said, "I need money," or "I must get some money." In converse fashion, the identification or labeling of a goal may be sufficient to create the experience of tension. "I want a new car," we say, and the identification of a goal becomes a source of tension until the goal is either achieved or abandoned. Goals rise from tension, and goals create tension. They are the verbal concomitants of any experience with tension which has been interpreted.

These categories—tension, learned behavior, individual interpretation, and goals—constitute the minimal set of categories needed for the analysis of behavior. In a sense they provide a definition of the term "motivation." The larger label hypothesizes the existence of factors internalized by the individual which lead to goal-directed behavior, and thus stipulate that at some level behavior is caused, can be understood, and can be influenced. The smaller categories of tension, et cetera, direct us toward an examination of relevant data about the individual and his environment when we are interested in interpreting or influencing his behavior.

2.

Any attempt to present an abstract analysis of a phenomenon raises the difficulty of retaining the essential sense of the unity, i.e., of the phenomenality, of what is analyzed. Our lengthy definition of motivation may be summarized

in a quasi-physical formulation which helps emphasize its situational character:

$$M = (T + LB) I \longleftrightarrow G$$

In this schema motivation (M) is the label for the totality of those factors internalized by an individual which lead to various sorts of goal-directed behavior. These internalized factors may be described as the experiencing of tension (T) and the learned patterns of behavior (LB) associated with those tensions. In human behavior the meaning of any experience with tension, or with the conduct or interruption of any learned behavior, is mediated by the use of language in acts of interpretation (I). The language behavior characteristic of acts of interpretation gives rise to the identification of goals (G). These goals serve both as the ends of tension initiated behavior and as the sources for altered patterns of tension, behavior, or interpretation.

We have found the schema a useful way of introducing students of persuasion to the concept of motivation. It permits an expanded or abbreviated discussion of the tension producing potential of various physiological or psychological needs experienced by the organism. It gives attention to the significant role of learning in the development of either verbal or non-verbal behavior patterns. The tension-learned behaviors-goal relationship adapts itself readily to discussion of the important part played by reinforcement in the learning of verbal or non-verbal behavior, and to this extent the schema is readily adaptable to learning theory. It provides a strategy for dealing with the confusion usual to the use of such terms as "need" and "goal" by showing that although goals are structurally or interpretatively linked to tensions, the perception of

goals may be tension-creating, whereas the attainment of goals may not in every case relieve tension.

Perhaps the most important term in the schema is that of "interpretation." The introduction of this concept into the analysis of behavior permits ready perception of behavior as situational, and provides a useful bridge to the consideration of the significant role of language in the development and control of behavior. Language provides the structure within which people perceive, or locate (interpret) their tensions, and define (interpret) their goals. Language is the instrument for interpreting or giving meaning to the environment of the organism, but it is also a significant part of the environment of the organism. This latter relationship is of primary interest to the student of persuasion who wants to study how language affects the experiencing and interpreting of tensions, learned behavior, and goals.

At the most general level, the schema serves as a framework for examining any persuasive situation whatsoever in an effort to relate the activity of the persuader to the motivation of the persuadee. It is possible to observe the persuader using language in an effort to intensify latent tensions or to allay tensions. It is possible to observe the persuader using language to interpret tension so that it becomes linked to presumably relevant goals by types of behavior available to the audience. At the simplest level, an advertisement for a deodorant cream may be a blatant effort to stir up and interpret tensions latent in almost any interpersonal situation. In a much more complex sense, one could observe the extensive effort made by President Woodrow Wilson in call-

ing for a declaration of war on Germany, not only to make use of public tensions produced by the alleged acts of aggression by the German nation but also to reinterpret the tension existing in the American "search for peace" as capable of relief only through the act of war. "The war to end wars" became a sign interpreting the goal directed behaviors appropriate to the search for peace and an end to aggression.

The schema is consistent with or leads to the kind of treatment given motivation in Walter's article. Walter's set of "motivational situations" is an effort to establish a typology for the most common sorts of tension producing situations within which persuaders encounter audiences. To the extent that his typology fits the scene, it permits the linking of characteristic motivational situations to the range of *topoi* or lines of argument characteristically available in such situations.

3.

The purpose here has not been to contend that the schema is to be preferred for the scientific investigation of behavior. It is not scientific in its genesis, although it does no violence to tenets generally acceptable to behavioral scientists. Rather the statement is a strategic one—a search for a minimal set of terms in a structural relationship which will serve the purposes of the student of persuasion in understanding and creating persuasive discourse. To the extent that the schema is teachable, that teaching it does not lead to a grossly oversimplified conception of human behavior, that it permits quick entry into the study of the linkages between persuasive discourse and human behavior—it may be useful.

A COMPARATIVE CRITICISM OF HUGH BLAIR'S ESSAY ON TASTE

John Waite Bowers

IN most contemporary thought, "taste" is an obsolete concept, disreputable in academic circles and totally negative in popular parlance. Psychologists have classified "taste" as an acquired cultural variable, and their classification has been accompanied in other groups by a reorientation of the term which requires that it nearly always be prefaced by "in bad." The decline of "taste" has been remarked in criticism as well as in psychology. Kenneth Burke, commenting on the classification of literature as "equipment for living," which he advocates, observes:

[My system of classification] would, I admit, violate current pieties, break down current categories, and thereby "outrage good taste." But "good taste" has become inert. The classifications I am proposing would be active. I think that what we need is active categories.¹

Apparently, "taste" is no longer useful in the analysis and evaluation of the discursive arts. Its historical importance as a critical tool in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, however, is established. The questions of what taste is and how it operates were extremely important both theoretically and practically during an age in which the discursive arts were losing their strictly

didactic function and acquiring a new aesthetic purpose. It was necessary for the artist to satisfy a mental critic, "taste," whose nature, function, and scope were the subjects of dispute among philosophers. Three of the many protagonists in the controversy were Immanuel Kant (1790), Edmund Burke (1757), and the central subject of this paper, Hugh Blair (1783).

Herman Cohen gives a clear exposition of Blair's conception of taste by comparing his statements with those of Lord Kames, Edmund Burke, Sir Joshua Reynolds, and David Hume.² Cohen devotes considerable space to a discussion of Blair's primacy in treating taste as "a part of rhetoric."³ However, he does not specifically disclose the reasons for an essay on taste in Blair's work, nor does he critically evaluate the essay. I hope to show: (1) that the inclusion of the essay on taste in Blair's *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* is justified by certain trends in critical and philosophical thought during and preceding his period; and (2) that because of certain ambiguities and inconsistencies, Blair's analysis was at the time of its writing less worthy of consideration than were those of at least two of his contemporaries, Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant.

The first question which I propose to answer is: How does an essay on taste happen to be found in a volume on

Mr. Bowers is instructor in rhetoric and a graduate student in speech and dramatic art, State University of Iowa. This article is a revision of a paper read at the "Debut" Session, SAA Convention, St. Louis, 1960. "Debut" is sponsored by the Rhetoric and Public Address Interest Group, and participants are selected by a national board of critics.

¹ "Literature as Equipment for Living," *The Philosophy of Literary Form* (New York, 1957), p. 262.

² "Hugh Blair's Theory of Taste," *QJS*, XLIV (October 1958), 265-274.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

rhetoric and belles lettres? I intend to answer this question by demonstrating that the dominant trend in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century philosophical and critical thought almost dictated that taste be considered in a volume dedicated to composition and criticism. The inclusion of the essay in the *Lectures* was less remarkable than its omission would have been.

Blair defines taste as "the power of receiving pleasures from the beauties of nature and of art."⁴ The isolation of this "power" has obvious theoretical advantages in the formulation of precepts both for composition and for criticism. The speaker or writer must design his discourse so that it appeals to this power, and the critic must develop the power in order to appreciate and analyze the beauties of the discourse which he reads or hears. The faculty psychologies popular at the time made the isolation of "taste" as the arbiter of art acceptable in both pedagogical and critical circles. Blair was simply taking advantage of accepted psychological theory as a basis for the practical rules which he would develop later.⁵

To those unacquainted with the background of Blair's rhetorical theory, it may appear surprising that rhetoric should be considered an art designed to give "pleasure" through "beauty." One accustomed to thinking in contemporary terms might say that the only discursive art concerned with "beauty" is poetic and that rhetoric's concern is with argument. A brief review of the position taken by Blair's predecessors and contemporaries reveals, however, that poetry

and oratory more frequently were combined under the single term "eloquence" than would be permitted by contemporary usage. Indeed, many critical theorists made the two arts nearly identical.

Blair and most of his predecessors considered both oratory and literature to exist for the purpose of teaching, pleasing, and moving; furthermore, the same method, that of vivid portrayal, was common to both arts as the principal agent for achieving the tri-purpose. An example of this position can be found in the *Dialogues on Eloquence* of Fénelon (1717), who makes the power of "portrayal" central both to oratory and to poetry, discerning no difference between the two arts except for the "ecstasy" apparent in the poet's diction.⁶ Most of Fénelon's predecessors (Peter Ramus and Julius Caesar Scaliger, for example) saw poetry as oratory in verse. In 1800, even a poet was willing to concede that the diction of his trade was less than inspired: "It may be safely affirmed that there neither is, nor can be, any essential difference between the language of prose and metrical composition."⁷

Blair, like Fénelon, identifies the ends of poetry with those of oratory. Like Wordsworth, he sees no essential difference between the language of the two arts:

It is hardly possible to determine the exact limit where eloquence ends and poetry begins; nor is there any occasion for being very pre-

⁶ Fénelon, *Dialogues on Eloquence* [1717], trans. W. S. Howell (Princeton, 1951), p. 93. Mr. Howell gives a scholarly comment on this aspect of the *Dialogues* in his article, "Oratory and Poetry in Fénelon's Literary Theory," *QJS*, XXXVII (February 1951), 1-10.

⁷ William Wordsworth, "Preface," *Lyrical Ballads*, 2nd ed. (1800). Of course, some writers of the period did perceive essential differences between oratory and poetry. For example, see Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment* [1790], trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford, 1911), p. 192.

⁴ Hugh Blair, *Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres* [1783] (Pittsburgh, 1833), Lecture II, p. 16.

⁵ For an approach to the same problem from a somewhat different point of view, see Douglas Ehninger and James Golden, "The Intrinsic Sources of Blair's Popularity," *Southwestern Speech Journal*, XXI (Fall, 1955), 12-30.

cise about the boundaries, as long as the nature of each is understood. These are the minutiae of criticism, concerning which, frivolous writers are always disposed to squabble; but which deserve not any particular discussion.⁸

Basically, then, Blair combines the arts of persuasion and of portrayal into an art of eloquence to which a single set of philosophical tenets and practical precepts is applicable. Since taste is the agent by which eloquence is evaluated, a discussion of it in Blair's *Lectures* is vital to the understanding of discrimination in composition and in criticism. Taste is the faculty (or, in Blair's system, the combination of faculties) to which the discursive artist must appeal and by which the critic must evaluate.

I promised earlier to evaluate critically Blair's conception of taste by comparing it with that of Edmund Burke and Immanuel Kant. Blair's most apparent weakness arose from his failure to commit himself to any specific origin for taste. Without such an origin, he found it impossible to proceed systematically through an examination of the faculty. In spite of the importance of an a priori assumption concerning the nature of taste, Blair's statements are ambiguous and qualified to the point of becoming noncommittal:

[Beauties] sometimes strike in the same manner the philosopher and the peasant; the boy and the man. Hence the faculty by which we relish such beauties, seems more nearly allied to a feeling of sense, than to a process of the understanding; and accordingly, from an external sense it has borrowed its name.⁹

Blair's statement appears to indicate that he would adopt Edmund Burke's view of taste as being dependent primarily on sense perception. Attributing taste to a sensuous origin results in a simple

but comprehensive system, the point of which Burke makes concisely:

But as there will be little doubt that bodies present similar images to the whole species, it must necessarily be allowed that the pleasures and the pains which every object excites in one man, it must raise in all mankind, whilst it operates naturally, simply, and by its proper powers only; for if we deny this, we must imagine that the same cause, operating in the same manner, and on subjects of the same kind, will produce different effects; which would be highly absurd.¹⁰

Since judgments of taste are rooted in the senses, differences in those judgments can be accounted for by differences in sensuous acuity.

Blair, however, was unwilling to allow his analysis to become as materialistic as is Burke's. As we will see, the word "seems," in the phrase "seems more nearly allied to a feeling of sense, than to a process of the understanding," became inordinately important to Blair. If taste depends to more than a minor degree on the sharpness of the senses, then Blair would be unable to account for the "immense superiority" in judgment which he imagines civilized nations to have over uncivilized and barbarian races.¹¹ In this, as in other pronouncements, Blair's ethnocentrism appears to impede his objectivity.

If Blair refused to become totally materialistic in his conception of the origin of taste, neither would he allow the supernatural to enter his analysis. Although the Scottish clergyman could not have read Kant's *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, we might expect him to arrive independently at a system similar to the German's, in which the taste faculty non-cognitively judges beauty

¹⁰ Edmund Burke, "A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful; with an Introductory Discourse Concerning Taste" [1757], *Works of the Right Honorable Edmund Burke* (London, 1826), I, 99-100.

¹¹ Blair, Lecture II, p. 18.

⁸ Blair, Lecture XXXVIII, p. 422.

⁹ Blair, Lecture II, p. 16.

when confronted with a natural or artistic object which reflects a principle of the supersensible world.¹² In a Kantian system, Blair would be able to explain aesthetic disagreements by speculating that the verdict of one or both contending parties is perverted by cognitive judgments concerning the usefulness, moral quality, or sensual desirability of the object.¹³ Apparently, however, Blair was unwilling to venture into an area which openly admits that it cannot be defined observationally.

Blair's failure to describe specifically the roots of his system led him into serious difficulties. Since taste is only slightly dependent upon sense perceptions, and since, apparently, it has no relationship to the supernatural, Blair had to find another rationale for explaining individual differences in judgments about the kind and intensity of beauty present in art works. The professional teacher eventually adopts "education and culture" as the principal variables in judgments of taste. The ambiguity of Blair's terms, which I will analyze later, creates the impression that his position is a regression to neoclassic doctrine rather than an anticipation of today's "learning theory":

This inequality of taste among men is owing, without doubt, in part, to the different frame of their natures; to nicer organs, and finer internal powers, with which some are endowed beyond others. But, if it be owing in part to nature, it is owing to education and culture still more.¹⁴

Blair's faith in the beneficial effects of "education and culture" where taste is concerned, although perhaps predictable in a teacher, may be unfounded. At any rate, Alexander Pope was not so sanguine

about the unerring development of the man of taste:

But as the slightest sketch, if justly traced,
Is by ill coloring but the more disgraced,
So by false learning is good sense defaced:
Some are bewildered in the maze of schools,
And some made coxcombs Nature meant but
fools.¹⁵

Blair's *Lectures*, of course, were soon to become an important part of the "maze of schools."

Whether or not Blair's dependence on education as the source of taste was justified, it later necessitated a devious line of reasoning and assertion to demonstrate that, while taste improves with formal training, genius is more common among "primitives." As though to underline the inadequacy of his system, Blair himself refers in the *Lectures* at least four times to the beauties of the fraudulently primitive Ossian poems and wrote a book on the same subject.¹⁶ The finding of beauties in poems, of course, is not a basis for condemning the finder. But to attribute those beauties to causes which do not exist is a critical fault, and Blair sees the beauties of Ossian as the result of the poet's primitive state. A system of taste should have enabled Blair to detect the fraud. Other critics more perceptive than Blair (e.g., Dr. Johnson) did detect it. In this instance, at least, Blair's system does not achieve its purpose.

Part of the essay's weakness can be attributed to Blair's failure to reduce the terms "education and culture" to their components. Burke, avoiding this difficulty to some extent, reduces "taste" to a system involving three faculties and four areas of judgment with no reference to education and culture:

¹² Kant, *Critique of Aesthetic Judgment*, p.

¹³ See note 7.

¹⁴ For a clear exposition of this position, see Barrows Dunham, *A Study in Kant's Aesthetics* (Lancaster, Pa., 1933), pp. 25-26.

¹⁵ Blair, *Lecture II*, p. 18.

¹⁶ *Essay on Criticism* [1711], lines 23-27.

¹⁷ Blair, *Lecture IV*, p. 42; *Lecture XV*, p. 164; *Lecture XVI*, p. 180; *Lecture XVII*, p. 183. *A Critical Dissertation on the Poems of Ossian, the Son of Fingal* (London, 1763).

On the whole it appears to me, that what is called taste, in its most general acceptance, is not a simple idea, but is partly made up of a perception of the primary pleasures of sense, of the secondary pleasures of the imagination, and of the conclusions of the reasoning faculty, concerning the various relations of these, and concerning the human passions, manners and actions.¹⁷

Charles Edward Noyes finds six variables used by David Hume, whose analysis is often similar to Burke's, in the Scottish sceptic's analysis of taste. Only two of them—insufficient practice in judging the art form concerned, and too limited a knowledge of examples which may be used for comparison—can be subsumed under "education and culture," and both of Hume's "education" variables are considerably less abstract than are Blair's ambiguous terms.¹⁸ By leaving his terms general, Blair could take another step toward his ethnocentric ideal of the man of taste.

Besides causing him difficulties in accounting for individual differences in judgment, Blair's ambiguity involved him in an inconsistency when he attempted to arrive at a standard for judgment. If taste is primarily a function of education and culture, we would expect the arbiter of taste to be the educated and cultured man. Either modesty or a glimpse of equality, however, led Blair to admit that no such absolute judge exists. Unable to produce a standard of judgment from his own system, Blair borrowed Burke's *sensus communis*—that is, he placed the standard of taste in the general agreement of mankind. Apparently recognizing the inconsistency, Blair qualified his position until, as I will show, it becomes useless for any discussion involving more than one

nation or more than one period. Three distinct conditions must be met before the *sensus communis* can be considered trustworthy: (1) The nation making the judgment must be civilized; (2) The age during which the judgment is made must not be one of "ignorance and darkness"; (3) The nation, if civilized, must be unperverted by religious or social error.¹⁹

Blair's standard is useless because it is totally unstable; in effect, it shifts with every nation in every age. According to Blair, who obviously thought that the standard of taste resided somewhere in the eighteenth-century British Isles, any civilized and unperverted nation existing during an age which is not ignorant will arrive at valid judgments of beauty. Undoubtedly, every nation and age considers itself civilized, unperverted, and enlightened. Furthermore, most nations and ages will consider most other nations and ages unfit to judge beauty for one of the three reasons listed by Blair. Charles Lamb, for example, condemned Dryden's age for its "impure ears."²⁰ To give other illustrations of the same phenomenon would be to belabor the obvious. The point to be made is that Blair's standard of taste, allegedly universal, is actually relative. Any attempt to employ it as a standard in an aesthetic discussion would be futile.

More consistent than Blair, Burke found it unnecessary to qualify the *sensus communis* since his conception of taste, based primarily on sense perception and its servant, imagination, is comparable among all men in all ages. Kant, on the other hand, found it unnecessary to set up a standard at all, since it is impossible to argue about the supersensible world which he had

¹⁷ Burke, *Works*, I, 114.

¹⁸ Charles Edward Noyes, "Aesthetic Theory and Literary Criticism in the Works of David Hume," doctoral dissertation (University of Texas, 1950), p. 290.

¹⁹ Blair, Lecture II, p. 25.

²⁰ Charles Lamb, "On the Tragedies of Shakespeare."

established a priori.²¹ Blair appears philosophically unsophisticated by comparison with these two of his contemporaries.

At this point, Blair's shortcomings as a speculative philosopher (or theoretical psychologist) should be apparent.

²¹ H. W. Cassirer, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Judgment* (London, 1938), p. 289. Dunham (see note 13) holds that, implicitly, Kant subscribes to the notion of *sensus communis* as the standard of taste.

His failure to commit himself to a clear, basic position concerning the nature of taste led him into a number of difficulties, of which those cited here are representative. A comparative examination of parts of the essay with treatments of "taste" by Burke and Kant reveals several unsolved problems for the Scottish rhetorician. Although Blair's concepts are, for the most part, outdated, their importance in the history of rhetoric is apparent.

CHARLES FOX AND THE LONDON PRESS

Loren Reid

DURING the 1769-1806 span of his political career, Charles James Fox was a colorful source of news for some twenty to thirty London newspapers. Although other personalities at times commanded the attention of the public prints more intensively—John Wilkes, for example, before the American war—year in and year out London papers printed a steady stream of short paragraphs, longer comments, and on occasion series of columns about this noted debater and spokesman for the liberal point of view.

The reasons are not far to seek. Active in Parliament, Fox took a position on nearly every public issue of the day.¹ On some issues he took two positions, leading to inconsistencies in his career that in themselves made excellent newspaper copy. Moreover, he spent his life in or near London, and thus was a well-known man of the city. From 1780 onwards he represented populous Westminster; in the bitter election of 1784 and in the usually-contested elections

that followed, he was heard personally by from 15,000 to 18,000 electors. In and near Westminster Hall he spoke to audiences reaching into the tens of thousands; at inns and taverns groups of hundreds were commonplace. Shopkeepers seeking the repeal of an oppressive tax, Protestant dissenters and Roman Catholics wanting a greater measure of religious freedom, citizens opposing a governmental policy, Whigs and other personal supporters, all found themselves in his audiences. Hundreds heard him from the Strangers' Gallery in the House of Commons, and in the great trials of state at Westminster Hall. The unceasing activity of this controversial speaker made him newsworthy for London; moreover, items about him were frequently clipped for provincial newspapers and for the continental and colonial press.

The reporting of Fox's parliamentary speeches is not discussed here; to discover exactly what Fox said would be a study in itself. Although London papers quoted Fox as accurately as they did anyone, their reports were incomplete. Verbatim parliamentary reporting was handicapped by lack of galleries for reporters, the inefficiency of eighteenth-century shorthand, the lack of space in four-column four-page newspapers, and the lack of any real need or desire to present, day in and day out, the orator's exact phraseology.² Here

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¹He said in the House of Commons on December 13, 1779, "it was the first time in his life that he had not, on any great public question, taken one side or the other." *Morning Herald* (Dec. 8, 1780) reported: "In the present session, Mr. Fox was obliged to speak on every question, and in every debate." Newspapers consulted are found in the Burney collection of the British Museum. I hereby express my deep appreciation to Museum officials for making these files available, and for their generous and expert counsel.

²A statement appearing in the *London Evening-Post*, Dec. 22-24, 1772, illustrates the casual standards of reporting: "The Parliament having adjourned for the holidays, the Printer embraces the earliest opportunity of returning his sincere thanks to his unknown correspondent,

it is the intention to reflect what the prints thought about Fox's speaking, and about him personally. Some excerpts quoted may be considered as editorial in nature; others come from correspondents.³ Impressions like these need to be considered in appraising Fox's influence, since the personal impact of a speaker constitutes one of his strong persuasive forces.⁴

who has honoured him with the Debates in the House of Commons this session; and assures him he will endeavour to merit the continuance of so extraordinary an indulgence, by an immediate and correct insertion of all future favours" (italics supplied by this author). No attempt is made in the excerpts in this study to follow the spectacular capitalization used by London printers.

³ The preceding footnote suggests that often these correspondents were unknown even to the printer. One could thus, personally or through friends, cause puffs to be inserted favorable to himself or to his speaking. Conversely, one could anonymously cause derogatory paragraphs to be inserted. Once when an Alderman felt insulted by the Lord Mayor, the former was overheard muttering, as he walked away, "Damn him, I'll paragraph him for this" (*Public Advertiser*, Jan. 22, 1773).

⁴ How extensive a circulation did eighteenth-century papers enjoy? Since each copy was taxed, yearly stamp sales supply a figure. The total number of stamps sold in 1760, when George III ascended the throne, was 9,164,790; in 1811 the figure had increased to 24,424,713 (H. R. Fox Bourne, *English Newspapers* [London, 1887], I, 372). The circulation of some papers was in the hundreds; a daily printing of 5,000 was above average (*ibid.*, I, 260-261, 273, 274). *The Gazetteer's* claim that its circulation of 5,000 put it at the top of morning papers in 1771 was not challenged, according to Robert L. Haig, *The Gazetteer: 1735-1797* (Carbondale, Ill., 1960), pp. 79, 123. A. Aspinall in *Politics and the Press, c. 1780-1850* (London, 1949), pp. 6-7, estimates that in 1783 one newspaper was sold daily for every 300 inhabitants, compared with one in four a century and a half later. He also mentions government subsidies of favored papers (Chap. 3). Dennis O'Bryen, of some help to Fox and his friends with their newspaper problems, wrote in March, 1782, that 25,000 papers were published every day in London; "allowing ten readers to each paper, I am sure these 250 thousand, include by much the reading class of the community" (Burke MSS., Sheffield Central Library, 1211/1056).

Though circulation was not extensive, important people were reached. Members of Parliament enjoyed the franking privilege and mailed thousands of copies each week to selected persons. This practice enhanced the reach and influence of newspapers. In the single week beginning June 15, 1789, members sent 63,753 copies of newspapers through the

THE PRESS: CENSURE

Throughout his career Fox was under attack by an important segment of the press. Recurrent themes were that he was a gambler, that he was politically inconsistent, that he was, as a speaker, violent and inflammatory.

Fox's reputation as a gambler was established early in his career. It is well known indeed that Henry Fox introduced his son to the gambling table, supplied him with ample funds, and paid debts which even by 1773 touched a hundred thousand pounds. The *Middlesex Journal* reported in 1772: "C—J—F—, Esq., is appointed a Lord of Trade. . . . A gambler can certainly do much less mischief at that board, than he might do at the T[reasur]y Board."⁵ In 1774 Fox was described as, inside the House, trying to destroy "the grand bulwark of our constitution, the press; and . . . out of it, exercising the profession of a common gambler."⁶ That same year, however, it was considered "intelligence extraordinary" that Charles Fox had "left off gaming,"⁷ and in 1776 the *Morning Post* informed its readers that Mr. Fox was not at the Newmarket races, but at his *post* in the House of Commons.⁸ The attack could also be oblique: thus William Pitt would be "denounced" for the high crimes of *not* being acquainted with "the arts of gam-

London post office under their franks, according to the report of the inspector of franks (Chatham MSS., Public Record Office, 196).

⁵ Dec. 19-22. Later it more correctly announced that the appointment was to the Treasury.

⁶ *Morning Chronicle*, Feb. 25. In his early parliamentary career, Fox found occasion to attack bitterly certain printers, who had, contrary to rules then existing, printed reports of parliamentary debates.

⁷ *Middlesex Journal*, Nov. 29-Dec. 1.

⁸ Issue of Nov. 1. Italics are the newspaper's, illustrating the old English custom of italicizing words used in a special or double sense. The same issue, however, reported that "a celebrated orator"—name not given—"had 1 guinea at the beginning of the week, and by Saturday had £17,000."

ing, drinking, and bilking tradesmen, or *not* skilled in cutting, shuffling, . . . or *not* belonging to White's, Brooks's, the Cocoa-Tree, or Newmarket."⁹

Fox could make a brilliant speech, as he did in 1788 in Westminster Hall, but praise of it could be lessened for readers by comments such as this: "Mr. Fox, prior to his celebrated Law Reply . . . had sat up the whole night before, and won a *thousand pounds* at the New Club—a talent more extraordinary for *Law*, and a more *extraordinary School* for it are seldom united."¹⁰ The *World* praised Fox for a speech in 1795 making provision for the Duke of York—but it also noted that immediately after making it he went to Brooks's.¹¹ Sometimes the paragraph might appear as a bit of hearsay: "Mr. Fox, it is said, did not win less than £50,000 at the last Newmarket meeting."¹²

Comments about gambling were easily associated with Fox's perpetual debts: (1772) "Mr. Charles F-x has offered to join Opposition, provided they will pay all his debts";¹³ (1774) to make Fox Chancellor of the Exchequer "is adding insult to injury"; he is a "financier from the dice box";¹⁴ (1779) when Fox observed that "the resources of this country were near at an end,

North replied, loud enough to be heard by several, 'I know that thine own, Charles, have long been at an end';"¹⁵ (1783) Fox's India Bill will bring him much credit, "for when he has got India in his hands, his friends in the city will lend him what sums of money he chuses."¹⁶ So London newspapers reminded their readers that Fox's vice was habitual, seasoned, professional. Fox could retort, as he did in 1780, that gaming "was countenanced by the fashion of the times" and involved "some of the greatest characters,"¹⁷ yet London papers wrote large, and wrote frequently, that public men should stay clear of it.

Fox was most vulnerable, however, to the charge of political inconsistency. In 1771 he was reported as having said in the House of Commons: "This House represents the people of England; and whoever sets at nought its authority, sets at nought the authority of the people. . . . I think both Petitions and Addresses of so equivocal a nature, that I will never acknowledge the voice of the people to be fully expressed anywhere but in this House." He went on to say: "Our privileges are the privileges of the people; our dignity is their dignity. The greater and more awful we are, the greater and more awful they become."¹⁸ The first part of this passage was especially remembered, and could

⁹ *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Aug. 9, 1782. As late as 1795, at a public meeting in Palace Yard with perhaps 30,000 assembled, the *True Briton* could describe the "hero of the day" defending his political conduct, "carefully omitting all reference to his coalition with Lord North" [of a dozen years previously] and afterwards going to "the gaming house in St. James's Street" (Nov. 17). Then (Nov. 20) it solemnly apologized, said Fox and his friends did not "alight" at the gaming house but only "halted," and then went on to Mrs. Armistead's. The *True Briton's* true readers would recognize Mrs. A. as Fox's mistress; they did not know, and Fox did not want any one to know, that the two had just been secretly married.

¹⁰ *World*, Feb. 22.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, Mar. 17.

¹² *Public Advertiser*, July 20, 1789.

¹³ *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, Mar.

11.

¹⁴ *Morning Chronicle*, Feb. 24, 1771.

¹⁵ *Public Advertiser*, Mar. 3.

¹⁶ *Morning Herald*, Dec. 15.

¹⁷ A similar way in which Fox's character was attacked was by reminding readers that he was the son of Lord Holland, "the public defaulter of unaccounted millions." In the Westminster election of 1780, his opponents reminded voters that Fox's father was "a public defaulter" who plundered his country of "unaccounted millions." In addition to this "original sin," a correspondent added, Fox had many more of his own to account for (*Public Advertiser*, Sept. 15). Fox's defense of his father was never able to silence the attacks.

¹⁸ *Middlesex Journal*, Apr. 9-11, 1771; also *General Evening Post*, same date.

be cited pointedly whenever, later, Fox sponsored public petitions.¹⁹

The coalition with North was a political misstep that newspapers did not forgive or forget. The *Morning Post* freely quoted Fox against himself: "The moment he [Fox] should make any terms with him [North], he would rest satisfied to be called the most infamous of mankind."²⁰ A month later it made this attack:

The following alterations are to be made in the next edition of Johnson's Dictionary, at the request of the *two friends*.

Traitor. An honest man; one who serves his country.

Scoundrel. A gentleman, every inch of him.

Consistency. Turning round to all the points in the compass.²¹

Another source addressed queries "to honest, loyal, and independent electors of Westminster" about a man for whom "no free Briton" could give his suffrage:

Who is the notorious and infamous liar that formed a coalition with Lord North?

Who robbed the India Company of their charter, trade, and revenue?

Who stole the Great Seal from the Lord Chancellor?²²

The Beauties of Fox, North, and Burke, with quotations from 1774 to

¹⁹ The *Morning Post* was persistent on this theme. See also *General Evening Post*, Feb. 10-12, 1780, which cited a Guildhall speaker as declaring that Fox "had changed his opinion and his conduct as much as any man living." The *Public Advertiser*, Apr. 10, 1780, also comments on Fox's political inconsistencies. The *Morning Herald*, June 21, 1781, delicately put it: "He is said to be destitute of P-le."

²⁰ Feb. 25, 1783.

²¹ Apr. 8, 1783. It also reported that election crowds no longer received Fox as "The Man of the People," but instead called out: "Holloo, turncoat!—None of your damned speeches!" Nineteen years later papers still reported the same kind of comment: "Go home, Charley, and repent, or you'll die an old sinner," and, continually, "No coalition."

²² *History of the Westminster Election* (London, 1784), p. 214. This book of 538 pages contains newspaper paragraphs, cartoons, songs, and reports of public meetings. When the Great Seal was stolen in March 1784, the *Herald*, with more mischievousness than accuracy, reported that Fox and the Duke of Portland were seen on the streets at two a.m., carrying crowbars and a lantern (Mar. 25, 1784).

1784, gave ammunition to all. Advertisements for the pamphlet printed copious excerpts from the Table of Contents:

Charges against North by Fox or Burke

	Page
charged with treachery and falsehood . . .	3
charged with negligence	ib.
leads the House of Commons blindfold . .	4
pronounced deserving an axe	20
Mr. Fox thinks it would have been better	
Lord North had never been born	33
. . . freezes Mr. Burke's blood, and harrows	
up his soul	60

It remained for the *Public Advertiser*, however, to give a mid-career summary of Fox's inconsistency. This task a contributor performed in 1789, when he charged that Fox "has supported the King against the Commons, the Commons against the People, the People against the Commons, the Prince of Wales against them all."²³ In 1794, more than ten years after the deed, the *Oracle* reminded readers that in the coalition with North "the basis of all defalcation of principle and moral tergiversation was laid by Mr. Fox."²⁴ In 1798, and again in 1800, a columnist launched a series of letters against Fox, reiterating the inconsistency theme: "Your principle of conduct . . . has been erratic and contradictory . . . notoriously applicable to all times, and to all events."²⁵ Macaulay wrote in retrospect:

To the very end of his career, small men, when they had nothing else to say in defense of their own tyranny, bigotry, and imbecility, could always raise a cheer by some paltry taunt about the election of Colonel Luttrell, the imprisonment of the Lord Mayor, and other measures in which the great Whig leader had borne a part at the age of one or two-and-twenty.²⁶

²³ Jan. 22.

²⁴ May 21.

²⁵ *True Briton*, Oct. 17, 23, and Dec. 14, 1798; Oct. 21, 1800, et seq.

²⁶ "Lord Holland," in *Essays* (London, 1843), III, 319-320. Macaulay could have added that these attacks persisted after Fox's death. See for example the pamphlet, *Some Particulars in the*

Most papers freely acknowledged Fox's skill as a parliamentary speaker, but turned even this talent against him by describing him as "inflammatory." The *Morning Chronicle* in 1774 said, "Mr. Charles Fox was exceedingly hot and passionate . . . violently severe."²⁷ In 1778 the *Morning Post* reported that Colonel Luttrell called Fox "one amongst a set of the worst of placemen—placemen without places; orators who spent their time in studying inflammatory speeches . . . rhetoricians who got their livelihood by their speeches in parliament."²⁸ Next year it observed: "In the Commons, but one great gun, Fox, went off, and the patriotic powder of that was so damped, that it was an hour and forty minutes before the smoke vanished."²⁹ The *London Courant* commented:

He! . . . whose whole progress and advancement in eloquence had been a tissue of inflammation—He! whose inflammatory harangues had led the Parliament and the Nation into all the calamities under which they now labour . . . He! who had dealt in nothing but inflammation . . .³⁰

When Fox left the Government in 1782, the *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser* advised: "Cease then vainly to court popularity; your art and cunning will no longer prevail; your oratory will now lose all its charms . . . hide then your guilty head in humble retirement. . . ."³¹ And ironically in 1797 when Fox, dis-

couraged, for a time seceded from the House of Commons, refusing altogether to participate in debate, the press scolded him for *not* speaking.

THE PRESS: PRAISE

Though Fox received bitter censure during his lifetime, he also had friends among editors who esteemed, respected, idolized, marvelled. For example, James Perry accepted the editorship of the *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser* in 1783 "on the express condition that he was to be left to the free exercise of his political opinions, which were those asserted by Mr. Fox . . . liberality in the cause of freedom, justice, and humanity."³² Throughout his career, Fox received high praise—sometimes based on an objective fact, sometimes obviously partisan, but still persisting in one form or another.

Only a few examples need be cited. The *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser* wrote in 1772: "The Hon. Charles Fox never shewed himself to such advantage as on Tuesday last, on his motion for repeal of the Marriage Act. . . . No less than twenty-three avowedly intended opposers of the motion absolutely voted in support [of] it."³³ The *Morning Post* reported in 1774 that bets ran two to one in favor of "this young statesman; and even his enemies think that, with all the faults of youth, he is a match for the best; and that he will soon arrive at the highest post of honor, and the Temple of Fame."³⁴ That Fox did arrive early at his oratorical fame is suggested by a brief but glowing tribute in the *Morning Post* in 1777. Almost a year before Chatham died, on a day when he was to offer a motion in the Lords, "a

Character of the Late Charles James Fox . . ., by Philotheus Antoniensus (London, 1809), which, three years after Fox had been laid to rest in Westminster Abbey, once more reviewed Fox's moral standards (gambling and other vices) and disparaged his religious beliefs.

²⁷ Feb. 19.

²⁸ Jan. 28. This speech was reprinted in the issue of Jan. 30, and revised and reprinted, presumably the way the Colonel finally wanted it, in the issue of Feb. 4. On Feb. 5 the *Post* noted that Fox "made a variety of comments, with his usual . . . acrimony."

²⁹ Nov. 27, 1779.

³⁰ Dec. 6, 1779.

³¹ July 31, 1782.

³² Haig, p. 189.

³³ Apr. 11, 1772.

³⁴ Mar. 25. Cited also in the *Middlesex Journal*, Mar. 24-26.

knot of members of the House of Commons, wondering at the crowd that attended, all agreed that they had heard Charles Fox as great as ever Lord Chat-ham had been."³⁵

On February 3, 1778, Fox attacked the conduct of the American War by the North ministry, and spoke a full two hours; when he finished, reported the *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser*, "ministers, chap-fallen, or struck with the impossibility of giving a rational, or even plausible reply, to one of the most able speeches ever delivered in a popular assembly, declined answering a single syllable."³⁶ The inability of the ministers to attempt a refutation attracted the astonished attention of many; this was to be not the last time that Fox's opponents found it impossible to reply to him. The *London Evening-Post* gave space to a correspondent who "lamented" the "open degeneracy" of the present times, when a speech replete with "good sense, precision, and a detail of useful information" could be passed over in silence by every member of the Ministry.³⁷

Newspapers liked one speech that Fox biographers have given little attention to. Of a debate of November 25, 1779, the *Public Ledger* commented: "Mr. Fox now rivited the attention of the house to one of the best speeches ever delivered in the British, or any other senate, since oratory has been known to the world . . ." and so on for a dozen lines.³⁸ The *Morning Chronicle* commented on Fox's "greatness of stile, good sense, and humour."³⁹ The *Morning Post*, noting that the galleries were completely filled by 1:30 that afternoon,

said that "all the eloquence of this day seemed to evaporate into nothing, in comparison with that blaze of eloquence with which Mr. Fox shone."⁴⁰ The *London Chronicle*, always sparing of praise for anybody, thought "his speech was, upon the whole, the most complete performance we ever heard."⁴¹ The *St. James's Chronicle*, a triweekly with therefore an additional day to reflect, declared: "Never did Mr. Fox, in the opinion of all who heard him, shine so greatly as on this occasion."⁴² The *Public Advertiser* thought well of a speech given two weeks later: "Mr. Fox made a reply the most vehement, the most in point, and supported by the strongest arguments, and the greatest force of eloquence we ever remember to have heard him exert upon any question."⁴³ When in 1780 Fox, alluding to Solomon, declared, "We cry out aloud, and petition you for a reform of the public expenditure . . . now let the world see who is the parent of corruption," the *London Evening-Post* reported that "the hear him broke out into a torrent of applause."⁴⁴

Fox often elected to be the last, or one of the last speakers; he was particularly effective in refutation and reply. This preference meant that often he

⁴⁰ Nov. 26.

⁴¹ Nov. 25-27.

⁴² Nov. 25-27.

⁴³ Dec. 7. Other comments were similar.

Speech of Mar. 1, 1792: "There were three hundred and sixty members in the House, he spoke for nearly three hours, and during that time not one person left his seat" (*London Recorder*, Mar. 4). Speech of May 26, 1797: "One of the most brilliant and animated speeches ever delivered" (*Oracle*). "Mr. Fox's speech, on the question of reform, in the House of Commons . . . is universally allowed to have been one of the most masterly pieces of reasoning . . . that has been heard within its walls for the last 20 years" (*St. James's Chronicle*).

This study purposely omits newspaper comments on the celebrated Fox masterpieces like his plea for peace on Feb. 3, 1800, of which he himself said: "Ah, that was a damned good speech."

⁴⁴ Feb. 8-10.

³⁵ June 21.

³⁶ Feb. 4, 1778.

³⁷ Jan. 31-Feb. 3, 1778. Another correspondent in the same issue wrote that Fox "stands high in the esteem of all the remaining good, honest Whigs in the Kingdom."

³⁸ Nov. 26.

³⁹ Nov. 26.

would rise at 2:00 or 3:00 in the morning to face a house that had been exposed to speechmaking for six to ten hours. Yet invariably he was heard attentively whenever he rose to speak, for as long as he cared to hold forth. "There was now a general cry for the question, that summary mode of terminating debate," reported the *London Evening-Post* in 1780, "when the Hon. Charles Fox rose up, and the house was instantly calmed."⁴⁵ When the public knew in advance that Fox would speak, galleries would overflow: "So large was the crowd of strangers brought down to the House yesterday, in order to hear the debate on Fox's promised motion . . . that when the Printer reached Westminster Hall at three o'clock, the gallery of the House was entirely filled, and consequently he found it impossible to gain admittance."⁴⁶

Fox was effective at mass meetings as well; at Westminster he spoke to an estimated (by friendly sources) 100,000 people; when he finished the crowd yelled, "Fox For Ever," and he replied, in a short response, "that he was warmed in their cause for ever and ever." Then he was put in "an armed gilt chair," dressed out with laurel and various flowers, and carried to his office in Cleveland Row—the people lining the streets and peering from the windows yelling and cheering.⁴⁷

As Mr. Secretary Fox he received a full share of praise, to offset in part the bitter criticism directed against the coalition. The *Morning Chronicle* said that on one occasion he spoke in a strain of argument, ingenuity, and poignancy that exceeded even his two admirable speeches on the same subject in former debates; that he replied

"most ably" to Powys and Dundas, "obtaining the cry Hear! Hear! more than once, at the expence of each of these gentlemen."⁴⁸ In 1784 the *Gazetteer and New Daily Advertiser* felt justified in editorializing this praise:

Mr. Fox is alone the Minister of this country. . . . In or out of place it is precisely the same with him. His influence in Parliament is such, that he in truth is the source of every measure. . . . His maxims in politics are the most enlarged of any man in Parliament, and his powers are without question the most extensive of any man's at this instant on the public scene.⁴⁹

This comment may sound overdrawn, yet in later years newspapers that opposed Fox would wish that his talents could be brought into the Government; or they would note that Fox presented an opposing argument as strongly as it could possibly be presented—so that if he were unable to convince the printer, the printer's position must be correct.⁵⁰

One of Fox's inconsistencies even his editor-critics were willing to overlook. Although in his early years Fox had denounced the press for its handling of parliamentary debates, in 1791 he led the fight for a clarification of the libel law, so that there was enacted, the following year, that milestone in the struggle for freedom of the press known today as Fox's Libel Bill. Of his principal speech on this theme, the *World* said:

Mr. Fox was above two hours and a half on his legs—through the whole of his speech he displayed that accuracy of reasoning, brilliancy

⁴⁸ Dec. 2, 1783. Next day it observed that a subsequent speech of Fox's was "one of the completest performances ever heard in Parliament, both for accuracy [and] the finest energy of thought and expression."

⁴⁹ Jan. 26. This paragraph was probably composed by James Perry (see n. 32).

⁵⁰ Nothing shows more strongly how just and necessary has been the war . . . than that the unrivalled powers of Mr. Fox's mind should be directed . . . against it, without being able to shake . . . the national conviction" (*Times*, Feb. 6, 1800).

⁴⁵ Nov. 7-9.

⁴⁶ *Morning Chronicle*, June 13, 1781.

⁴⁷ *London Courant*, Apr. 4, 1782. But compare this reaction with the one described in n. 21.

of expression, and extent of legal information, for which he is so justly celebrated.

Mr. Fox is certainly entitled to the best thanks of his country, and of the literary world, for his noble exertions, to rescue the Press from oppression, and to restore it to its genuine freedom.⁵¹

Final evidence of the keen interest of the London press in Fox is shown by its reporting of speeches made by or about him at each of the many annual celebrations of his birthday, and of the date of his first election from Westminster. For many years, moreover, the monthly (except for summer) meetings of the Whig Club were reported at length; at this forum Fox was either the speaker, or his principles or current activities were discussed by others.

CONCLUSION

The comments about Fox in the whole sweep of London newspapers during the 1769-1806 period lead to the conclusion that he made a sharper impact upon London than, perhaps, biographers have suggested. His effectiveness as a speaker extended not only to the House of Commons, but included also a wide variety of popular audiences, some of great size. London papers admitted his abilities as a speaker, at times with qualification, though some would have applauded him more heartily had he spoken on the side of the Government rather than against it. Newspapers that sought to counteract his influence frequently presented to their readers an image of a man who was a confirmed gambler, and who was the son of a corrupt politician. Moreover, they sought

to minimize the force of his later arguments by reminding readers that at one time he had spoken on the other side. Though Fox countered vigorously, his defense seldom caught up with the attacks.

A torrent of praise, however, came in 1806, at the time of Fox's death. For days he had suffered a lingering illness, many papers printing a regular bulletin on his condition; when on September 13 he died, they outdid themselves in their tributes, giving him more space by far than they had to most of his distinguished contemporaries. After all, here was a man who, though he bore the heavy burden of many shortcomings of temperament and some of judgment, and though he had spent most of his career in hopeless opposition, had nevertheless taken a positive stand for freedom of speech, the removal of religious restrictions, the abolition of the slave trade, the importance of party as a factor in government, and the right of peoples to search for liberty. On countless occasions he had faced the people, singly, in small groups, and in throngs, to plead for their support and their suffrages; invariably he had borne their jeers and their applause with humbleness and dignity. Many Englishmen could say, as reputedly their King did, "I did not realize I would miss him as I do." A hundred and sixty-five pages of these final tributes were made part of a two-volume work, and can be consulted today as a kind of memorial erected to him by the English press.⁵²

⁵¹ May 21, 1791. On other occasions the *World* had been highly critical of Fox.

⁵² *Character of the Late Charles James Fox*, by Philopatris Varvicensis [Dr. S. Parr] (London, 1809).

PERSONALITY CHARACTERISTICS OF DEBATERS

Duane F. Hetlinger and Richard A. Hildreth

EXPERIMENTS and research in the field of speech by Dow,¹ Hunter,² Murray,³ Rose,⁴ Tracy,⁵ and Waggener,⁶ indicate that certain measurable personality characteristics may be closely related to successful public speaking ability. On this basis, it appears logical to assume that it would be possible to differentiate students with public speaking ability through the analysis of their personalities as measured by a group personality scale. However, debate, which involves a more frequent use of public speaking than other speech activities, has been examined more in the light of content and technique than in terms of the individuals involved.

The purpose of this study was to determine whether the Edwards Personal Preference Schedule (PPS),⁷ almost a self-administered personality scale, could be used to differentiate between successful debaters and non-debaters of both sexes.

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¹ Clyde W. Dow, "The Personality Traits of Effective Public Speakers," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXVII (December 1941), 525.

² Aria Daniel Hunter, "A Comparison of Introverted and Extroverted High School Speakers," *Speech Monographs*, II (1935), 50.

³ Elwood Murray, "A Study of Factors Contributing to the Maldevelopment of the Speech Personality," *Speech Monographs*, III (1936), 95.

⁴ Forrest H. Rose, "Training in Speech and Changes in Personality," *Quarterly Journal of Speech*, XXVI (April 1940), 193.

⁵ James Albert Tracy, "An Investigation of the Personality Traits of Mature Actors and Mature Public Speakers," *Speech Monographs*, II (1935), 53-57.

⁶ Janice Olive Waggener, "A Comparative Galvanometric Study of Inferior and Superior Speakers," M.A. thesis (University of Denver, 1930).

⁷ A. L. Edwards, *Manual, Edwards Personal Preference Schedule* (New York: Psychological Corp., 1954).

Specifically, the null hypotheses tested in this study are:

1. There is no personality difference, as measured by the PPS, between successful debaters and non-debaters on the high school level.
2. There is no personality difference, as measured by the PPS, between successful debaters and non-debaters on the college level.

PROCEDURE

SUBJECTS. For the purpose of this study a successful debater on both the high school and college levels is defined as a participant in interscholastic debate competition who has "won" at least one tournament. The 21 male high school successful debaters were selected from 10 Kansas high schools and paired on the basis of sex, age, general ability, grade point average, and general popularity with non-debaters, who are operationally defined as students who had no debate training. High school females are eliminated from this study because it was impossible to gather data on enough successful debaters. College level successful debaters, 28 males and 23 females selected from championship debating teams from the Kansas State Teachers College, were paired on the basis of sex and age with a random selection of students from the same college.

TESTS. The PPS, a forced-choice personality inventory, purports to measure the relative strength of 15 "manifest needs" or personality characteristics which were identified and named by N. A. Murray.⁸ The test items are matched on the basis

⁸ N. A. Murray, et al. *Explorations in Personality* (New York, 1938).

of social desirability, and each of the fifteen variables is paired twice with each of the other variables and spiraled through the test. Separate norms are provided for males and females. A measure of internal consistency is determined by a separate key. The inventory can be completed in about fifty minutes by the average high school or college student.

The PPS was administered to all subjects by their debate coaches. The subjects were told that these data were confidential and the results would be returned to the coaches for dissemination to them. The cooperation of the participating coaches and subjects was excellent.

ANALYSIS OF DATA. For each group of successful debaters and its control group, tests of significance of the difference between the mean scores for each of the 15 PPS variables were made by use of the *t*-ratio. These data are presented in Tables 1 through 3.

RESULTS. The null hypotheses as stated in this study can be rejected in both instances. The *t*-test results for college males are reported in Table 1. In this

case six personality variables were found to show significant differences between debaters and non-debaters. These results indicated that the debaters have greater need for Achievement, Dominance, and Aggression, and less need on the variables of Affiliation, Abasement, and Change. These are significant at the .01 level except for Dominance, Abasement, and Aggression, which are at the .05 level.

The *t*-test results for college females, reported in Table 2, indicated that seven personality variables differentiated between debaters and non-debaters. The mean scores of the female debaters were higher than the non-debaters for the personality variables of Achievement, Autonomy, Dominance, and Aggression, and lower for Order, Abasement, Nurture. These findings are also significant at the .01 level with the exception of Achievement, which is at the .05 level.

DISCUSSION

Those personality variables which failed to discriminate between the successful and unsuccessful subjects, have been excluded from this discussion.

TABLE 1
T-RATIOS COMPARING SUCCESSFUL COLLEGE MALE DEBATORS AND NON-DEBATORS
ON 15 PERSONALITY VARIABLES

Personality Variables	Successful Debaters		Non-Debaters		<i>t</i> Score
	Mean	Standard Deviation	M	SD	
Achievement	18.96	3.90	15.08	4.38	4.85**
Deference	11.36	4.10	11.19	3.46	.02
Order	11.32	4.95	9.63	4.49	1.71
Exhibition	16.00	3.97	15.33	3.61	.85
Autonomy	14.71	4.40	14.16	4.21	.35
Affiliation	12.57	4.43	15.30	4.02	3.08**
Intracception	15.32	5.18	13.98	5.08	1.03
Succorance	10.71	5.40	10.91	4.57	.15
Dominance	18.18	5.34	14.79	4.78	2.57*
Abasement	10.82	5.72	14.30	4.97	2.30*
Nurture	12.32	5.52	13.71	4.79	.98
Change	13.21	4.55	15.62	4.51	2.63**
Endurance	12.07	5.57	13.56	5.14	.99
Heterosexuality	16.57	5.30	17.16	6.18	.12
Aggression	15.88	4.88	13.67	4.29	2.28*

**t* of 1.90 = 5% Level.

***t* of 2.60 = 1% Level.

TABLE 2
t-RATIOS COMPARING SUCCESSFUL COLLEGE FEMALE DEBATERS AND NON-DEBATERS
ON 15 PERSONALITY VARIABLES

Personality Variables	Successful Debaters		Non-Debaters		t Score
	M	SD	M	SD	
Achievement	14.67	4.21	12.88	4.24	1.93*
Deference	11.47	3.86	12.04	3.63	.68
Order	8.23	3.97	10.55	4.32	2.64**
Exhibition	15.77	4.55	14.43	3.58	1.39
Autonomy	14.10	4.15	11.38	4.40	2.97**
Affiliation	15.97	4.70	17.72	4.26	1.72
Intracception	17.20	6.00	16.60	4.27	.48
Succorance	12.27	4.83	13.75	4.40	1.42
Dominance	17.03	3.56	12.63	4.47	5.47**
Abasement	12.97	4.48	17.95	4.40	5.07**
Nurturance	13.60	4.42	17.08	4.22	3.60**
Change	17.30	3.60	16.41	5.22	1.07
Endurance	11.40	5.90	13.01	5.03	1.31
Heterosexuality	14.50	4.34	13.02	5.57	1.51
Aggression	13.83	5.17	9.66	4.12	3.76**

*t of 1.90 = 5% Level.

**t of 2.60 = 1% Level.

TABLE 3
t-RATIOS COMPARING SUCCESSFUL HIGH SCHOOL MALE DEBATERS AND NON-DEBATERS
ON 15 PERSONALITY VARIABLES

Personality Variables	Successful Debaters		Non-Debaters		t Score
	M	SD	M	SD	
Achievement	17.38	4.30	16.48	4.51	.91
Deference	9.14	3.65	11.24	4.04	2.07
Order	7.38	3.30	10.95	6.05	2.75*
Exhibition	17.18	3.27	16.38	3.66	1.05
Autonomy	15.10	3.93	14.24	4.45	.64
Affiliation	13.81	3.34	14.62	4.03	1.41
Intracception	13.67	4.67	13.57	4.60	.07
Succorance	10.52	4.98	11.67	5.85	.67
Dominance	19.62	3.50	15.33	3.50	3.05**
Abasement	10.24	4.76	13.90	5.40	2.25*
Nurturance	11.05	5.02	14.38	5.84	1.89
Change	17.05	4.65	14.86	4.56	1.24
Endurance	14.81	5.26	11.76	5.94	2.01
Heterosexuality	19.29	5.20	16.00	6.08	1.81
Aggression	14.00	4.20	14.48	5.91	.36

*t of 2.09 = 5% Level.

**t of 2.85 = 1% Level.

Those variables which indicated significant differences are described and presented, in abbreviation, as they appear in Edwards' "manifest needs" description.

The successful male college debater is, apparently, an individual who has *greater* need than the average non-debater to be recognized as a success by doing things better than others (Achieve-

ment), and who enjoys a leadership position in groups where he can influence and direct others (Dominance). He also feels more need to criticize and attack contrary points of view (Aggression). He feels *less* need than the average non-debater for a number of firm and loyal friends (Affiliation). He also has fewer inferiority problems, is less concerned by inability to handle situations (Abase-

ment), and has less need to seek change in routine and follow fashions or fads (Change).

The successful female college debater appears to be an individual with *greater* need than the average non-debater to be recognized as a success and do things better than others (Achievement), and to assert herself as a free and independent person (Autonomy). In addition she also has more need for influencing and directing others from a position of leadership (Dominance), and to criticize and attack contrary points of view (Aggression) than the average non-debaters. She has *less* need than the average non-debater for precise organization and planning before making decisions (Order), and to treat others with kindness, sympathy, and affection (Nurturance). Like her male counterpart, she is less concerned with problems resulting from feelings of inferiority or the inability to handle situations (Abasement).

The male and female college debaters are similar in their greater needs for Achievement, Dominance, and Aggression, and in fewer needs for Abasement.

The successful high school debaters (male) indicated significant differences on three personality variables. These subjects have a greater need for Dominance and less need for Order and Abasement. There is a noticeable similarity between the successful male high school debaters and the male college debaters. The following information is offered as a matter of interest.

Although these differences are not significant, the high school successful debaters are like the college debaters in that they score higher on the variables

of Achievement and Dominance, and lower on Affiliation and Abasement than do the non-debaters.

The present findings suggest that successful debaters, as compared with non-debaters, are individuals who have high needs for Achievement—striving for success and surpassing others; low Abasement—unwillingness to submit passively or accept criticism and blame; high Dominance—fondness for leadership, control, and influencing others; low Affiliation—seeking cooperation and friendship of others; high Aggression—overcoming opposition forcefully; low Nurturance—assisting and caring for others.

SUMMARY

The average PPS profile of successful debaters and that of a matched group of non-debaters were found to be significantly different by the *t*-test technique. There are substantial differences which are apparently meaningful on 6 of 15 PPS scales for college males, on 7 of the 15 scales for college women, and on 3 of the 15 scales for high school males. The debaters tended to score higher on the variables of Achievement, Dominance, and Aggression, and lower on Affiliation, Succorance, Abasement, and Nurturance.

Although this study indicates that debaters have unique personality characteristics, no causal relationship was established or attempted. Further research is now in progress to determine whether people with these apparent debater-personality-traits seek out debate or whether debate develops these traits.

VERBAL PATTERNS IN COTTON MATHER'S *MAGNALIA*

William Reid Manierre

IN 1702, at the age of thirty-nine, Cotton Mather, champion of Puritan orthodoxy ("Puritan Priest," Barrett Wendell called him), third and last of Boston's great ministerial triumvirate of Mather,¹ indefatigable preacher of sermons, most prolific of all American writers and a conscious stylist in all that he wrote, enjoyed, after more than four years of nervous anticipation, his first sight of the published version of his masterpiece, the monumental church history of New England, the *Magnalia Christi Americana*.² In this vast work, which covers in seven books the settlement of New England, the lives of its governors and ministers, the establishment of its college, the codification of its theological principles and ecclesiastical practices, and concludes with a record of divine mercies vouchsafed and of dangers overcome, Mather chants a sustained paean to the virtues of "primitive" New England and of its founding saints. His purpose was to create a moral renaissance in a "backsliding" generation. The historical intention is, therefore, strongly qualified by the desire to move and to persuade. The method is largely biographical, and biography for Mather meant the "narration of an exemplary man's exemplary deeds, written

to glorify God, honor the memory of his faithful servants, and stimulate readers to admiration and imitation."³ Biography, then, as conceived by Mather, involved principles closely allied with epideictic—that branch of rhetoric concerned with praise or blame and most often associated with highly ornamented and extravagant style.

In the *Manuductio*,⁴ twenty-four years later, Mather cautions against "Squandering . . . Time on the RHETORIC . . . and upon all the Tropes and Schemes, . . . the very Profession whereof usually is little more than to furnish out a Stage-Player." But he qualifies this advice by advocating careful observation of the "Flowres and Airts of such Writings, as are most in Reputation for their Elegancy" and by recommending the "agreeably ingenious" employment in the "Pulpit-Oratory," of "The Sublime . . . Beautiful . . . [and] . . . Affectuous . . . Rhetoric[al] . . . Figures . . . in our Sacred Scriptures" (p. 34). Thus, the "flowers of rhetoric" out one window are back in through another; and the *Magnalia*, written in the "grand" manner, generously exemplifies this permissiveness. In this work, rhetorical ornament and verbal ingenuity, involving studied play on the sounds and/or meanings of words, constitute

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¹ Richard (1596-1669); Increase (1639-1723); Cotton (1662/63-1727/28).

² Printed in London by Thomas Parkhurst. All quotations from the *Magnalia* are taken from this edition.

³ Reginald E. Watters, "Biographical Technique in Cotton Mather's *Magnalia*," *William and Mary College Quarterly—Historical Magazine*, 3rd Series, II (1945), 155.

⁴ *Manuductio ad Ministerium* (Boston, 1726).

⁵ I have retained the original capitals, spellings, and italics throughout.

the most striking characteristics of Mather's heightened use of language.

To be fully appreciated Mather's prose must be read aloud. This fact suggests both the ultimately oratorical nature of his stylistic strategies, and the close relationship between spoken and written word in an age and place in which the sermon was the dominant literary form. The style points forward to the near fusion of rhetoric with poetic in the eighteenth century, and to the politically oriented rhetoric of America's early national period.⁶ But so too does it point back to the glories of an earlier baroque in the works of Sir Thomas Browne, Jeremy Taylor and Thomas Fuller—and beyond these to the source of Renaissance styles in the Middle Ages.

As a means of distinguishing Mather's style from that of others, I have attempted to indicate some of the ways in which his use of various "schemes" differs from that of his contemporaries. It is hoped that the following analysis of Mather's verbal patterns will illuminate his methodology, partly define his style, and suggest some of the possible consequences of appropriating to the written language techniques apparently more suited to the spoken.

1.

At its least conspicuous level, sound play in the *Magnalia* stems from the customary seventeenth-century practice of using words in pairs: "Bent and Aim" (III, 18),⁷ "Erroneous and Heretical" (III, 22). Though other New England writers sometimes coupled words in similar fashion, Mather used the device far more frequently than they, and he

alone repeatedly combined it with paromoion (repetition of sound). Because of the presence of more striking verbal ingenuities, one might well miss the two sets of word pairs contained in the following passage from "The LIFE of JOHN NORTON":

But he had the Privilege to enter into *Immortality*, without such a Formal and Feeling Death, as the most of *Mortals* encounter with; for though in the *Forenoon* of April 5, 1663, it was his Design to have Preached in the *Afternoon*, he was that *Afternoon* taken with a sudden *Lypothymie*, which presently and easily carried him away to those Glories, wherein the *Weary are at Rest*; but it was a *Dark Night*, which the *Inhabitants of Boston* had upon the Noise of his Death: Every Corner of the Town was filled with Lamentations, which left a Character upon that *Night*, unto this *Day*, not forgotten (III, 38).

The paired adjectives, "Formal and Feeling," and adverbs, "presently and easily," are unobtrusive, but they exemplify one of Mather's favorite stylistic devices, which coupled noun with noun, verb with verb, or, as here, adjective with adjective or adverb with adverb.

When others combined paromoion with word pairs, it was usually in the form of simple alliteration (repetition of sound at the beginning of words). This form often appears in the *Magnalia*: "forget or forgive" (I, 9); "Seasonable and Sufficient" (I, 31); "shaken and shatter'd" (II, 58). With equal, if not greater frequency, however, such pairs in the *Magnalia* involve repetition of sound at the end of words (homoio-teleuton): "Killing and Wounding" (I, 9); "Liberty and Property" (II, 197); "Temptations and Afflictions" (III, 16).

Almost as frequent, and far more noticeable, are the word pairs involving repetition of sounds at both end and beginning. This form (paronomasia)⁸

⁶ Gordon E. Bigelow, "Rhetoric and American Poetry of the Early National Period," University of Florida Monographs, *Humanities*, No. 4 (Spring, 1960).

⁷ Each of the seven books of the 1702 folio has separate pagination.

⁸ The minute differences between paronomasia, agnomination, syllabic antithesis, etc.

often combines a play on sound with a play on sense, but, when in conjunction with word pairs such as those described here, paronomasia in Mather's prose tended to be primarily a figure of sound. It is, however, less likely than the simpler forms to be merely additive: "Conviction . . . Confession" (III, 7); "encouraging and enlivening" (III, 53); "Passion and Poison" (III, 72); "Pathetical and Prophetical" (III, 62). The punning possibilities of this figure are sufficiently obvious, but since the pun does not necessarily involve repetition of sound, being primarily a figure of sense, it will be dealt with later.

Another form of paromoion that constantly appears in the *Magnalia* consists of the repetition in a modified word of a sound initially introduced in the modifier: "most memorable" (I, 2); "unseasonable Freezing" (I, 24); "Troublesome Time" (II, 20). Like the less elaborate word pairs, this variety of sound play is quite unobtrusive when occurring by itself. Locutions, however, that incorporate pairs of modifiers with pairs of words modified, particularly when each word contains sounds identical or similar to those contained in the other three, convey effects considerably more striking: "comfortable Dwellings and considerable Demesnes" (III, 87); "terrible Temptations, and horrible Buffetings" (III, 121). Frequently, the modifier is simply repeated: "several Deliverances from several Distresses" (III, 87). Less frequently, the modified words, although themselves containing similar sounds, do not contain sounds present in the reiterated modifier: "of Good Estate, and of Good Esteem" (III, 33).

But Mather, not satisfied with the coupling of merely two words, extended the technique to include combinations

need not concern us. What is desired here is to give some idea of the general patterns that characterize Mather's use of language.

of three or more words in series. Inordinately aware of sounds, he usually incorporated paromoion with such structures: "Little, Idle, Angry" (I, 25); "Colonies, Counties, and Congregations" (I, 27); "Provoking, Pernicious, and Perilous" (VII, 23). Frequently the series consists of three or more phrases of various types rather than of single words: "with what Holiness, with what Watchfulness, with what Usefulness" (III, 40); "their Love to, and Zeal for, and Care of these Churches" (II, 21); "broke up, went off, and came to nothing" (I, 12).⁹ Sometimes the series is interrupted by qualifying words or phrases which partly break the otherwise symmetrical pattern. Sometimes not all the words or phrases contain similar sounds, and, time after time, words placed in conjunction with each other are presented in such a way as to stress contrast or antithesis. And sometimes sets of words and phrases are not simply presented in series but are incorporated into more complex structures.

When modification is combined with sets of three or more words, the effect is conspicuous. It will be noted that, in some of the following examples, Mather varies his structure in order to avoid absolute symmetry, to make additional modification possible, or to add still another "member" to the series. Regardless of variations, however, the overall pattern remains the same—an extension and elaboration of the relatively simple device of using words in pairs: "an extraordinary Invention, Curious Disposition, and Copious Application" (IV, 173); "the Gravity, the Majesty, the Scriptural and Awful Pungency of these his Dispensations" (IV, 174); "most

⁹ The symmetry in this and the preceding example is the result of isocolon and parison rather than of paromoion. Mather ordinarily relied more on similarity of sound than of form or length, although quite often all three are involved.

Exemplary *Piety*, Extraordinary *Ingenuity*, Obliging *Affability*, join'd with the Accomplishments of an Extraordinary Preacher did render him truly Excellent" (IV, 200); "*Prayers and Praises*, and in *Inexpressible Joys*" (II, 25); "It is an *Honest*, and a *Lawful*, tho' it be not a very *Desirable* Employment" (I, 36). It would be a pointless task to categorize in detail the many variations which patterns of this kind can and do take in Mather's prose. Consider, for instance, the following passage, which, although it belongs to the same general category as do the examples already cited, is identical with none of them: "the Ministers and Passengers constantly served God, Morning and Evening; *Reading, Expounding and Applying* the Word of God, *singing* of His Praise, and *seeking* of His Peace" (I, 17). The possible combinations are innumerable, but all of them fit into the same general pattern of conscious verbal manipulation for stylistic effect.

Verbal patterns such as those described here illustrate the copia of Mather's style. He was seldom satisfied with one word if he could use two, or with two if he could use three. His theory of style does not advocate concision, nor does his prose exemplify this characteristic. These facts may partly result from the customary Puritan desire for exactness and precision, even at the expense of brevity. Much New England prose consisted of precise Biblical exegesis and the drawing of fine distinctions between theological points. In order to combine clarity with precision, the Puritan author frequently resorted to what can only be called superfluity of modification. Mather, who combined with these motives the desire to present everything in its strongest colors, delighted in piling adjective on adjective and adverb on adverb: "he

was Affable, Courteous, and generally *Pleasant*, but *Grave* perpetually; and so Cautelous and Circumspect in his Discourses, and so Modest in his Expressions" (II, 28); "this our Learned, Able, Holy, and no less *Considerate*, than *Considerable* MITCHEL" (IV, 180); "One of the most Eminent and Judicious Persons that ever lived in this World, was *Intentionally* a *New-England Man*, tho' not *Eventually*, when that *Profound*, that *Sublime*, that *Subtil*, that *Irrefragable*, yea that *Angelical Doctor*" (III, 3). There were simply not enough words in the English, or any other language, to express adequately the extremity of Mather's reverence for the leaders of primitive New England.

Closely related to the repetition of sound in groups of two or more different words is the repetition of the same word within a single sentence.¹⁰ Play on the concepts of night and day is probably the most conspicuous feature of the passage on Norton ("*Dark Night*"; "upon that *Night*"; "unto this *Day*"). Mather here calls attention to his own ingenuity by repeating the same word in different contexts and by placing it, toward the close of the sentence, in emphatic contrast with the antithetic word "*Day*."¹¹ Repetition of a single key word for stylistic effect (plocé) is one of Mather's favorite devices: "a very diminutive kind of Boat . . . [which] . . . they made a shift . . . to lengthen it so far, that they could therein form a *little Cuddy*, . . . and they set up a *little Mast*, whereto they fastened a *little Sail*, and accommodated it with some other *little Circumstances*, according to their present poor Capacity" (II,

¹⁰ Sometimes Mather would repeat a key word over and over again throughout passages extending to a paragraph or more. In his sermons, key words are repeated throughout.

¹¹ The effect is all the more pronounced because of the earlier play on "*Forenoon*" and "*Afternoon*."

54).¹² Sometimes, as here, the purpose is to emphasize a single descriptive point. Although this passage is somewhat atypical in that Mather usually emphasizes bigness, abundance, excess, rather than diminutiveness or paucity,¹³ the same technique could serve either purpose. There were no words strong enough to express Mather's detestation of idleness other than the very word itself, which, by repetition, constitutes its own superlative: "*Idleness*, alas! *Idleness* increases in the Town exceedingly; *Idleness*, of which there never came any *Goodness*; *Idleness*, which is a *reproach to any People*" (I, 37). Equally emphatic is Mather's denunciation of sin: "Let us beware of every *Sin*; for *Sin* will turn a *Man* into a *Devil*. Oh! Vile *SIN*, horrid *SIN*, cursed *SIN*; or, to speak a more pungent Word, than all of That; Oh, *SINFUL sin!*" (IV, 198).

Repetition of key words is a standard characteristic of the New England sermon. In order to keep their listeners' attention on the Biblical text, or particular thesis, New England ministers were not averse to using the same words over and over again in different contexts. They did so primarily in order to gain clarity, precision, and less often, emphasis. Mather, as usual, carried the device to extremes, and in his sermons its effect is less that of clarity and precision than of exaggerated emphasis—and, at times, of pure ingenuity. In his sermon entitled "What the Pious Parent Wishes For,"¹⁴ Mather repeats the

key word "heart" more than one hundred and sixty times. The number of exclamation marks is staggering, and the unutterable excess of his emotion is conveyed by no fewer than thirty-four instances of the exclamatory interjection "OH!"¹⁵ Mather's reliance on this characteristically oratorical stratagem is simply another indication of his overpowering compulsion to magnify, to exaggerate, to present every subject in superlative terms.

Such studied repetition of an individual word provided him with a suitable means of attaining "elegant," "charming," and "agreeably ingenious" rhetorical turns: "It was not on the *Lord's Day* only, but *every Day*, that this good Man was usually, *In the Fear of the Lord all the Day long*" (III, 79).¹⁶ More striking are passages which involve the repetition of more than one key word or phrase. These structures usually point verbal contrasts and always involve balance of one kind or another; their witty effect sometimes results from reversal of the original word order, and, less often, from violation of natural word order. Here are examples:

There was nothing more *Observable* in his *Temper*, than such a *Study of a Temper* in all *Difficult Matters*, as renders a *Person aimable* [sic], wherever 'tis *Observable* (IV, 177).

He was a Burning and a-Shining Light. In the *Tabernacle of Old . . .* there were those *Two Things*, a *Candlestick* and an *Altar*; in the *One a Light* that might never go out, in the

landers. A reading of the sermons contained in it will give, as no description can, a feeling for the difference between Mather's characteristic frenzy and the more restrained tone of his contemporaries.

¹⁵ Appearing entirely by itself, rather than in such apostrophes as "Oh God!," with which the sermon is also liberally endowed.

¹⁶ The play on "*Night*" and "*Day*" in the passage on Norton is, like the just quoted example, more ingenious than emphatic. Usually, the two qualities are about equal: "gave *Thanks* unto the God of Heaven, so they sent an *Address of Thanks* unto Their Majesties, with other *Letters of Thanks* unto some Chief Ministers" (II, 58).

¹² The four locutions in which "little" is repeated, each time with a different noun, may be considered an elaboration of Mather's use of three or more words in series. Note also that "diminutive" and "poor" are roughly synonymous with "little."

¹³ In fact, when applied to human beings, "little" was one of Mather's favorite terms of disparagement. To magnify was to praise; to diminish, to condemn.

¹⁴ Included in *A Course of Sermons on Early Piety* (Boston, 1721). This is a delightful little collection of sermons by various New Eng-

other a *Fire* that might never be extinguished; and yet such an Affinity between these, that there was a *Fire* in the *Light* of the one, and a *Light* in the *Fire* of the other (III, 32).

Mather was fond of attaining antithetic and surprising verbal relationships by altering prefixes¹⁷ or the elements of compound words: "this *False-dealing* proved a *Safe-dealing*" (I, 7); "I was my Self an *Eye-witness*, that one, who was an *Eye-witness*" (II, 67). Usually, however, this figure consists of the repetition of a single root in different inflectional forms (polyptoton): "his Abstinence had more *Sweetness* in it, than any of the *Sweets* which he abstained from" (III, 179). Here the root word "sweet" appears with two different endings but each time as a noun. Metathetic change is illustrated by the noun "Abstinence" and the verb "abstained from." The device enabled him to use what was essentially a single word as more than one part of speech within a single sentence, and to combine ingenious patterns of sound play with varying degrees of semantic antithesis.

Clearly a development of the simpler device of repeating the same word within a given passage, polyptoton is the most distinctive form of Mather's sound play.¹⁸ In its possibilities for emphasis, for elaboration of similar or antithetic concepts, for variety, and for ingenious verbal twists, this form of paromoion was ideally suited to the purposes Mather set for himself as an author, and like his other stylistic characteristics, it is an extreme form of customary Puritan literary techniques. The examples which follow will give some notion of the many variations which this figure can take:

¹⁷ As in the play on "*Forenoon*" and "*Afternoon*" in the passage on Norton.

¹⁸ Both plocé and polyptoton are important features of Edward Taylor's poetry. See my forthcoming "Verbal Patterns in the Poetry of Edward Taylor," *College English*.

- (1) he was loth to *see*, and yet fear'd he *saw* . . . (III, 189).
- (2) though a Great Person for *Stature*, yet a Greater for *Spirit*, he was greatly serviceable for the Good of the Church . . . (III, 214).
- (3) Governour *Phips* . . . must have, his *Envious Enemies*; but the palest *Envy* of them, who turned their worst *Enmity* upon him . . . (II, 58).
- (4) After *Him* we have had, besides those, whose *Lives* are anon to be *Written*, many others that by *Writing* have made themselves to *Live* . . . (IV, 135).
- (5) He was a very *Lively Preacher*, and a very *Preaching Liver*. He lov'd his *Church* as if it had been his *Family*, and he taught his *Family*, as if it had been his *Church* (III, 114).
- (6) The *Faults* of the *Penitent*, indeed, should be *Concealed*; but these pretended *Preachers* of *Repentance* are not known to *Practice* the *Repentance* which they *Preach* (VII, 32).¹⁹

In these examples, polyptoton, in combination with balanced structures, not only serves to accentuate various degrees of semantic contrast, but to emphasize the decidedly rhythmical qualities inherent in such structures.²⁰

Our progression has been from the simpler forms of sound repetition, rel-

¹⁹ This and the preceding example illustrate another trait of style frequently encountered in the *Magnalia*: the ending of a sentence with a word (usually with inflectional variation) that has previously appeared in it. As a result of Mather's fondness for repetitive patterns (isocolon, parison, and, above all, paromoion), his sentences tend to be more symmetrical than those of most New England authors. Unlike Ciceronian (or euphuistic) sentences, however, Mather's are almost never perfectly circular or symmetrical in structure. They are, rather, characterized by symmetry of the part and asymmetry of the whole, and are far more apt to involve intraclausal than interclausal balance. They conform to Senecan, not Ciceronian, patterns; on occasion, repetition of words in terminal position tends to obscure the fact.

²⁰ The emphatic rhythms of Mather's prose are further accentuated by his preference for polysyllabic diction: "As his *Diligence* was indefatigable, so his *Proficiency* was proportionable: And he was particularly considerable there, for his *Disputations* upon the *Points* then most considerably controverted" (III, 143). But this is an extreme example.

actively divorced from plays on meaning, to those in which semantic relationships are at least equal in importance to sound play. Ploce and polyptoton, for instance, particularly when combined with balanced structures, serve to emphasize contrasts in sense; but one often feels that Mather used such figures as much for their own sake as for their contribution to meaning. In passages such as those quoted in the last paragraph it is impossible to distinguish so precisely as to state dogmatically that polyptoton is primarily a figure of sound or of sense. It serves both functions about equally and so constitutes the turning point of this essay; the remainder deals with verbal ingenuities, which, although they may involve paromoion, are primarily plays on meaning rather than sound.²¹

2.

In the following passage, play on differing meanings of "stand" results in paradox: "sometimes he could not *stand before it*; but it was by *not standing* that he most effectually *withstood it*" (II, 10). Apparent contradiction is also the initial impression conveyed by the following play on "*Falling Down*" and "*Flying up*": "his Labours were so fervent and eager, that he would sometimes *Preach till he fell down*. . . . His last *Falling Down* was a "*Flying up*" (III, 217). As in these instances, the apparent contradiction of a Mather paradox is apt to be metaphorical or verbal rather than actual. "*Flying up*" is a metaphor for the ascension of the soul to heaven;²² "stand," in the verb "to withstand," means something decidedly

different from when used by itself. Because of this characteristic, Mather's verbal paradoxes are actually a kind of pun instead of the expression in words of concepts or situations that are themselves paradoxical.

The "punning paradox" constitutes a culmination of the various verbal patterns previously identified. It represents the setting up of words or phrases in balanced and antithetic relationship with each other carried to its extreme form—that of implied contradiction. Although it does not always illustrate paromoion, it frequently involves balance, antithesis, symmetry, inversion and contrast to which paromoion, in its various forms, draws attention:

- (1) But what is now become of *New-Haven Colony*? I must Answer, *It is not*: And yet it has been growing ever since it first was (I, 26).
- (2) he was chosen a *Magistrate of New-England* before *New-England* it self came into *New-England* (II, 19).
- (3) having been taught by the Affliction to *Die Daily*, as long as he *Lived* (II, 24).
- (4) Hitherto we have seen the *Life* of Mr. Cotton, while he was not yet *Alive*! (III, 15).
- (5) he became a *Father* to the *Colledge*, which had been his *Mother* (IV, 181).
- (6) Wo to us, if we are not *Born Twice* before we *Die Once*! (III, 230).

Mather also indulged in the pun pure and simple. In the *Magnalia*, the pun usually consists of a repetition of the same word in two different senses, but, on occasion, one use of the word sufficed: "when he judg'd that he had kept them on their *Knees* long enough, he having first secur'd their *Arms*, received them aboard" (II, 40). Here, without repetition, Mather expressed both the anatomical and the military meanings of the single word. Similarly, repetition was unnecessary to an ingenious play on animadversions: "It will not be so much a Surprise unto me, if

²¹ *Schemata sententiae* as opposed to *schemata verborum*; roughly synonymous with the terms "puns" and "jingles," which have often been used—most often pejoratively—to describe Mather's verbal ornaments.

²² The apparent contradiction results from Mather's intentional omission of the distinction between body and spirit.

I should live to see our *Church-History* vexed with *Anie-mad-versions* of Calumnious Writers" ("General Introduction"). Usually, however, the effect was gained by repeating homonyms in their different senses:

He did not put off his *Charity*, to be put in his last *Will*, as many who therein shew that their *Charity* is against their *Will* (III, 181).

. . . the *Ministers* . . . used all due *Pains* to *Charm* these *Adders* with convincing *Disputations*, when they were in the *Bay*, and indeed often drove them to a *Bay* with *Argument* (VII, 12).

. . . to be oft, or long in your *Visits* of the *Ordinary*, 'twill certainly expose you to *Mischiefs* more than ordinary (I, 36).

Mather's desire to be ingenious is even more apparent in his discussion of certain "*Private Meetings* [at which] good People [concluded] their more Sacred Exercises with Suppers; [but now, although the meetings] do still abound among us; . . . the *Meals* that made *Meetings* of them, are generally laid aside" (III, 6). Puns on common nouns, usually combined with some form of repetition, are frequent in Mather's prose, but his special delight was in the metaphorical possibilities afforded by personal names.

In contrast to his other verbal ingenuities, Mather's puns on personal names rarely depend on repetition of sound or on balanced structure. Their distinguishing feature is their metaphorical quality—easy metaphors, to be sure, but not used frivolously:

[Henry Flint] was a *Solid Stone*, in the Foundations of *New-England* (III, 122).

Thomas Shepard . . . escaped those, to whom such a *Shepherd* was an *Abomination* (III, 87).

. . . even that *Hooker*, who having *Angled* many *Scores* of Souls into the Kingdom of Heaven (III, 174).

. . . for all the *Fires* of Martyrdom which were kindled in the Days of *Queen Mary*, [York-

shire] afforded no more *Fuel* than one poor *Leaf*; namely, *John Leaf*, an apprentice (II, 2).

Sometimes, as in the following pun on the name of John Cotton, the effect is ludicrous: "One would have thought the *Ingenuity* of such a *Spirit* should have broke the *Hearts of Men*, that had indeed the *Hearts of Men* in them; yea, that the hardest *Flints* would have been broken, as is usual, upon such a soft *Bag of Cotton*! (III, 26). It is, perhaps, all for the best that Mather closed this sentence with an exclamation point.

Play on the meanings of personal names often appears in conjunction with Mather's use of knowledge derived from books. The name of Samuel Stone was, like those of Hooker and Shepard, ideally suited for the simple pun. "Indeed the Foundation of *New-England* had a precious *Jem* laid in it, when Mr. *Stone* arrived" (III, 116). "He was a *Man of Principles*, and in the Management of those *Principles*, he was both a *Load stone* and a *Flint stone*" (III, 117). In the following passage, however, the simple pun, in which Samuel Stone gave "sparks" in the form of a theological work, introduces equations between Samuel Stone, the "*Stone from the Sling of David*" (I Samuel, 17:49) and the "*Stone of Bohan*" (Joshua, 15:6; 18:17):

But certain *Strokes* of Mr. *Hudson* and Mr. *Cowdrey*, fetch'd one *Spark* out of this well compacted *Stone*; which was, *A Discourse about the Logical Notion of a Congregational Church*; wherein some thought, that as a *Stone* from the *Sling of David*, he has mortally wounded the Head of that *Goliah*, *A National Political Church*. At least, he made an *Essay*, to do what was done by the *Stone of Bohan*, setting the *Bounds* between Church and Church, as *That* between *Tribe* and *Tribe* (III, 118).

The puns here refer not only to Biblical matters but to controversies over the relationship between church and state. The knowledge derived from books also contributes its share to a pun on the

illness that did not cause Samuel Stone's death: "As for Mr. Stone, if it were *Metaphorically* true (what they *Proverbially* said) of Beza, that *he had no Gall*, the Physicians that opened him after his Death, found it *Literally* true in this worthy Man" (III, 118).²³ And a Latin aphorism concludes yet another pun on the apposite subject of stones: "'Tis not easy to *comprehend*, and I wish no such Faithful Servant of God may *experience* it; how much the *Spirit* of Mr. Stone, was worn by the *Continual Dropping* of this Contention.—*Gutta Cavat Lapidem*" (III, 118).²⁴ In fact, "The LIFE of Mr. SAMUEL STONE" opens with a learned, biographical parallel based on the identity of meanings of the English word "stone" and the Latin word "lapis."

"The LIFE of Mr. ADAM BLACKMAN" consists largely of a play on contrasts between name and character, combined with appropriate comments on a famous teacher who "had the Name of *Niger*" and that "Great Person among the Reformers in *Germany*, . . . [Melanchthon] . . . who had almost the same Name with our *Blackman*" (III, 94). Although the name of Partridge is less obviously suited to puns on character and calling than are Shepard, Hooker, Stone, or Blackman, Mather discovered a parallel that thoroughly pleased him. "The LIFE of Mr. RALPH PART-RIDGE" consists almost entirely of an extended, punning metaphor that con-

veys, in little, the essence of the Puritan migration to New England.²⁵ This particular divine was described (III, 99):

an hunted Partridge . . . , distress'd by . . . Ecclesiastical *Setters* . . . [Having] Defence, neither of *Beak*, nor *Claw*, . . . [he took] *Flight* over the Ocean . . . [and] . . . Covert [in] the Colony of *Plymouth*. . . . [He had] the Innocency of the *Dove* [and] . . . , in the great Soar of his intellectual Abilities . . . , the Loftiness of an *Eagle*. . . . [He was], notwithstanding the *Paucity* and the *Poverty* of his Congregation, so afraid of being any thing that look'd like a *Bird* wandring from his *Nest*, that he remained with his poor People, tiil he took *Wing* to become a *Bird of Paradise*, along with the winged *Seraphim* of Heaven.

EPITAPHIUM

Avolavit —————

This is not great literature, but surely it is a pleasure to read. Doubtless, the formula is mechanical; neither intuitive perception nor artistic sensitivity is requisite to its use. The pun and the fanciful conceit are out of date and have lost their seriousness, but for Mather they provided a perfect means of combining variety and ingenuity with edification. His delight in developing such figures communicates itself to the sympathetic reader—but this is beyond the reach of analysis.

Personal names were not, for Mather, mere tags, of use only to distinguish one man from another.²⁶ They, like everything else, were full of meaning. What may be called the etymological pun was another device by means of which Mather utilized such meaning: to "bedeck" his prose, to characterize his subject, to advocate desirable personal "attributes," and, ultimately, to profit his readers. This variety of the pun con-

²³ Note the explicit distinction between metaphorical and literal meanings. Note also the equation drawn, in the preceding quotation, between "*Goliah*" and "*A National Political Church*." Analogical, metaphorical, and symbolical (no less than typological) interpretation of the Scriptures was responsible for much that appears in New England (as in Medieval) literature.

²⁴ One cannot fail to note how Mather's verbal devices appear again and again. In this example, there is the pointed contrast between "*comprehend*" and "*experience*;" in the preceding example, between "*Metaphorically*," "*Proverbially*," and "*Literally*."

²⁵ As Austin Warren says in *New England Saints* (Ann Arbor, 1956), p. 15: "Cotton Mather, commemorating the Reverend Ralph Partridge, . . . finds a life in a name. . . ."

²⁶ Nor did other orthodox New England Puritans consider them as mere tags. See the first chapter of Warren (above).

sists of the pointed use, in English translation, of the original meanings conveyed by personal names in their parent languages. Sometimes, as with the name of Thomas Allen, Mather underscores his linguistic knowledge. "The Name of *Allen* being but our Pronunciation of the Saxon Word, *Alwine*, which is as much as to say *Beloved of All*, expressed the Fate of this our *Allen*, among the Generality of the well-disposed. And being a *Man greatly Beloved* . . ." (III, 215).²⁷ Sometimes Mather used his knowledge of ecclesiastical history to introduce his etymological puns. The result is a variety of the biographical parallel. "One of the First English Arch-bishops assumed the Name of *Deus dedit*, and the Historian says, he answered the Name that he assumed. Our *Nathanael* was not in the Rank of Arch-bishops; but *as was his Name, a GIFT OF GOD, so was he!*" (III, 104). Usually, however, as in the two following examples, Mather's use of this learned device was unobtrusive. "His *Benjamin* was made the *Son of his Right Hand* . . ." (III, 174). "Her Name was *Anne*, and *Gracious* was her Nature" (III, 173). Somehow less obnoxious to modern tastes than the pun pure and simple, the etymological pun reflects, and partly defines, Mather's learned background.

The anagram, like the pious pun, and itself a kind of pun, provided Mather with still another means of extracting significance from personal names. "... an End, whereat JOHN NORTON went, according to the Anagram of his Name INTO HONOR" (III, 38). "... our *Eliot* (the Anagram of whose Name was TOILE) . . ." (III, 193). Mather himself described the anagram as "a

certain little *Sport of Wit*" (III, 49)—a phrase indicative of low esteem. He recognized, however, that it, like the pun, could be used for edification. Sometimes it "has afforded Reflections very *Monitory*, as *Alstedius* by his just Admirers changed into *Sedulitas*; or very *Characterizing*, as *Renatus Cartesius*, by his Disciples turn'd into, *Tu scis res Naturae*; or very *Satyrical*, as when *Satan ruleth me*, was found in the Transposed Name of a certain Active Persecutor"²⁸ (III, 49). Since anagrams could be at the same time instructive and ingenious, Mather had every reason for using them in the *Magnalia*, but few of those that appear in the work are of his own devising. Almost all are qualified by the remark that someone else made them up. "Mr. Wilson's anagrammatising of JOHANNES NORTONUS into *Nonne is Honoratus?* Will give him his deserved Character" (III, 38). John Allin "was indeed one of so sweet a Temper, that his Friends *Anagrammatised* [his name] into this: IN HONI ALL" (III, 133).

Anagrams and pious puns are forms of the same general technique, which results from a search for significance over and above mere literal import. They are also indicative of the importance attached by New England Puritans to the meanings of words and, in particular, of those most meaningful of all words—personal names. J. F. Jameson remarks:

The punning habit . . . crops out in all [of Mather's] writings, and indeed a general habit of verbal jingles and ingenuities which might justify one in applying to [Mather] what he

²⁸ Mather, in discussing John Wilson's penchant for the anagram, points out the didactic values of this form of wit: "... there could scarcely occur the Name of any Remarkable Person, at least, on any Remarkable Occasion unto him, without an Anagram raised thereupon; and he made this Poetical, and Peculiar Disposition of his Ingenuity, a Subject whereon he grafted Thoughts far more Solid, and Solemn, and Useful, than the Stock it self" (III, 49).

²⁷ For a more extended example, which combines display of linguistic knowledge with Biblical exegesis, see Mather's discussion of "the signification of the word Azazel" (VI, 66).

in the *Magnalia* says in praise of Rev. John Wilson, in commending

"His care to guide his *Flock* and feed his lambs,

By words, works, prayers, psalms, alms,
and anagrams."²⁹

Mr. Jameson's comment introduces the final point of this essay. Play on the sound and/or meaning of words is unquestionably characteristic of the *Magnalia's* style, but to what extent is it a distinguishing feature?

3.

What distinguishes Mather's sound play is less the nature of the techniques used than the excessive use to which he put them. Many of the patterns described at the beginning of this paper occasionally appear in the prose of other New England authors. William Bradford, John Cotton, Edward Johnson, and John Norton, for instance, utilized word pairs and sometimes combined them with repetition of sound.³⁰ Others, such as John Winthrop, Increase Mather, and William Hubbard, rarely used such pairs either with or without sound play. Repetition of the same word within a single sentence was not uncommon, but the purpose was, almost invariably, clarity or emphasis rather than ingenuity. Repetition of the same stem with inflectional variation³¹ was, however, extremely rare. Play on two key words in antithetic relationship was also uncommon, but does, on occasion, appear. Structures involving antithetic and balanced relationships between clauses

or phrases are far more frequent, but, with the exception of Mather, few authors brought attention to them by paromoion. Other writers, when they wished to make a passage particularly striking, had at their disposal the same techniques that Mather used. But he wanted everything to be striking and, consequently, used exorbitantly what others used with restraint.

The passage in which William Hubbard remarks that "the foolishness of the sons and daughters of men makes them choose sin rather than shame, till at last they are covered with sin for their shame,"³² is virtually indistinguishable from innumerable passages in the *Magnalia*. So too with isolated passages in the writings of John Norton, Thomas Hooker, and Increase Mather. In the prose of these authors, however, such rhetorical turns are isolated, tending to occur no more than three or four times in a given work. Furthermore, by the 1690's, Cotton Mather was almost alone in continuing to use them at all.³³ They reflect an earlier period, during which a restrained play with words was a legitimate form of decoration, during which a limited use³⁴ of verbal ingenuity was not regarded as entirely frivolous. By the 1690's, however, literary standards were changing, and spokesmen for a new age—the Stoddards, Calefs, Colmans, and Wises—had no use for such "outworn devices." What distinguishes Mather's use of sound play from that of earlier New England writers is that he utilized it so frequently and in such a

²⁹ J. Franklin Jameson, *The History of Historical Writing in America* (Boston, 1891), p. 5. Jameson quotes from "The LIFE of Mr. JOHN WILSON," *Magnalia*, III, 51.

³⁰ Usually in the form of alliteration. Johnson was fond of using series of three or more nouns or noun phrases. Such series, in Johnson, frequently involve either alliteration or homoioteleuton.

³¹ Or with metathetic change or varied prefix.

³² William Hubbard, *A General History of New England from the Discovery to MDCLXX*, Vols. V and VI, MHS Collections, 2nd Series (Boston, 1848), VI, 530.

³³ They continue to appear sporadically in the prose of Increase Mather, and one occasionally encounters them in that of Benjamin Wadsworth.

³⁴ Cotton Mather's generous use of such techniques would always have conflicted with the negative requirements of the plain style.

variety of contexts. What rarely appears in the prose of others is constantly present in the *Magnalia*. Few of its paragraphs are without rhetorical turns of one kind or another, and, when missing, their place is usually taken by ingenious displays of learning. When, as so often happens, the two appear in combination, the effect is distinctly Matherian.

The abundance of "verbal jingles,"³⁵ rather than their mere presence, distinguishes Mather's prose from that of New Englanders who wrote prior to the last decade of the seventeenth century. Their presence or absence alone, however, helps to distinguish "early" New England prose from that produced after the turn of the century. But verbal ingenuity stemming primarily from the studied play on multiplicity of meanings, rather than on repetitive sound patterns, is, regardless of date, a major feature in the prose of but two New England authors—Cotton Mather and Nathaniel Ward.

Before the close of the century, the pious pun had been a thoroughly reputable ingredient of elegiac verse. "Since nothing in the life of a good man could be unordained by Providence, one's name—either in its pristine form, or anagrammatically rearranged—or the disease one suffered from, or one's profession, or the mode of one's death: all were motifs not adventitious."³⁶ Except for Mather and Ward, however, New Englanders tended to restrict the pun,

whether on common noun or personal name, to the funeral elegy.³⁷ The anagram, too, was ordinarily limited to obituary verse; although it occasionally appeared in prefatory poems.³⁸ These were techniques that the generality of New Englanders considered somehow less suitable to prose than to poetry, Cotton Mather and Nathaniel Ward dissenting.

The "punning habit" perfectly exemplifies Mather's custom of putting to use every rhetorical device available to him. Others used the pun in their poetry; Mather used it in his prose as well. Others occasionally used antithetic structures in their prose, and, less often, combined it with simple and unobtrusive forms of sound play; Mather incorporated seeming contradiction with such structures, and the result is the punning paradox. Others, interested in exegetical precision, worked out the etymology of words; Mather combined etymological study with plays on double meanings, and the result is the etymological pun. Others tended to limit the anagram to obituary verses; Mather utilized it in his prose. In short, whatever had proved useful to other writers, Mather appropriated to his own purposes; verbal techniques that others used seldom, unobtrusively, and with restraint, Mather used without restraint, extravagantly, and in exaggerated form.

³⁷ This is not to say that puns never appear in the prose of others than Ward or Mather; only, that they are rare.

³⁸ See, for instance, the anagrams on the name of Cotton Mather that precede the text of the *Magnalia*.

³⁵ Those that consist of sound play rather than play on meaning.

³⁶ Warren, *loc. cit.*

THE FORUM

KENNETH BURKE AND IDENTIFICATION

To the Editor:

In the October, 1960, issue of *QJS*, Mr. Dennis Day made an effort to throw some light on Kenneth Burke's contributions to our field in an article entitled, "Persuasion and the Concept of Identification." Quoting Marie Hochmuth Nichols' statement that "Burke deserves to be related to the great tradition of rhetoric," Mr. Day proceeded to support this position in his discussion. If this statement means, as Mr. Day's paper seems to indicate, that Burke is basically traditional in his approach, then in my opinion Burke "deserves" something more than to be pigeonholed with Aristotle. In order to make full use of Burke's contributions, we need to dwell on what is *new* in Burke.

Mr. Day tells us:

We shall discover that Burke's concept of identification is an extension of traditional rhetorical theory, that it is based upon his philosophical concept of "substance," and that the concept of identification itself is expressed implicitly in the writings of A. E. Phillips and explicitly in James Winans' book, *Public Speaking*.

My investigation suggests that this description is so superficial that it tends to be grossly misleading, and that it is more profitable and more appropriate to take the position that the term *identification* used by Burke is an essentially new term, with properties that are not found in the traditional use of the term. I should like further to suggest that Burke's whole discussion of rhetoric ought to be viewed by scholars in our field as a new approach to the subject which can no

longer profitably be grouped with classical tradition.

The key to Burke's concept of identification is not that it is like the identification of Winans and Phillips. Burke's identification certainly encompasses the concept of Winans and Phillips, but it functions not only as a *process* whereby separate entities are brought together, but also as a *structure*—a hierarchial structure in which the entire process of rhetorical conflict is organized. Identification is then not only a process which operates in rhetoric; it is also the structure which gives it order.

Although Mr. Day is right as far as he goes in saying that "identification at its simplest" can be put "in terms of the joining of interests," he overlooks or ignores the hierarchial function of Burke's identification concept. Mr. Day supports his statement by quoting Burke out of context: "For example, the politician says to the farm group, 'I was a farm boy myself.'" The complete quotation from Burke is: "Identification ranges from the politician who, addressing an audience of farmers says, 'I was a farm boy myself,' through the mysteries of social status, to the mystic's devout identification with the source of all being." Although Burke admits the traditional rhetorical definition of identification into his definition, he places the greater emphasis in this work on spinning out the implications of the latter part of the statement—the functioning of the hierarchy of identification in the context of social action.

Mr. Day tells us: "Burke generally conceives of rhetoric in traditional terms.

Almost one half of *A Rhetoric of Motives* is devoted to what he titles 'traditional principles of rhetoric.' " To characterize the first part of *A Rhetoric of Motives* as a traditional treatment of rhetoric, regardless of what Burke calls it, is a dangerous oversimplification of the facts. Viewing as he does the whole realm of traditional rhetoric from the standpoint of his identification concept, Burke discusses the traditional rhetoric in a far from traditional way. For instance, in summing up his discussion of Aristotle, Burke tells us, "Thus, all told, besides the *extension* of rhetoric through the concept of identification, we have noted . . . purely traditional evidences of the rhetorical motive." He also uses his discussion of Aristotle to introduce ideas of "semi-verbal, semi-organizational," tactics which Burke calls a "Rhetoric of Bureaucracy." In this discussion, Burke is illustrating the workings of the identification hierarchy in the social structure. He points to the devices in Machiavelli's *The Prince* as an example. Surely these ideas cannot properly be called Aristotelian.

I would like to suggest that Mr. Day and other writers in the field who have made such an effort to relate Burke to the rhetorical tradition now take a look at the other side of the coin and examine more closely what is unique in his position.

Identification in its function as a structure is an order based on the resolution of conflicts by finding their common source. A conflict is "resolved" by discovering a larger generalization which will encompass both sides of the conflict. In this structure, "truth" is arrived at not by eliminating one side of a conflict and allowing the other to stand, but by finding a "name" which will describe the state of the conflict at any given time. A result of this approach

is a uniquely modern statement of "truth" not in absolute terms but in terms of an ordered *contingency*. This new kind of rhetorical statement is fundamentally akin to Heisenberg's *uncertainty principle*, Weiner's *physics of contingency*, and other contemporary scientific statements about the nature of the universe.

The implications of this new rhetorical statement have yet to be considered by scholars in our field. Aristotle met Plato's challenge in fashioning a rhetoric to deal with the Platonic notion of truth as an absolute. Is it not possible that Burke is fashioning a rhetoric to deal with the modern notion of truth as a contingency? We can answer this question by examining closely Burke's "hierarchy of identification," being careful to avoid over-simplifications and too-easy categorizations of this difficult but exciting concept.

JOHN W. KIRK
University of Florida

KENNETH BURKE AND IDENTIFICATION—A REPLY

To the Editor:

In the foregoing letter, Mr. Kirk bases his disagreement with my treatment of the Burkean conception of identification on two points: (1) the term *identification* should be treated as "an essentially new term," and (2) identification "functions not only as a process . . . but also as a . . . hierarchial structure. . . ." Both points involve semantic difficulties.

Identification is neither a "new" term nor a "new" concept with Burke. The semantic problem here is what we mean by the term "new." Let us drop the term "new" and phrase the point in a different way. Neither the concept of identification nor the term *identification* originate with Burke. With this statement there should be no disagreement.

What then is original with Burke? Burke's treatment of rhetoric *solely* in terms of identification is original. This is the point I made in the concluding paragraph of my discussion of the concept.

It is difficult to determine from Mr. Kirk's letter what value will accrue from dissociating Burke's discussion of identification from previous discussions of the concept. Mr. Kirk is concerned with exploring the implications of identification for rhetoric. We can agree that before we begin exploring the implications of a concept we should define the concept. The purpose of my article was directed to this end. Our understanding of Burke's use of the concept is facilitated by examining previous treatments of the concept in both rhetoric and psychology.

The semantic difficulties involved in Mr. Kirk's second point, that identification is not only a process but a structure, are obvious. What is a process? A structure? Furthermore, to say that identification is a process and a structure does little to illuminate the concept itself. Some of the confusion in attempting to define identification stems from the fact that Burke uses the term in two fundamentally different senses: identification *of* and identification *with*. Identification *of* refers to the *act* of indicating consubstantiality. Identification *with* refers to the *affective relationship* which results from the perception of consubstantiality. Neither of these uses of the term suggests that identification is *structure*. Admittedly, identification may operate *within* a structure such as a social system. It may even be the "force" or "motive" which holds the structure together—as Freud suggests in *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*—but it does not follow from such an

analysis that identification is the structure.

The recognition that Burke's treatment of rhetoric is related to both classical and modern treatments of rhetoric does not mean that we cannot explore the implications of that which is original in Burke. A careful reading of my article will indicate that I do not suggest that Burke should be "pigeonholed" with Aristotle or even that he should be "grouped with classical tradition." I agree with Mr. Kirk that "in order to make full use of Burke's contributions, we need to dwell on what is *new* in Burke," but I would add that in order to understand what is new in Burke, we need to examine his relations with traditional and modern principles of rhetoric and psychology.

DENNIS DAY

San Diego State College

GHOSTWRITTEN SPEECHES

To the Editor:

In his article on "The Ethics of Ghostwritten Speeches," (*QJS*, October 1961), Professor Bormann is right in contending that the practice of ghostwriting raises an important and difficult ethical issue. Ghostwriting and collaborative writing are widespread in our culture, and the practice seems to be increasing. Such practice often carries overtones of deception, and to this extent calls for serious and sustained attention by students of speech.

However, I believe Professor Bormann is wrong in his effort to establish a kind of generalized ethical indictment of ghostwriting regardless of the context within which the "ghost" does his work, or the motivations which occasion the work. Professor Bormann's method of attacking the problem of ghostwriting seems to be first to cite instances of such writing which are patently uneth-

ical, as in the case of the college student who turns in as his own work a paper written by a fraternity brother. He then associates such ethical malpractice with such unsavory incidents as the deceptions practiced in television quiz shows. He leaps to the conclusion that the effectiveness of any ghostwritten communication depends on deception. He is then ready to assert the position that ghostwriting is wrong, and make this a kind of ethical imperative sufficient to cover any and all instances of the practice.

This method of ethical analysis has the merit of permitting one to make strong moralistic statements and to discover that our society is full of sinners. But it results in some rather unusual categorizations of persons and practices. By propounding a generalized indictment of ghostwriting, Professor Bormann manages to get George Washington and Dwight Eisenhower, who used speech writers, into the same bed with the student who plagiarizes his English theme, the graduate student who buys his dissertation, or the quiz bowl contestant who dramatizes his struggle with questions for which he has been given the answers. While I would not argue that presidents are not caught up in communication practices which may be suspect, I nevertheless am uneasy with the kind of ethical generalization which catches the father of our country in the same net with a plagiarist. Perhaps a different kind of ethical analysis is needed.

I was trying to suggest a different kind of analysis some years ago when I said that college professors ought to write their own speeches, but that the administrators of vast and complex organizations cannot be expected to take the time to originate the manuscripts for all the speeches they may have to make as

a condition of their responsibility. Professor Bormann says that in taking such a position, I am applying a "double standard" to communication practices. I would say that I am trying to make some distinctions about the vastly different circumstances which occasion the use of ghost writers, and the way in which our ethical judgments ought to take account of these circumstances. This is common and sensible practice in the field of ethical judgments. We say that a father is wrong, both legally and morally, if he forcibly imprisons one of his children; but we say that under some circumstances the state may forcibly imprison persons who break laws. We say that murder is ethically and legally wrong, but we do not censure the man who takes the life of another in defense of himself or his family. In short, we do not treat all cases of forcible imprisonment, or of taking life, as though they were of one substance; to do so would not reveal the purity of our morality but rather our lack of capacity to observe important distinctions in the nature of actions which share some characteristics.

If we ask whether or not it is wrong for a student to submit a speech or paper written by another as though it were his own, the answer is immediately clear. Of course it is wrong. The assumption under which such classroom papers are produced is that the student is learning to do his own work, and that he is to be evaluated, as an individual, on that work. If a student represents another's work as his own, he does violence to one of the basic premises upon which an institution of learning conducts its business. His malpractice, if generally followed, would destroy the vitality and usefulness of educational institutions. Needless to say, in such a setting, the person using a ghost writer must main-

tain complete secrecy as to his practice if he is to escape punishment. Deception is not merely an overtone of the practice; it is the essence of the practice.

If we apply the same kind of analysis to the use of speech writers by presidents of the United States, our answers do not flow so easily. We may note in the first place that virtually all American presidents since the founding of the Republic have used collaborators in the preparation of some of their speeches, and that the practice has now been institutionalized to the point that the title "speech writer" designates in a relatively unambiguous manner the work of certain employees of the federal government. The universality of the use of ghost writers by presidents seems not to have destroyed the institution of the presidency. In fact, one might suspect that the practice has grown up in response to the nature of the task faced by presidents, and their concern with performing these tasks efficiently.

An examination of the office of the presidency would reveal some interesting differences between the role being taken by the president, and that being taken by a college student, or for that matter a college professor. The president presents himself simultaneously as a person and as the spokesman of a vast and complex organization known as the federal government. As the chief of state his voice is the voice of many persons. He speaks for himself, he speaks for his administration, he speaks at times for the American nation. His responsibilities are awesome. He is administrator, policy maker, and the most authentic single voice of that vast abstraction known as the American nation. We not only expect that he will seek collaboration in the development and execution of his policies; we would think him both arrogant and negligent were

he to fail to do so. If a crisis develops in Berlin, we may expect that he will address the American people concerning that crisis. We do not expect that he will spend eight hours on the day the crisis breaks developing the first draft of this message. We do expect that he will meet with the relevant advisers on formation of policy; that he will communicate the essence of his policy to skilled writers; and that when he speaks he will know as fully as possible the meaning of all that he says and accept the full responsibility for saying it. I cannot conceive of the president of the United States, or the head of any other large institution, doing his job responsibly and effectively without deploying the fullest range of talent available to him in the conduct of that job. And it seems to me that the president who seeks out the finest writers he can command to help him with his speeches is acting both responsibly and ethically. His action does not assume that his speechmaking is an incidental chore on the level of making hotel reservations. Along with Professor Bormann, I object to this kind of defense of ghostwriting as offered by Mr. Ray. Rather the president's use of speech writers would seem to reflect his awareness of the importance of his role as "spokesman." The president should no more talk in public without the counsel of advisers than he should try to run the armed forces without the assistance of the joint chiefs of staff.

Professor Bormann seems to me to strain his readers' credulity when he suggests that the usefulness of ghost writers, even by presidents, would be ended unless an element of deception is introduced into the action. A citizen of the United States would need to maintain an aggressive level of ignorance to be unaware of the fact that presidents

use speech writers. The names and activities of such writers have been reviewed not merely in scholarly publications, but also in news magazines and newspapers with the widest circulation. I dare say there are many Americans who have not read any of these accounts, just as there may be many who would guess that SEATO is a new type of reclining arm chair. But it is unquestionably the case that wide and continuing publicity is being given to the activities of speech writers attached to the president's office, and that there has been no disposition in recent years for American presidents to seek to conceal their use of such writers. I think it likely that public knowledge and understanding of the work of the speech writer in the president's office is greater today than at any time in this nation's history. The increased candor with which the work of presidential speech writers is treated seems to me both sensible and ethical, and to set a pattern which ought to be followed by executives in less prominent positions. In short, it seems to me that the public needs to understand the way in which executives or administrators conduct the work of their offices, to comprehend the significance and complexity of managerial action in our complicated age, and to get rid of some of its illusions about the way decisions are made and communicated in the modern world.

Professor Bormann's brief treatment of alternatives to the use of speech writers by busy executives seems to me singularly unpersuasive. In the interests of brevity I will avoid a detailed analysis of the kind of necessity which underlies most of the public appearances of a president of the United States, or the kinds of compelling reasons presidents have for their frequent use of manuscript speeches rather than extemporaneous

speeches. But I think it possible to observe that the speaking practices of successive presidents are substantial evidence that necessity exists for these practices, and that this necessity has nothing to do with the attractions of deception. I simply cannot agree that George Washington used speech writers because he thought his public image needed inflation, or that Andrew Jackson used speech writers because he thought it wise to deceive the American people, or that Abraham Lincoln sought Seward's advice on some of his speeches because he thought his own style insufficient to the tasks of his office. If I am right in believing that the use of speech writers by presidents has little to do with their desire to be deceptive, and much to do with the necessity of the political institution which they serve, then I think we ought to be cautious about flinging the word "unethical" in the direction of such practices. The institutional life of any society is inseparable from the culture or civilization of that society, and communication practices incident to the conduct of that institutional life cannot be blithely altered without affecting in an important way the form and efficiency of the institution. I am not ready to change the form of the American presidency to eliminate the use of speech writers.

Professor Bormann wants all men to speak for themselves. It is a position I find attractive. Most of our efforts in speech education are directed at providing students with the skill, the courage, and the intellectual resources to enable them to attain such self-sufficiency. But speech itself is a social phenomenon before it is an individual possession. It belongs to a culture as much as to a man. It manifests itself as a behavior linked not only to the action of a person, but also linked to the so-

cial context within which the person acts. We are unwise as students of speech to ignore or treat lightly the importance of context in shaping the multitude of forms within which speaking originates and takes place. We would be wise, I believe, in attacking the problem of ghostwriting, or collaboration, to seek to examine the variety of contexts within which such practice occurs, to appraise existing practice against the full range of purpose and necessity which it reflects, and to pinpoint our ethical judgments.

DONALD K. SMITH
University of Minnesota

GHOSTWRITTEN SPEECHES— A REPLY

To the Editor:

I should like to address to Professor Smith a Modest Proposal for Agreement on the Unethical Nature of the Majority of Speech Collaborations in Our Society.

If I interpret Professor Smith's letter accurately, he and I both agree that when a college student employs someone to write a speech, a paper, or a thesis for him, the practice is "patently unethical." We would further agree, I think, that the graduate adviser who writes substantial portions of a thesis for a student, or the forensic director who appreciably upgrades an oration or a debate speech for his students, is unethical. From his silence on these matters, I take it he would agree that ordinary citizens, clergymen, and college professors who hire a ghostwriting agency or a writer friend (or, perhaps, a member of SAA) to write their speeches for them are unethical. If he would allow one further class of speech events to be covered by our "ethical imperative," I should be content, and as I

read his letter I believe that he might well agree.

But before we come to that shadowy area on the continuum that divides what we can condone from what we must condemn, I would like to enter one small disclaimer. Professor Smith has misrepresented slightly my "method" of analysis of this problem. He says that I first cite "patently unethical" examples of ghostwriting and then leap to "a kind of ethical imperative sufficient to cover any and all instances of the practice." He hints that I thereby find myself in the embarrassing position of charging Abraham Lincoln with the unethical use of ghost writers. This slight misrepresentation makes me seem intolerant, impractical, and anti-American since I would be against both George Washington and Abraham Lincoln. The consummate rebuttal skill demonstrated in setting up this straw man makes me shudder a bit to contemplate Professor Smith's active role in a "Speech Writing Team in a State Campaign."

Professor Smith prefers the legalistic approach exemplified in the laws of homicide. Actually my method was much closer to the one he prefers than the one he erected for me. How do we decide if a homicide is justifiable, or third degree murder, or first degree murder? (The very words "third degree," "first degree," suggest a continuum such as the one I set up in my analysis.) We must define first degree murder carefully so the law can be applied to a given killing. I defined ghostwriting as the practice of using collaborators to deceive the audience and make the speaker appear better than he is (or at least different).

Even though the law is quite explicit, however, we are still faced with decisions about those shadowy cases between justifiable homicide and murder.

Professor Smith raises this question about collaboration: Are those cases where the great man speaks not for himself but as a spokesman for the office of the presidency of the United States, or for the Teamster's Union, or for the United States Steel Corporation, ghostwriting? If, indeed, as Professor Smith argues, the audience is clearly and explicitly informed that although the great man reads the words they are not his own but really the words of the executive branch, or of the union, or of the corporation, I believe there is no deceit and we can call such instances justifiable homicide.

This much I agree to if Professor Smith will agree that when the great man speaks for himself (as he frequently does), either as a candidate for re-election to the presidency, or as an individual fighting against the attorney general

for his position in the union, or as a retired corporation president organizing political societies, and uses collaborators to deceive the public and build his personal image, that this is murder. The tough border-line cases we always have in ethical questions, but it does not keep us from having laws against murder and should not keep us from deploring ghostwriting.

ERNEST G. BORMANN

University of Minnesota

ASSOCIATE EDITOR

Robert T. Oliver, Pennsylvania State University, has accepted appointment as Associate Editor for the area of Mass Communication and Opinion, to fill the uncompleted term of Ross Scanlan. A memorial essay for Professor Scanlan was carried in the October issue.

NEW BOOKS IN REVIEW

ROBERT G. GUNDERSON, *Editor*

FESTSCHRIFT FROM THE IOWA SCHOOL

Everett Lee Hunt

One of the many rewards of teaching is to watch the progress of former students, as one watches children following and then passing the footsteps of the father. Of course the teacher who tries to see in every freshman a future Ph.D. in his own field may produce as unhappy results as the father who insists that his son follow his own profession. But the teacher who has found joy and meaning in his own area cannot be indifferent to the achievements of those who have carried his influence beyond the sphere of Mr. Chips, and have found satisfaction in similar professional activity.

The introductory chapter of *American Public Address*, written by Orville A. Hitchcock, is a tribute to Albert Craig Baird as a teacher and leader in the field of public address. It makes it easy to understand why so many of his students have developed similar interests, and the listing of degrees and academic positions of the eighteen contributors shows in part how widely Baird's influence is extending.

Another point of interest that may seem quite aside from a critical judgment of the book is the number of its speakers who worked their way through a small (often western) college, who

participated in student debate and oratory, who regarded success in speaking as a path to leadership, and whose interest in public life transcended the limits of professional specialization. This tradition has never equalled the log cabin to White House appeal as a symbol of American life, but it is worthy of some remembrance in the newer plans for American education. A parallel might be drawn between these early careers and the college years of many teachers of speech. The difference in our later years might suggest that some of us are frustrated orators, others are fully absorbed in being educators, and some of us are detached intellectuals who would find fulfillment in building a science of rhetorical criticism. It is not likely that such a well-proportioned collection of studies should have appeared spontaneously, without editorial effort. The balance between the rhetoric of a situation and its historical or sociologic or economic background must owe much to Loren Reid's work as editor, and to the committee which envisioned the project and gathered the essays. They doubtless influenced the selection of speakers to be included; the choice shows respect for tradition and for individual talent.

Such considerations lead us to an evaluation of the volume. What has been the purpose and method of the authors? We may be sure that they are

Mr. Hunt is Dean Emeritus, Swarthmore College. He has contributed to QJS since the first volume in 1915, and was editor, 1927-1929. He himself is the subject of a Festschrift, Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rhetoricians, edited by Raymond F. Howes, to be published by Cornell University Press.

acquainted with the history and theories of rhetoric. They have surely read Thonssen and Baird's *Speech Criticism*. They must also have read Baird's introductions to the many speeches he has edited in *The Reference Shelf*. They have probably done justice to Brigrance's *History and Criticism of American Public Address*. They are undoubtedly familiar with Wichelns on "The Literary Criticism of Oratory," with Marie Hochmuth Nichols on "The Criticism of Rhetoric," and with the various essays in the *Quarterly Journal*. Obviously, if all the possibilities suggested in this literature were developed, a large volume for each speaker would be required. But in this work authors are limited to about twenty pages, and they must and do show great selectivity and independence of method. The appended notes also show the thoroughness of the scholarly preparation. As a lay reader I should like to testify to the success of the writers in presenting the most interesting and significant aspects of the careers of their speakers and in encouraging a general belief that American public address has had and still has a great influence on national thought and action.

Some of the speakers selected for this work have been inevitable choices in almost any volume of speeches or critical essays on speeches or speakers. But some of the authors have written of less known figures and have even introduced us to the contemporary scene. To summarize such abbreviated sketches is an impossible task of condensation, and this reviewer can only mention the items in each section that interested him most.

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes is one of the few figures who has had public lectures upon his influence authorized by Congressional action. Dorothy Anderson's chapter makes clear the distinction

between his famous legal decisions and his relatively few speeches:

He talked like a man more keenly interested in telling you how he felt about things than in trying to convince or persuade. . . . He does not impress us with his use of conventional appeals to the audience nor with the traditional logical or rhetorical structures. . . . His ideas are . . . "imparted by contagion" rather than by deliberate argument or persuasion. He makes us realize that true rhetoric is art.

Most of Holmes' public speeches were delivered on Memorial Days, university commencements, reunions, banquets, dedication ceremonies, and in commemoration of colleagues—occasions which bring out the platitudes, we often say. But Holmes gives us a really thoughtful consideration of man's basic values. Miss Anderson makes clear his basic beliefs, and somehow fills us with admiration for this man and his one speech for all occasions.

Obviously for such a speaker not much time need be spent on audience analysis. But for Clarence Darrow, whose speeches run into the thousands, who seldom missed an opportunity to make a speech, and who regarded himself as the defender of the disinherited, an analysis of class feelings and social change is a necessity. It is also very helpful to know the origin of Darrow's early and constant identification with the outgroups, and to understand why he himself became an American myth in his own time. All this is admirably shown, together with the relation of his personality to his rhetorical method—or lack of it. Darrow, like Justice Holmes, was really a man of one speech.

Turning to the ministry, we have further examples of speakers concerned with fundamental values, who, with the aid of radio, brought them to the attention of enormous audiences. Fosdick's and Sockman's listeners were too numerous to make audience analysis practi-

cable; in their sermons they attempted to convey verities valid for all men. By contrast with Justice Holmes, the attention given the verities owes much to the personalities and rhetorical methods of the speakers.

In the section on political speakers, we seem to turn more to deliberative rhetoric, where the skill with which the speaker adapts himself to his audience calls for more attention than his basic principles. Albert Baird Cummins is characterized by his logical analysis. Robert La Follette had extraordinary audience adaptation, direct style, and vigorous delivery. Theodore Roosevelt is characterized as the militant preacher, but the authors say that they are making no attempt to "duplicate the able analyses of his career as a speaker by William A. Behl and Richard Murphy." Bryan the man was generally identified with social progress, world peace, and human brotherhood, but he lacked ability to analyze deeply enough to originate ideas. This recalls Richard Weaver's assertion that the function of an orator is not so much to lead us to think as to remind us of what we have already thought. Since the issues that Albert J. Beveridge presented have largely lost their significance, attention is centered on his language, arrangement, and delivery. William E. Borah, the Lone Rider of Idaho, is another figure who seems to have diminishing contemporary significance, but his courage and his oratorical prowess make his career worth studying as a symbol of the speaker in a democratic society. Franklin Roosevelt's persuasive power is attributed to the peculiar fitness of the principles he espoused to the time of his leadership, the peculiar fitness of his temperament for the application of these principles to the tasks at hand, and the surpassing excellence of his oral interpretation. The

chapter on Thomas E. Dewey is limited to the Oregon debate with Harold Stassen on the issue of outlawing the Communist party, and is given almost exclusively to a statement of the issues. Eugene V. Debs is given a unique place in the history of American oratory because "'No man in America has been more hated and few have been so much loved.'" His personal history and his myth have certain parallels with Clarence Darrow. Ralph Bunche is presented as a contemporary Negro spokesman because of his prestige, position, and articulateness, but this chapter is devoted to an exposition of his position on segregation rather than to analysis of his techniques as a speaker. Edward R. Murrow is termed "The Reporter as Orator," and a new element is introduced into the development of public address. It should lead to similar and more extended studies of other radio and television speakers, and should make us more aware of the elements that enter into influential reporting.

The purpose of this summary is to suggest the variety of approaches of our scholars, and the peculiar appropriateness of each point of view for the speaker under discussion. One gets a renewed impression that analyses of American public address are a significant part of American history, that a liberal education is a prerequisite for such studies, and that directing undergraduate attention to them may be something of an antidote for over-specialization. These chapters should give Professor Baird increased satisfaction in contemplating his influence, and they will add to our already high esteem for the durable qualities of his life work.

BOOK REVIEWED

AMERICAN PUBLIC ADDRESS: STUDIES
IN HONOR OF ALBERT CRAIG BAIRD.
Edited by Loren Reid. Columbia: University
of Missouri Press, 1961; pp. xxii+331. \$5.95

THE PAPERS OF HENRY CLAY. Edited by James F. Hopkins and Mary M. W. Hargreaves. (Volume II, *The Rising Statesman, 1815-1820*.) Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1961; pp. viii+939. \$15.00.

The two volumes now available in a projected ten-volume edition of Clay's works offer unmistakable evidence that this is a monumental editorial and publishing enterprise. There are, of course, several earlier editions of Clay letters and speeches, but *The Papers of Henry Clay* will, when completed, supersede all other editions in its completeness and accuracy. Almost everything said or written by Clay, as well as materials significantly pertinent to him, have been swept up into the historians' net and are being diligently reproduced in chronological order. Through these volumes the reader becomes party to Clay's incoming and outgoing correspondence, his records of business and professional transactions, legislative business in which he had a clearly identifiable responsibility, his diplomatic papers, and his speeches. Clay's court work is excluded on the grounds that extant records are limited to legal technicalities so remote that they throw little light on Clay the man.

The very massiveness of these first two volumes and their formidable documentary notes suggest strongly that they belong properly in the scholar's domain. Actually though, they afford enjoyable browsing territory as well for the general reader who has a lively interest in the period and who seeks a sharply defined acquaintance with Clay the rising young lawyer, the gentleman farmer, the legislator, the businessman, the diplomat, the family man, and friend as he interacts with contemporaries of the era. In addition to their elements of universal interest, these volumes will prove indispensable to students of the first half of the nineteenth century. Indeed, I confess to overpowering regret that this project was not completed a score of years ago, when it would have considerably reduced my own life's expenditures.

As for speech materials specifically, the two volumes supply one set of extant speech notes, all surviving texts of speeches in their various forms and states of completeness, and notices of Clay's speeches for which no texts exist. The reproduction of these materials is meticulous in detail. Editorial notes supply necessary documentation, references to other collections in which speech texts may be consulted, cor-

rections of errors in other editions, and explanatory background for the speeches.

When completed, *The Papers of Henry Clay* will comprise an impressive first-hand account of a man selected by the United States Senate in 1957 as one of the five most outstanding members in its long history.

ERNEST J. WRAGE
Northwestern University

GREAT PRESIDENTIAL DECISIONS: STATE PAPERS THAT CHANGED THE COURSE OF HISTORY. Selected and edited with an Introduction and Commentary by Richard B. Morris. Philadelphia and New York: J. B. Lippincott, 1960; pp. 413. \$7.50.

Since the state papers included in Professor Morris' book are to be found for the most part in Richardson's *Messages and Papers of the Presidents*, their reprinting is chiefly a convenience to those who may not have ready access to Richardson's compilation. The Introduction and the Commentary by Professor Morris, however, are more than a convenience: they are stimulating treatises well worth the price of admission to the book. Some of the implications and assumptions, especially, will intrigue students of rhetoric and public address: state papers—and speeches—can change history (as implied in the title); state papers—and speeches—can recapture times of greatness (p. 21); one reading a state paper—or speech—can recapture an imperishable moment (p. 21); America's continental destiny seemed about to be decided as Polk came to the Presidency (p. 152); Andrew Johnson's arguments . . . preserved the Presidency itself (p. 256); more than any speeches made during the entire 1912 campaign, the Winona address of President Taft assured the election of Woodrow Wilson (p. 326); following Roosevelt's State of the Union message of January 6, 1941, the American commitment to the saving of the West was irrevocable (p. 382).

Taken as a whole, *Great Presidential Decisions* will comfort those old-fashioned folk who incline to believe that public opinion polls have not yet made public speaking obsolete, that rhetoric—considered as the art of determining counsel in questions of probability—may still be viable.

In thirty-four instances—from Washington's proclamation against the Whisky Insurrection to Eisenhower's proposals at Geneva—Professor Morris observes presidents engaged in making decisions that offered alternatives and required

action, or accepting the consequences of inaction. Doubtless some rhetoricians and some historians will challenge Professor Morris' presuppositions or his conclusions; all should read his argument with close attention.

BOWER ALY
University of Oregon

THE INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENTS. . . .

Annotated by Davis Newton Lott. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961; pp. xi+299. \$8.50.

"You could almost write a history of this nation by compiling an anthology of inaugural addresses," wrote Walter Winchell in 1957. Cued by the columnist, Davis Newton Lott and his publishers have placed the presidential words in a sumptuous setting worthy of the august occasions that evoked them. Taking full advantage of the scope afforded by a quarto, they have lavished portraits, a half-dozen fonts, and acres of empty space on the production of a handsome volume with a high level of visibility.

Four prefatory sections accompany each address. The first three bear headings that indicate their character: "The President," "The Nation," and "The World." The fourth, printed in italics, somewhat impressionistically sets the scene for the delivery of the speech. Marginal notes and (in an Appendix) the Declaration of Independence, the Articles of Confederation, the Constitution, and lists of the Presidents and Vice Presidents complete the editorial apparatus. The presidential roster includes party affiliation, years in office, age upon taking office, birthplace, dates of birth and death, and age at death.

The editor's contributions vary in quality and utility. Dates and facts are generally trustworthy (James Barnes of Temple University is credited with verifying them) and opinions, though they usually reflect conventional judgments, occasionally direct one's thinking into fresh channels. Much of the editorial material is, however, irrelevant to any conceivable use of the book, or too schematic to be helpful.

Despite reservations about its historical and rhetorical sophistication, this is obviously a useful book. Teachers will be glad to own it, and to make it accessible to students, who might base scores of term papers on its contents. The price, however, may restrict its market to libraries and well-heeled grandmothers

who are seeking a present for a boy who likes American history.

NORMAN W. MATTIS
University of North Carolina

LECTURES ON REVIVALS OF RELIGION.

By Charles Grandison Finney. Edited by William G. McLoughlin. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University, 1960; pp. lx+470. \$5.95.

When twenty-nine year old Charles Grandison Finney experienced a cataclysmic religious conversion, described in his *Memoirs* as unbearably exhilarating, like "a wave of electricity, going through and through me," he immediately abandoned a successful law practice. The following day just before court opened, he thoroughly shocked his client by announcing: "I have a retainer from the Lord Jesus Christ to plead his cause, and I cannot plead yours." From that moment until his death in 1875 at 83, he electrified the sacred and secular world with his radical religious innovations, carried his revival message to Europe, served as the second president of Oberlin College (1851-1866), and easily ranked as the foremost evangelist of his day.

In 1835, fourteen years after his conversion and the same year he became Professor of Theology at Oberlin, the *Lectures on Revivals* first appeared in book form. Reprinted frequently in England without Finney's paragraph condemning tea as a "useless stimulant," they were eventually translated into Welsh, French, and German. William G. McLoughlin, editor of the present handsome edition, skilfully analyzes the religious and political impact of the *Lectures*. In a closely knit, perceptive Introduction and through carefully selected footnotes, Professor McLoughlin documents Finney's successful struggle to free the "Presbyterian" churches from the strangle hold of the orthodox, conservative Old School Calvinists.

The *Lectures* epitomize Finney's philosophy and the techniques by which he administered the *coup de grace* to the Calvinistic God whose arbitrary decrees condemned most of creation to hell. Further, they became the classic manual, setting the tone and temper for revivalism in succeeding generations. Billy Graham would probably question few of Finney's evangelistic techniques. Moreover, most modern instructors of homiletics would applaud the lecture on "How to Preach the Gospel."

Holding a theological position closely akin to the egalitarian, democratic doctrine of the

Jacksonians, Finney was no dour, brimstone orator. To the end he maintained a buoyant, optimistic faith in the benevolence of God, and the common man's ability to achieve salvation and perfect the nation. The millennium was at hand, Finney believed, and a consecrated band of evangelists could and would save and reform the whole Mississippi Valley, if not the entire world. For those who study past or present day revivalism, or who seek the rhetorical elements in the reform movements and spread-eagle oratory of the past century, this edited volume is essential reading.

PAUL H. BOASE
Oberlin College

CHARLES SUMNER AND THE COMING OF THE CIVIL WAR. By David Donald. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960; pp. xvii+392+xxiv. \$6.75.

Appearing as the first of two volumes, this is the first Sumner biography in fifty years; studiously planned and executed, minus the panegyric flights characterizing its predecessors, it is the best of them all.

Princeton Professor Donald does more than consider Sumner as a leading antislavery spokesman; his efforts in behalf of international peace, prison reform, common school improvement, and the new Republican party are also discussed. While facets of Sumner's personality are convincingly delineated, the study centers on the man's ideas. Holding that his subject was never an original thinker, the author anchors Sumner's ideas in the thinking of men who influenced him—Joseph Story, Samuel Gridley Howe, John Quincy Adams, and especially William Ellery Channing. Inheriting the New England fascination for superlatives, trained more in matters of form than in matters of content, ruthless in his use of personal invective, he seized upon the ideas popularized by others and, as an uncompromising doctrinaire, carried them by "illogical logicity" to their most extreme conclusions. In sonorous, rigidly blocked-out speeches, Sumner imbued these ideas with renewed vitality, and thereby both earned the praise and incurred the wrath of partisans.

More by force than by choice, however, he was known almost exclusively as a slavery restrictionist; whether he had been silent on this question for some time or had recently given a stirring antislavery speech, his Massachusetts constituents literally goaded him into creating the opportunity, if necessary, to speak out once

more against the despised institution. As an ante-bellum Senator, his speaking on other issues was insignificant.

Trying to understand Sumner as completely as possible, Donald displays an interest in speechmaking which many biographers lack. He interprets speeches as communication experiences in which citizens heard the scholarly moralist's "verbal exorcisms" against principles he deplored. His extensive treatments of Sumner's 1852 "Freedom National," his 1856 "Crime Against Kansas," and his 1860 "Barbarism of Slavery" Senate speeches, and particularly of his celebrated 1845 Fourth of July oration in Boston, "The True Grandeur of Nations," are commendable.

In a rhetorical study, attention might well focus more sharply on the interworkings among Sumner, his speeches, and his listeners so that rhetorical effort could be more straightforwardly evaluated; Donald, nevertheless, to no small degree presents Sumner in the light of his speeches and the times in the light of speech situations. Rhetorical critics and other biographers alike, therefore, will find much in his work worthy of emulation.

DONALD E. WILLIAMS
University of Florida

JOHN COIT SPOONER: DEFENDER OF PRESIDENTS. By Dorothy Ganfield Fowler. New York: University Publishers, 1961; pp. xii+436. \$6.00.

Skill in the art of juggling words is not always prerequisite to success in American politics. We have the conspicuous example of Dwight D. Eisenhower and a number of examples less well-known, such as that of Philetus Sawyer, at one time a power in the Wisconsin Republican party. It was not true, as was sometimes alleged, that Sawyer could not write his own name, but it was true enough that he wrote or spoke only with great difficulty. Quite different was Sawyer's political protege and partner, John C. Spooner. Now something of a forgotten man of American eloquence—and also of American conservatism—Spooner in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century gained quite a reputation as an orator. All he remembered of his student experience at the University of Wisconsin was the debating society, in which he (like Robert M. La Follette later) took a vigorous part. "He is conceded the greatest parliamentary debater of his day," William Howard Taft said of him, "and really deserves the title, so much mis-

applied, of a great constitutional lawyer." His eloquence, together with his legal knowledge, made possible his success as an attorney, party boss, and (1885-1891, 1897-1907) United States Senator. He was a leader of the resistance to La Follette and the Progressive movement within the Republican organization. "Spooner could never be, like La Follette, a rebel; he was always a conservative, but not a reactionary or a cowardly conservative, as he called the moss-backs," Professor Fowler of Hunter College concludes, in the first book-length study of the man.

Professor Fowler has had access to the Spooner papers, is thoroughly versed in the life and times of her subject, and writes clearly and well. She has not chosen to analyze Spooner's techniques as a public speaker, nor does she expound his philosophy as a conservative. Indeed, as she indicates, there was little to expound. Spooner "thought as a lawyer; he was not introspective or philosophical; nor was he an original thinker." But he was an influential figure, one who deserves to be rescued from historical neglect, as Professor Fowler has so ably rescued him.

RICHARD N. CURRENT
University of Wisconsin

POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THEODORE ROOSEVELT.

Henry Harbaugh. New York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1961; pp. viii+568. \$7.50.

Written for the general reader, this weighty tome may be soporific for all but the amateur historian. The author is among those who have taken a fresh look at TR and have found that their predecessors (especially Henry F. Pringle) were less than fair to him. His examination of TR's public life, including relevant motivations, furnishes profitable insights. Compulsive aggressiveness abetted by egotism forced Roosevelt to stomp into controversies angels might fear to fly over. Harbaugh's intensive probe of TR's complex personality reveals his varied interests, eternal moralizing, furious prejudices, sense of fair play, raw courage, and unhesitating use of duplicity when the "politics of the possible" seemed to warrant it.

The author advances the interesting idea that Roosevelt, known for his impulsive acts and candor as a budding politician, deliberately encouraged this impression as a mature statesman. The middle classes "... were inspired by it. They seemed to believe Roosevelt incapable of dissemblance, though in truth he

had an artful side; and they expected that he would act invariably on his words, though in fact he often failed to do so" (p. 21).

The analysis of the issues of the day, especially the background of his major speeches, merits our serious attention. Many collections of American addresses feature "The Man with the Muckrake," which TR delivered twice in 1906. Labeling the speech a minor tragedy because it made him seem an arch-conservative, Harbaugh says essentially: TR was hated by industrial barons because he tried to limit their power, yet he feared the militant left even more than the rampant trusts. Reformers (including Ida M. Tarbell, Thomas W. Lawson, Lincoln Steffens, Ray Stannard Baker, Burton J. Hendrick and David Graham Phillips) had begun to arouse the public with exposures of the Standard Oil Company, financial manipulations, municipal corruption, railroad malpractices, insurance rackets, etc. But some of these attacks (especially Phillips' sweeping indictment of the Senate) went beyond evidence to character assassination. Since TR was trying to inveigle a conservative Congress to pass the Hepburn Act, a bill for the regulation of railroads, the Muckrake speech was an effort to placate the irate lawmakers.

Although Harbaugh presents too charitable an assessment of the Brownsville incident, and of Roosevelt's foreign policy, this biography is nevertheless a "bully" new light to limn one of our greatest presidents.

FORREST L. SEAL
University of Southern California

NEWTON D. BAKER: A BIOGRAPHY. By C. H. Cramer. Cleveland and New York: World, 1961; pp. 310. \$6.00.

A distinguished statesman, lawyer, orator, and educator, Newton D. Baker was also a man of many interesting paradoxes, some difficult to explain. Although formerly a pacifist, he became Secretary of War; he was an upright individual, but was not above defending in court a man of dubious character; he was a strong advocate of home rule for communities as a curb against growing state and federal power, yet he used federal power freely and high-handedly when the opportunity came; although not politically ambitious, he was in the limelight in 1932 as a possible Democratic nominee for the presidency.

This first full-length biography of Baker is an important contribution to the new history of Progressivism. It provides new insights into

the political, economic, and military problems encountered by the nation in World War I, and brings into sharp focus the picture of a controversial man whose real nature has been obscured by violent criticism from many quarters. Rhetoricians will be particularly interested in the chapters on Baker as an orator and as a lawyer.

C. H. Cramer, professor of history and dean at Western Reserve University, bases his work on exhaustive research among official documents, Baker's public and private papers, and related collections. Unfortunately, most of Baker's correspondence as Mayor of Cleveland was inadvertently destroyed, and the author documents this period with reminiscent letters, Cleveland newspaper reports, and secondary accounts. As a Cleveland area resident, Cramer had opportunity to discuss Baker with those who were his friends and associates.

This biography will stand up well under the critical examination of the scholar. Because it tells a fascinating story in a lively, interesting style, the book should have wide appeal.

CLAIR R. HENDERLIDER
Western Reserve University

PEACE WITH JUSTICE: SELECTED ADDRESSES OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER.

Foreword by Grayson Kirk. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961; pp. xii+273. \$4.00.

Dwight Eisenhower cannot be ranked with those twentieth-century American presidents who have achieved distinction in the area of public address. Lacking the vigor of Theodore Roosevelt, the intellectual grasp and phrase-making ability of Woodrow Wilson, and the language control of Franklin D. Roosevelt, he often speaks in platitudes. To say that Eisenhower is an ineffective speaker, however, is to miss the mark. During his eight years in office, he correctly understood the free world's desire for peace, and knew how to adapt to it. With a simple faith, strong sincerity, and contagious friendliness which his listeners came to view as his principal oratorical trademark, he developed his favorite theme of peace.

This present volume presents not only an excellent insight into the rhetorical practice of Eisenhower but also the hopes and aspirations of the western world. Beginning with an address at Columbia University in 1950, and ending with a speech celebrating the fifteenth anniversary of the United Nations ten years later, these selected addresses—thirty in all—set forth

the doctrine of "peace with justice." He is at his best when speaking on foreign soil and when recalling personal experiences. To the people of India and Latin America during his 1959 tour, he spoke with unusual warmth and humility. But his most effective speech, strangely enough, was the canceled address he had hoped to deliver to the people of Leningrad in May, 1960. Students of contemporary public address will find much in this volume which has relevance in the crucial decade of the 1960's.

JAMES L. GOLDEN
Muskingum College

THE CHAUTAUQUA MOVEMENT. By Joseph E. Gould. New York: University Publishers, 1961; pp. ix+108. Paper \$1.45, cloth \$4.50.

This brief, readable supplement to Chautauqua literature focuses chiefly upon William Rainey Harper's contribution to the movement, and the influence of the mother institution upon subsequent developments in collegiate education. Seventy of the hundred pages of text are devoted to the story of Harper's rise from a position as a college teacher of Hebrew to the principalship of the Chautauqua College of Liberal Arts, and eventually to the presidency of the University of Chicago. This central portion of the book contains an interesting comparison of the structure of the Chautauqua Lake establishment and the reorganized University of Chicago, and some enlightening descriptions of early extension teaching.

The abbreviated, general accounts of the mother institution and of the tent circuits, which precede and follow the Harper story, shed no new light on the movement. Fuller, more perceptive accounts than these can be found in such books as Harrison's *Culture Under Canvas* and Victoria and Robert Ormond Case's *We Called It Culture*. Those readers anticipating further insight into Chautauqua fare will be disappointed. While Gould mentions the names of a dozen speeches and two dozen speakers, and quotes paragraphs from several speeches, he mentions not a single platform reader and only one dramatic group, the Ben Greet players. In no instance does he treat of a speaker, speech, or dramatic production with any degree of thoroughness. The "feel" of the movement, so vividly realized by other writers, is lost in generalization.

Gould's succinct statement of the reasons for the demise of the movement comes off more successfully. He explains the failure of circuit

Chautauqua by citing its two fundamentally opposed goals: the dispensation of culture and the desire to make money. He says that there was no place in the system for those speakers who were seriously advocating programs of action, that "inspirational" speakers inundated the movement in pap, and that the policy-makers, in attempting to please everyone, pleased no one. The chief reason for the failure of Harper's attempt to transfer Chautauqua principles to the American university system, as Gould sees it, was too heavy a reliance upon a belief, shared with circuit managers, that education is a merchantable commodity.

There is little that is news in this short book. Its distinctiveness lies in Gould's assessment of Harper's pioneering role, and in his exploration of the relationship between Chautauqua and higher education at the end of the nineteenth century.

JOHN F. WILSON
Cornell University

WHEN GOVERNORS CONVENE: THE GOVERNORS CONFERENCE AND NATIONAL POLITICS. By Glenn E. Brooks. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961; pp. x+186. \$4.50.

SECRECY AND PUBLICITY: DILEMMAS OF DEMOCRACY. By Francis E. Rourke. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1961; pp. x+236. \$5.00.

The brief review by Professor Brooks of the history and nature of the conference of governors indicates another arena for research into the functions and effects of public address. Founded in 1908 by Theodore Roosevelt, the annual conferences of the governors began to assume genuine importance in the nineteen-thirties, as they confronted the problems of the Great Depression. In the years since World War II—with state expenditures rising from 12 billions in 1948 to 28 billions in 1958—the conference became an association, with a continuing program dealing with questions of the relationship of the federal and state governments. The way in which the organization has been shaped and reshaped, and in which policies have been adopted or defeated through speaking and other methods used by individual governors, is worthy of rhetorical examination. *When Governors Convene* is useful as a starting point for such study.

Secrecy and publicity in the operations of the federal government, as discussed by Francis Rourke, are less dilemmas than diseases of

democracy. The amount of secrecy in the operations of government in these times of international cold war is astounding. During World War II, six billion items were marked "classified"; by 1957 the rate was still higher; and by 1960 the Pentagon alone was placing its stamp of secrecy each week on a stack of documents higher than the Empire State Building. It is obvious that a great deal goes on of which the public is uninformed.

Meanwhile, and conversely, the federal government has enormous resources for impressing its own message in its own terms upon the public mind. This is done in large part through selection of topics and comments by the President and other officials in speeches and press conferences.

Professor Rourke is alarmed by the growing tendency of our democracy to use the twin powers of secrecy and publicity in much the same way and for much the same ends as in the totalitarian dictatorships: to "manufacture consent" through manipulation of information; to punish individuals and groups through adverse publicity; to protect inefficient officials and unpopular programs; and to support diplomatic policies by feeding some information into international channels while withholding other facts. Brainwashing, Mr. Rourke feels, is becoming a province of our own government, exercised upon our own citizenry, as well as being a characteristic of Communist states. Students of persuasion and of the theory of communication will be particularly interested in the facts and opinions presented in his book.

ROBERT T. OLIVER
Pennsylvania State University

COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA METHODS: A CASE STUDY ON CZECHOSLOVAKIA. By Vladimir Reisky de Dubnic, Introduction by Hans J. Morgenthau. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960; pp. xiv+287. \$6.00.

Although the general title of this work suggests that it will be a synoptic review of Communist propaganda methods mediated through the particular example of Czechoslovakia, the author's focus is more strictly limited. His concern is mainly with Soviet efforts to woo the Czechoslovakian intelligentsia and to overcome the ideological confusion of the post-Stalin period. What he provides is much of the raw material for a rhetorical critique without the critique itself.

The main techniques of the Communist

propagandists are identified and amply illustrated. The effort to associate Marxism with "science," the subordination of the university faculties to their chairs of ideology, the attempt to transform the language itself into an instrument for political conditioning, all are clearly described—sufficiently well to disclose, soberingly and saddeningly, the life of the mind within Czechoslovakia. And yet, in the end, the book is a disappointment. It has not illuminated its subject as well as it should; it has not yielded up the implications of its data.

The reasons for the disappointment are, I judge, remediable by the author. He assumes, perhaps without having realized it, a primitively mechanistic view of the persuasive process. There is a force—propaganda—working to shape a passive object—the intelligentsia; the passive object is recalcitrant, hence the force has not had its way. But is the situation really so simple? The reader is, at frequent points in this book, reminded of the unique intellectual tradition of Czechoslovakia, of the curious amalgam of Western European attitudes with Slavophilism which once shaped the letters of that country. One is reminded of this condition often enough to doubt that the failure of the Soviets to seduce Czechoslovakia's intelligentsia can be explained by simple apathy. There are more dynamic forces of skepticism at work, and the author's failure to isolate these forces through a careful analysis of the "audience" impoverishes his critique.

Another deficiency of the work is its neglect of the ways in which the propagandists make their arguments. We get here the structure of propaganda, but not its texture; we get themes, but not justifications. As a consequence, many of the author's efforts to assess the impact of the arguments appear *in vacuo*. The assessments do not flow from a cohesive view of the struggle for the Czechoslovakian mind. They are issued, sometimes dogmatically, bearing no apparent relation to the descriptive sections that have preceded them. Again, the difficulty seems to be that a naïve and ill-considered concept of the way persuasion works has informed the study and stunted it.

There is much valuable material in this book, material which the author controls, but it has not been shaped by a viable theory of rhetoric or enlightened by a psychology of sufficient complexity.

EDWIN BLACK
University of Pittsburgh

SMALL GROUPS AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF LEADERSHIP. By Sidney Verba. Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1961; pp. xii+273. \$6.00.

The past decade has witnessed a rather extensive infiltration of the concepts, methodology, and findings of small group research into a wide variety of disciplines—psychology, sociology, and speech; business, public health, and social work; theological seminaries; and even schools of law. It may thus be some index of the resistance to new ideas in departments of political science that the publication date of Verba's book is 1961. For this, to my knowledge, is the first attempt in book form by a political scientist to introduce his colleagues to the world of the small group, and to plead the applicability of its insights and methods to their problems.

The reader who is already familiar with the kind of material found in such anthologies of small group research as Cartwright and Zander, or Hare, Borgatta, and Bales, or the pertinent chapters in the *Handbook of Social Psychology*, will learn little they do not know by perusing *Small Groups and Political Behavior*. Except for an occasional importation of relevant pieces of research from political science sources (e.g., Lasswell or Berelson), or a new interdisciplinary insight here and there—such as the section in Chapter 2 on the importance of the primary group in influencing political behavior—this book is essentially an introduction to standard group dynamics as applied to the science of politics.

The author is obviously well versed in social psychology and does a creditable job of bridging the interdisciplinary gap. He is particularly keen in his evaluations of small group laboratory experiments, and the non-transferability of some of their findings to on-going groups with real tasks to perform, and with established structures of legitimized authority (Chapter 7). He also raises sharp questions (Chapter 9) about the use of the term "democratic" in studies like those of Lewin and of Coch and French, where the purpose of group participation was to gain acceptance for largely predetermined goals, and in studies like those of Lewin, Lippitt, and White, where the experimental relationship involved children and an appointed adult leader. Chapter 8 on "Leadership and the Norms of the Group," although not exceptionally original and somewhat short on illustrative material, is nevertheless one of the fullest treatments in print on the dilemma

of the leader-as-innovator versus the leader-as-conformist.

It is heartening to see the social sciences making efforts to understand and learn from one another, even if disappointing that it is often so little and so late.

FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN
Northwestern University

NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION.

Edited by Marshall R. Jones. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960; pp. xii+268. Paper \$3.25, cloth \$4.25.

THE MOTIVATION OF BEHAVIOR. By Judson Seise Brown. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961; pp. xii+404. \$7.50.

The seven previous volumes of the Nebraska series have been reviewed in these columns (XLV, 325-330 and XLVI, 215-216).

Particularly significant in the current volume are Heider's exposition and appraisal of the Gestalt conception of motivation, with special attention to Lewin's position, and Rapaport's critique of Freud's theory of motivation. These two papers fill a conspicuous gap left open in the symposia heretofore. The recognition of the factors common to motivation and perception is an interesting by-product of the Gestalt approach. It seems strange that Rapaport does not seem to recognize behind the false whiskers of Freud's *deus ex machina*, *instinctual drive*, the discredited old gentleman, *instinct*, so popular with psychologists half a century ago.

Barker's discussion of *behavior settings* opens up a promising and fertile field for those who teach and study persuasion. In the papers included in this volume, the authors stress the central importance of the social factors which condition and determine human behavior. There seems to be, also, an increasing appreciation of the role of values as springs of conduct.

The lay reader will find some of the Nebraska papers rather heavy going. These psychologists talk to one another in highly specialized and esoteric terminology which can be fully understood only by their colleagues. There is nourishing meat here but it can be ingested only by those who have become accustomed to the peculiar diet.

Again, as always heretofore, the editor's illuminating Introduction sets the stage perfectly for the contents of the book. The in-

dexes and the bibliographies are extensive and helpful.

Brown's book is designed to provide a unified interpretation of *motivation* and *drive* as explanatory constructs in behavior theory. It presents a comprehensive evaluation of experimental data. The treatment, though scholarly, is simple enough to be understood by advanced undergraduate and beginning graduate students. It furnishes clearly phrased definitions and explanations of all terms essential to the discussion. The differentiation of *specific* and *non-specific drive* is thought-provoking.

Speech people will be pleased to know that the author devotes four full pages to verbal stimuli as learned sources of drive! This strangely belated and inadequately developed concession is a major breakthrough into territory which students of persuasive techniques long have been exploring, but which most psychologists have either minimized or entirely ignored.

It is interesting to note that the name most frequently mentioned in the Nebraska papers and in Brown's book is Clark L. Hull, whose "Multiplicative Drive Theory" is referred to again and again. Brown critically appraises this useful concept and extends its application.

The chapter summaries, comprehensive bibliographies, and complete name and subject indexes are admirable.

A. T. WEAVER
University of Wisconsin

GENERAL SEMANTICS: A GUIDE TO BETTER LIVING. By Clarence L. Meader and John H. Muyskens. Toledo: Herbert C. Weller, 630 West Woodruff, 1959; pp. xx+175. \$7.50.

The more this reviewer reads the literature of science, the more skeptical he becomes of theories or systems based on "universally operating laws" of nature. Scientists themselves are coming to discard, or at least modify, the concept of the immutability of natural law, since it operates under a variety of situations, particularly under extreme conditions. And when the infinite variety of human behavior is involved, the universality of those "laws" becomes even less dependable.

The authors of the text here under review seem to have based their "Guide to Better Living"—the subtitle—on just such immutability or universality. It is a sequel to their *Handbook of Biolinguistics, Part 1-A*, published in

1950, and may be considered somewhat in the light of that earlier work.

The objective is worthy enough, the authors aim at extending the basic development of their *Handbook*, and essentially to establish a physiological basis for general semantics. Bechterev's "twenty principles of human reflexology" are one by one related to twenty corresponding principles of general semantics, although it seems that some of these relationships are highly attenuated. For instance (p. 47), it is said, in discussing Bechterev's third principle of similarity, that "like causes, acting under like conditions, produce like results." One is reminded of Professor Weaver's reported observation, "All things being equal, which they never are. . . ." I seem to recall from my readings on general semantics, that neither causes nor conditions are ever "alike."

One need not take exception to either the physiology or to the general semantics, on the whole. Neither one is actually treated adequately, but here and there a fresh idea creeps in. In the applications of the one to the other, in the implication that there is a positive relationship, there seems to be a fairly wide gap. Psychophysiological relationships seem to be forgotten. The result is that we are left with little understanding of just how the semantic and the psychic are interrelated, if at all. Of course, those of us who were nurtured in a philosophy of monistic realism are confident that such a relationship exists. But it does not appear here.

I remember that in my introduction to graduate study in speech some forty years ago, I was assigned to make a complete outline of John B. Watson's *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist*. I didn't see then, and I'm not sure that I do even now, just how the wealth of physiology presented in that text helped much to explain the processes in consciousness that we term "mental." No more do I see just how the physiology presented in *General Semantics: A Guide to Better Living* contributes to the effective use of language to provide a better "guide to living," or enable us to avoid the "wide mental deviations from nature's patterns"—however or whether they may thus be discovered—in order to prevent "insanity or unsanity."

If one would sift out the general semantic passages from the physiological discussions, one should find them helpful; on the other hand, a concentration on the physiological, by-passing the semantic, would probably give the

reader some insight into the functioning of the speech mechanism. Attempting to mix the two, with no fuller development than either of them gets, results in some confusion, and little or no understanding of just why they were put into the same book.

GILES WILKESON GRAY
Louisiana State University

CHRIST AND CELEBRITY GODS: THE CHURCH AND MASS CULTURE. By Malcolm Boyd. Greenwich, Conn.: The Seabury Press, 1958; pp. xii+145. \$3.50.

Malcolm Boyd bars no holds in his evaluation of Hollywood and Broadway "celebrity gods" and the "celebrity cult." In fact, he is just as unsparing in his criticism of so-called religious celebrities "in the industry" as he is of the secular ones. Using a much more compact style than he employed in *Crisis in Communication: A Christian Examination of the Mass Media* (1957), Boyd has written an extended critique of films, plays, and television programs that stimulates the reader on second perusal as much as it did on first acquaintance. Whereas this characteristic is a strength, it might also be a weakness. The book is given to so much illustrative detail that one is prone to lose the fundamental generalizations that the Hollywood-producer-turned-Episcopal-priest might have to offer. Especially is this true of his suggested solutions to the basic problem of the book: how truly to broadcast religion (in this case, Christianity) without at the same time and in the process "being evangelized by our culture and the wisdom of the world."

Truly one wonders as he lays the book aside, whether the Reverend Boyd has more to suggest than (1) do away with all would-be religious broadcasting because there is as much inherent danger in it as there is potential good, or (2) let each Christian (or other "religious" person) already in the industry go right on doing his work as well as he can, hoping ultimately to have some personal influence for Christ upon those with whom he works within the industry, and mayhap, upon the programming itself. Of course, there are other insights offered, though sometimes written between the lines. Many, therefore, should read this book to find out what those insights are. Counselors of persons contemplating a career in religious communications, mass or otherwise, especially should read this book.

CHARLES A. MCGLON
Southern Baptist Theological Seminary

THIS DIFFICULT INDIVIDUAL, EZRA POUND. By Eustace Mullins. New York: Fleet, 1961; pp. 388. \$5.00.

It is hard to write a dispassionate study of Ezra Pound. Any man who could advise Yeats and Eliot on literary theory, produce perhaps the most original poetry of our times, and still broadcast during World War II that Roosevelt should "go out over the steps of the American Capitol and commit harakiri," is a difficult figure to view objectively. Eustace Mullins, a close friend and protégé, is convinced that Pound is our greatest literary, political, and economic thinker, and his book is an attempt to plead Pound's cause to the world.

To prove that Pound was neither a traitor nor a lunatic, Mullins retraces Pound's career from the early London days through the Rome broadcasts and the twelve years in a Washington mental institution awaiting trial for treason. Mullins visited Pound regularly in Washington, and became convinced that Pound was not a Fascist but a true defender of the American Constitution. Using notes from his conversations and quotations from Pound's speeches, poems, and essays, Mullins builds up a picture of an idealist who could not stand by and see a world destroyed. Perhaps his most telling line is Pound's simple explanation for the Rome broadcasts that nearly ruined his life: "Knowing what I knew, I would have been a cad not to speak up."

Those who find Pound's views unacceptable would hardly argue today that he should be imprisoned for stating them, but Mullins wants a more complete victory than this. He insists on condemning anyone who ever attacked or criticized Pound, as if the man's importance could only be established by the total defeat of his opponents. Thus the book at times degenerates to a mere listing of villains, a list which includes Roosevelt, Bennett Cerf, "the jackals of the Press," and even Robert Frost, whose only crime appears to be that he came to Pound's aid in 1957 instead of 1948.

The strength of Mullins' book lies in his painstaking and carefully documented collection of Pound's views and theories. Its weakness lies in Mullins' attempt to write a polemic in defense of a master of polemic, Ezra Pound himself.

HARRY M. RITCHIE
University of California, Berkeley

LANGUAGE AND POETRY: SOME POETS OF SPAIN. By Jorge Guillén, Foreword by Archibald MacLeish. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961; pp. xii+293. \$5.50.

Readers familiar with the high quality of previously collected lectures from the Charles Eliot Norton Lectures will not be disappointed in this new addition to the series. Jorge Guillén is a distinguished poet in his own right, and has served as Professor of Spanish at Wellesley College, Yale University, and Ohio State University since his voluntary exile from Spain in 1938. He is an articulate poet and an educator of intellectual stature.

Although a knowledge of Spanish would be helpful, it is by no means necessary for comprehension of the principles of criticism and aesthetics which the chosen poets underscore. The chapters are carefully organized and clearly related to one another. Quotations from the Spanish are translated immediately below the original text. The Appendix contains excellent translations of complete poems used in the discussions, and the Index is detailed. The principles stated are directly applicable to contemporary poets writing either in English or in Spanish.

The first two chapters, "Prosaic Language" and "Poetic Language," are admirably paired to establish the basic concept which applies to the next three chapters. The final chapter, "The Language of a Poem," is an examination of the techniques and literary ideas of certain twentieth-century poets, including Jiménez and García Lorca.

This book must be classified as an important addition to poetic theory and criticism, but it does not depend upon specialized vocabulary and private symbols. It would be of interest to any scholar; it could be given to any college student, and would prove enlightening and satisfying. The groundwork is carefully laid and terms are clearly and boldly defined. It is a pleasure to come upon such clarity as, "Poetry, then, as language: 'constructed language'. . . . The question is not one of vocabulary but of manner" (Chapter Two). Here is a working poet who is willing to struggle with the "how" and the "what" of contemporary poetry.

CHARLOTTE I. LEE
Northwestern University

ITALIAN COMEDY IN THE RENAISSANCE. By Marvin T. Herrick. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1960; pp. viii+322. \$4.50.

"No fish should ever go anywhere without a porpoise," says the Mock Turtle to Alice. Professor Herrick has written a book with a "porpoise," which he describes in his short Introduction. It was to provide "an account in English of the major comic dramatists of Italy and some of the representative minor dramatists as well—an account detailed enough to provide the proper background for the understanding of the dramaturgy of Shakespeare, Jonson, Chapman, Marston, Middleton and other English writers of comedy." The book is, then, aimed primarily at scholars dealing with the English sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but it is also secondarily useful for the student of French and Italian as well, for Professor Herrick has concentrated material hitherto scattered throughout various books and periodicals and has made it more readily available.

Italian Comedy in the Renaissance has chapters on "Fifteenth Century Background," "Italian Farce," two long chapters on "The Learned Comedy," one on "Serious Comedy," and one on "The *Commedia dell'Arte* and Learned Comedy." A short bibliography, an index of Italian and Latin plays, and an index of names complete the volume.

In sixteenth-century Italy the Learned Comedy had small circulation and its influence was limited to the large cities and to the Courts. Ruzzante is the one exception. His appeal was much wider. Abroad, as Professor Herrick justly points out, "the learned comedy was known only to the educated few and to professional playwrights who could make use of it for their own work." Its influence was very circumscribed in Europe, and in this book the discussion is confined almost exclusively to its influence in England—France, Germany, Austria, and Spain are omitted.

An essential and very useful feature of the book is the detailed analysis of the plots of many comedies—plots which are confused and confusing, conducted along the Plautine and Terentian lines of intrigue, with mistaken identities, kidnappings, transvestites, shipwrecks, with stock characters, pimps, bawds, rascally servants, doddering fathers, dissolute sons, etc., etc., impossible to keep in mind and difficult to differentiate. Professor Herrick has done a neat job of sorting them all out. Another feature of the book is copious quotation from various plays, sometimes a whole scene.

One regrets to report that the translations are all too often both pedantic and pedes-

trian. Even granted the extreme difficulty of Englishing sixteenth-century Italian and Latin, they could have been more lively. The same criticism must be applied at times to the author's own prose style. One gets the impression he is rewriting the class notes for his graduate course in English literature. Another feature with which I find myself in disagreement is the very frequent attribution of influence between one play and another when such influence is impossible to prove. As André Morize used to say, "Similarity is not influence."

These are minor blemishes on a very learned book, one which needed to be written and will be very useful in the field to which its author has limited it.

LANDER MACCLINTOCK
Indiana University

THE DRAMA OF MEDIEVAL ENGLAND. By Arnold Williams. East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1961; pp. vi+186. \$5.00.

Beginning with the trope and its fortuitous transfer from mass to matins, this book examines five centuries of English drama. The Preface notes that the author aims his book at a lay audience and does not intend it for the literary scholar. He is too modest, of course; he is vastly helpful to the scholar whose specialty is anything other than Medieval England. Nevertheless, the book should be delightful reading for its proposed market: "the lover of the theater, the playgoer, or the tourist who has seen the magnificent production of the old plays at York and would like to know more about the sort of drama they represent." It is a thorough, careful, and lively work. One is rarely in doubt about the exact next step in probing sources—and broad those sources are, including significant recent scholarship.

Perhaps the most provocative example of this new information is Takahashi's tracing *Everyman* to a Buddhist source, thus clarifying the puzzling theology of this perennially popular drama. As Professor Williams wryly notes, "This explanation will doubtless come as a shock to all the church dramatic societies which have performed the piece almost as a work meritorious unto salvation."

It is quibbling to wonder why the work of Gustave Cohen and George Kernodle was not used to illustrate parallel trends on the continent. In the same vein, perhaps the ship in *Mary Magdalen* could have been a truly practical boat—as it evidently was at the Valencien-
nes Passion only a few years later.

It is not quibbling to suggest that someone should explore fully the relationship between Rederyker techniques and Medieval English practices—especially since we now see so clearly Elizabethan indebtedness to the Wakefield Master and his colleagues.

A major thesis of the author is that Medieval staging methods are much more important than once thought as sources of Elizabethan procedures, and indeed, as models for modern styles. The publisher's statement on the jacket, "Actors, directors, designers, and teachers of theater arts will find this analysis . . . useful in solving their practical problems," is undoubtedly correct. Certainly this book deserves a careful reading by all of them.

ARTHUR H. DORLAG
Florida State University

SHYLOCK ON THE STAGE. By Toby Lelyveld. Cleveland: Western Reserve University Press, 1960; pp. 149. \$4.95.

The present work is derived from a dissertation by the same title which Mrs. Lelyveld submitted to Columbia University in 1951. It is replete with footnotes, bibliography, index, and six full-page illustrations of various actors in the role.

Chapter I, "In The Beginning," considers the social and political status of the English Jews together with literary references to or depictions of Jews through Shakespeare's Shylock; attempts to establish the nature of the original interpretation; and then carries the story of the Jews through the Restoration, Granville's *The Jew of Venice*, and Dogget's comic portrayal of Shylock.

Chapters II, III, IV, and V center around Charles Macklin ("the innovation of a serious reading of Shylock's lines"), Edmund Kean ("it took courage and imagination to dress Shylock in a black wig and to remold him so that his character would conform to his new appearance"), Edwin Booth, and Henry Irving. Chapter VI, "Lesser Lights," offers brief (one sentence to two pages) evaluations of eighteen "modern" Shylocks, from William Poel (1898), to Morris Carnofsky (1957). Chapter VII, "Shylock Distorted," deals with what the author terms "the second-rate theatre," Shylock as portrayed by actresses, child-actors, burlesque performers, and elocutionists.

Mrs. Lelyveld's attempt to relate the public's attitude toward the Jew to the manner in which he is portrayed in the theatre is most successful in Chapter I, but less so elsewhere.

Analyses or comparisons are frequently superficial: "The chief characteristic of this presentation was its tempo. The world itself, in 1905, was quickening its pace." Ultimately this book becomes little more than a series of brief but intriguing reports on a number of actors performing the same role. It lacks sufficient insights and inter-relationships to make it much more than merely interesting reading. Serious students of such affairs will continue to turn to Odell's *Shakespeare from Betterton to Irving*, and Sprague's *Shakespeare and the Actors* or his *Shakespearean Players and Performances*.

DAVID G. SCHAAL
State University of Iowa

POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN DRAMA. By Caspar H. Nannes, Foreword by Allen Drury. Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1960; pp. xvi+256. \$4.95.

Caspar Nannes undertakes to discover to what extent political subjects and personalities have found a place on the New York stage during the past seventy years. He is able to list some two hundred and fifty plays performed within this span of time which answer his basic requirement, that their major action revolve around a political theme. Numerically at least this is impressive. Mr. Nannes does not contend that more than a few of them are memorable, or even very good plays.

It becomes clear from this survey that political plays, good or bad, usually come to be written because playwrights and producers climb aboard the bandwagon of contemporary popular sentiment, whether forming or already clearly manifest. These dramas provide footnotes to history, but usually make no more than theatrical history. Nannes rightly observes, "Political plays are essentially aimed at a contemporary audience that instantly recognizes the characters, situations, issues or philosophies upon which the story is built." Thus Charles Klein's *The Lion and the Mouse* (1905) echoes the revelations by Ida M. Tarbell in her *The History of the Standard Oil Company*; *Fiorello* (1959) capitalizes on the widely familiar LaGuardia legend. In each of his chapters, Nannes is at pains to sketch in some detail the historical parallels and backgrounds. They make the plays intelligible, and at the same time account for their often ephemeral quality.

The handful of politically oriented dramas which go beyond the level of entertaining journalism appear to be those reflecting their authors' deep concern or actual personal in-

volvement. Maxwell Anderson, Robert Sherwood, Arthur Miller, and Clifford Odets have all at times achieved political drama of more than timely interest. Others have merely exploited politics, hoping to assure a "hit."

Politics in the American Drama fulfills its modest purpose of summarizing, but only incidentally passing critical judgment upon, the plays classified as "political": those dealing with candidates running for office; corruption in government; specific political issues; outstanding political figures; and political philosophies or situations. Nannes optimistically believes that more and more our political drama, responding to the public's familiarity with national and international issues, will exert considerable influence. "The political dramatist has never had a better opportunity to present his wares than now."

JONATHAN CURVIN
University of Wisconsin

THEATRE WORLD: SEASON 1959-1960. By Daniel Blum. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1960; pp. 256. \$6.00.

THEATRE WORLD: SEASON 1960-1961. By Daniel Blum. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1961; pp. 256. \$6.00.

THE BEST PLAYS OF 1959-1960 (THE BURNS MANTLE YEARBOOK). Edited by Louis Kronenberger. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1960; pp. xii+435. \$6.00.

Like the three wise men of Gotham who went to sea in a bowl, since the 1930's the Broadway seasons embark in peril and eventually sink. Unlike the rhymers of Mother Goose's melody—if the bowl had been stronger, the song would have been longer—theatrical book-keepers each year must serve up Broadway samplings, facts and figures, bound in the same bright wrappers and designed to keep the record straight—downward. However much future historians may curse the endless length, monotony, and repetition of the old story, they will probably bless the available record.

Daniel Blum's sixteenth and seventeenth volumes survey the past two seasons on and off Broadway. Using his usual method of photos with casts, staffs, and dates, Mr. Blum devotes more than one-half of his space to plays Off-Broadway, New York City Center season, national touring companies, and Shakespearean festivals. Additional sections include the author's "Promising Personalities," biographies, obit-

uaries, and index. Each *Theatre World* contains more than 600 shots, selected—for the most part—with skill, proportion, and knack for immobilizing the dramatic moment.

Whereas Blum produces yearly an excellent pictorial journal, editor Kronenberger supplies the familiar verbal record of annual Broadway fare. Originally edited by Burns Mantle, the forty-third volume in the *Best Plays* series introduces a new feature this year. In keeping with the expanding scope of professional offerings in New York, a section devoted to Off-Broadway comprises excerpts from *The Connection* as well as a selected play list with appropriate casts and runs. About one-half the book contains the Ten Best Plays, each summarized with short dialogue bits connected by the story line. Several excellent indices, photographs, and drawings by Hirschfeld complete the current volume. In addition to an account of the Broadway season by the editor, critical summaries of Chicago, London, and Off-Broadway are supplied by Claudia Cassidy, Harold Hobson, and Henry Hewes.

EUGENE K. BRISTOW
Indiana University

THE STORY OF AMERICA'S MUSICAL THEATRE. By David Ewen. Philadelphia: Chilton, 1961; pp. 268. \$3.50.

At the most, David Ewen has written an entertaining volume on the American musical theatre, one that is easily read in a short evening. If his book had not been preceded by a plethora of Hollywood films about famous composers (i.e., Gershwin, Hart, and Ziegfeld), he might have provided us also with new, though dubious, information. But no such luck. Mr. Ewen has derived his materials from the same unknown sources. He even writes in the same manner as his Hollywood predecessors.

Here are 246 pages of a goody-goody world, replete with Lambs Club sentiment, Broadway hyperbole, and Sardi curiosity. The author skims along the surface of seventy years of American musical theatre from Victor Herbert to Leonard Bernstein, attempting to excite us with half-remembered names of stars, song titles, and plot summaries. Snatches of imagined dialogue are inserted frequently, designed to provide the reader with life as it might have been down Broadway memory lane.

In order to satisfy the academic appetite, the author has supplied us with dates, places, and number of performances for the famous "mu-

sical shows." However, there are no references to any sources save one, a tiny footnote (p. 54) that calls attention to a previously-published book by the same author. The only bibliography is a modest list of books situated opposite the title page, enumerating in detail "other books by David Ewen." A twelve-page preface, entitled "Overture," suffices for the musical theatre from the beginnings in America to the year 1894.

If David Ewen has made any contribution to theatre history, it is simply this: he has reminded us of the need for serious scholarship in the neglected area of American musical theatre.

MARVIN L. SEIGER
Hunter College

TEACHING SPEECH IN THE HIGH SCHOOL: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES.

By Mardel Ogilvie. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1961; pp. viii+434. \$4.75.

The author states that this book is addressed to the prospective or the new teacher of speech in the high school. It is intended to: (a) help the teacher develop for himself a workable philosophy of speech education; (b) give him a sense of his role in the school and community; (c) help him find materials and methods for teaching; (d) guide him in preparing courses of study, units, and lesson plans adapted to the needs and abilities of his students; (e) suggest to him ways of organizing and administering a program in speech therapy; (f) aid him in evaluating his own work and that of his students; (g) give him direction in planning and conducting extracurricular activities; and (h) counsel him in his professional development. The book is divided into the following sections: (1) aims and methodology of teaching speech; (2) teaching the fundamentals of speaking; (3) teaching public address; (4) teaching interpretative arts; (5) teaching radio and television; (6) evaluation; (7) tangential services (assemblies, speech correction); and (8) career of the speech teacher.

The book is well organized and clearly written. All of the activities a speech teacher is concerned with in the high school curriculum are included. The role of the speech teacher in assembly programs and in the speech correction program is discussed in considerable detail. Outstanding is the chapter titled "Organizing for Learning," which deals with what the author calls the six variables of a speech situation: the participants, the purposes of

speaking, the ideas, the pattern of ideas, the social climate, and the physical environment.

The problem of developing a course of study is briefly treated, principally by borrowing that which has already been printed elsewhere. The text includes extensive coverage of standard materials on articulation and voice, but offers little assistance in terms of how to relate this information meaningfully to the course and how to motivate the student. Discussion of the teaching of physical delivery is extremely brief, and it should be noted that the book includes no information on the problem of stage fright.

Treatment of the teaching of specific speech activities is well done in terms of the concepts and theory included, and outstanding with respect to taking the prospective teacher into the classroom by means of specific examples.

The number of textbooks devoted to the teaching of speech in high school has rapidly increased during the past ten years, thus making a new contribution more and more difficult to achieve. In spite of this problem, however, this text by Professor Ogilvie is well worth owning, and should be given serious consideration by those teaching methods courses.

WALDO PHELPS
University of California, Los Angeles

BRIEFLY NOTED

TELEVISION PRODUCTION HANDBOOK.

By Herbert Zettl. San Francisco: Wadsworth, 1961; pp. 450. \$6.50.

Herbert Zettl and the Wadsworth Press have combined their best efforts to provide the instructor of the television production class with an extremely satisfying and comprehensive text. The author clearly demonstrates that his local and network production experience has provided him with a splendid background for the preparation of this book. Unlike so many books in this area that are either so basic that they provide no useful information at all, or so specific that the reader is offered little more than a production diary of a vaguely remembered live drama series, the Zettl book deals in detail with television production as it is being practiced in the 1960's. While the chapter headings look similar to those found in other production books, the reader is encouraged to explore this book in other than a superficial manner. The reward for doing this is the discovery of an up-to-the-minute and detailed treatment of all the practical aspects and

frequently encountered problems of TV production. The writing is clear and tight, and the illustrative materials are always meaningful and appropriate. Students and instructors of television production, as well as professionals employed in the industry, will find this book to be a most complete and valuable text and/or reference work.

HERBERT SELTZ
Indiana University

THE MODERN BROADCASTER: THE STATION BOOK. By Sherman P. Lawton. New York: Harper, 1961; pp. xviii+351. \$6.00.

Here is a book designed for the individual interested in learning about the operations of the broadcasting business. As Professor Lawton states in the Preface, "It is a book designed for station employees, future and present."

The book is a significant and valuable addition to the texts now available in the broadcasting field. It is important because it presents in a straightforward and honest approach the kinds of jobs available in the business and how qualified and interested individuals may seek out these positions. It is, therefore, a practical book; its suggestions to the interested broadcaster are specific and concrete.

The book is divided into two basic divisions. Part I discusses the general field of broadcasting with specific comments dealing with the audience, station organization, economic factors, and the basic equipment necessary for operation. This part appears to be the most valuable because it presents material not usually found in a text on broadcasting. Particularly valuable is the chapter on economics, an important topic too often overlooked by the zealous neophyte.

Part II discusses various jobs that are available at radio and television stations. Emphasis is placed on announcing, directing, writing, and various specialized forms of programing such as news, weather, sports, interviews, and talks.

This book is valuable to our field; one like it has been too long coming. Professor Lawton writes in a frank, direct, and concise manner which should interest students and instructors alike.

HARRY AUSPRICH
Iowa State University

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THEATRE. By Frank M. Whiting. (Revised edition.) New York: Harper, 1961; pp. xxii+369. Trade \$8.00, text \$6.00.

Professor Whiting has been wisely objective in his task of revising, reorganizing, and adding material to strengthen the new edition of his popular text. Most of the book is unchanged, though in sections on modern theatre, acting and directing, crafts of the theatre, and theatre as a profession, alterations add clarity, detail, and a more logical development of the subject.

The text is designed for use in the beginning course for theatre majors, though it could also be used in general introductory theatre courses in the liberal arts curriculum. The author retains his solid, realistic view of the theatre in its historical, artistic, and cultural aspects. Although the book is highly selective in the material it treats, the reader gains a clear and balanced concept of the impact theatre has had upon the human community, a nodding familiarity with the important people and organizations which have shaped its growth, and knowledge about the crafts by which the finished theatre production is fashioned. The final section provides a realistic view of opportunities for professional work in the theatre.

The freshness of style and the author's obvious enthusiasm for his subject should help to win youthful recruits for the professional educational theatre.

RONALD C. GEE
Western Illinois University

THEATRE LANGUAGE: A DICTIONARY OF TERMS IN ENGLISH . . . FROM MEDIEVAL TO MODERN TIMES. By Walter P. Bowman and Robert H. Ball. New York: Theatre Arts Books, 1961; pp. xii+428. \$6.95.

As some pundit once said, the best literature is in the dictionary. Perhaps the best reading about theatre is in a dictionary, especially such a useful one as *Theatre Language*. Compiled by a scholar of language and a scholar of theatre, this book concisely defines terms from three categories: technical words (grid, reflector), standard terms of drama and dramatic criticism (masque, hamartia), and the slang terms which make up the most interesting of all trade languages (go to Cain's, stage door Johnny). Terms from related fields such as ballet and vaudeville are included, as are numerous British expressions. The emphasis is on American terminology.

This is a stimulating book for browsing (if you're a man who likes to read dictionaries), and a useful work for the reference shelf of the dramatic critic, the theatre historian, the

stage worker, and the legion of students and teachers interested in the stage. True, as Dr. Johnson tells us, "Dictionaries are like watches; the worst is better than none, and the best cannot be expected to go quite true." With this in mind, we can accept *Theatre Language*, within its specialized purpose, as close to Johnson's "best."

HERBERT L. CARSON
Ferris Institute

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ACTOR. By Yoti Lane. New York: John Day, 1960; pp. 224. \$3.75.

Yoti Lane's study of the actor as a psychological subject is an attempt to present the personality factors generally assumed or avoided by authors of acting texts and by actors writing on their art. Most writers on the art of acting omit the background area of "what makes an actor" precisely because of the multiplicity and complexity of motives driving and directing the individuals who enter the profession.

Miss Lane unfortunately falls into the common trap of many of those who attempt to set down the characteristics of any heterogeneous group: the unsupported generalization. In trying to portray the actor in terms of his sex life—or lack of it—his social conscience, his psychological direction, the volume results in a mass of meaningless and all-too-obvious platitudes. "The actor is not a revolutionary by temperament," says Miss Lane. Aside from the heady generalization, one may ask if there are any revolutionaries by temperament. Speaking of the sexual content of modern drama, the author states: "Man has inherent romantic feelings. . . ." The use of such vague and undefined terms, plus a complete lack of statistical evidence to support the very general conclusions, mark *The Psychology of the Actor* as a work which offers little to the student of the theatre.

JOSEPH G. GREEN
Indiana University, South Bend Center

THE SEARCH FOR GOOD SENSE: FOUR EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY CHARACTERS, JOHNSON, CHESTERFIELD, BOSWELL, GOLDSMITH. By F. L. Lucas. New York: Macmillan, 1958; pp. xiv+354. \$5.00.

F. L. Lucas, a fellow of King's College, Cambridge, author of *Tragedy*, a penetrating interpretation of Aristotle's *Poetics*, has now written about four people who represent dif-

ferent aspects of eighteenth-century life and letters: Johnson, Chesterfield, Boswell, and Goldsmith. Each study gives a brief biography, a review of major contributions (in Johnson's case, of course, his conversation), and some estimate of the individual's impact on his time. Such a task may seem almost impossible at the outset, but Lucas manages to show how each man, considering his gifts and shortcomings, lived up to the ideals of the age of reason—how each achieved a balance, however precarious, between emotion and common, or "good," sense. Johnson's is the fullest portrait, with, perhaps, Chesterfield's the poorest—probably because the latter, a superficial person himself, generates the least enthusiasm in the author. Although Lucas is, at times, rather subjective in his observations and interpretations, he is always lucid and many times very entertaining. Indeed, the untranslated quotations seem out of place in a book written in such a popular style. This does not, however, diminish the value of the book as a painstaking series of studies of men who have made important contributions to our literature. Indeed, one wonders if, with the possible exception of Johnson, these people ever came at all close to the end of their search for "good sense."

RICHARD HARRIS
San Diego State College

COMPENSATION ON THE CAMPUS. Edited by J. F. Wellemeyer, Jr. Washington: Association for Higher Education, National Education Association, 1961; pp. viii+528. \$3.00.

Compensation for college teachers has come to mean salary plus. . . . This volume of case studies purports to present "a source of ideas for college and university faculty and administrators wrestling with problems of improving salaries, salary practices, and fringe benefits for faculty members." The studies were written by officials in representative institutions, varying in form of support, size, and locale.

The editor's introductory chapter contains observations on compensation practices, and a preview of the case studies makes up the bulk of the volume. Several important questions are treated briefly in this chapter, e.g., salary levels and increments, tenure policies, dismissal procedures, retirement and death benefits, and forms of compensation other than salary. Examples of novel salary supplements abound. Several schools provide housing opportunities at below market cost; one school,

through its purchasing agent, helps faculty make purchases at attractive discounts; still another school makes summer employment available to non-teaching faculty.

This book has merit on several points. It is informative; those supporting its publication are quick to announce its limitations; no axes are ground; and, in general, it seems an interesting appraisal of compensation practices in a representative group of schools.

Teachers of speech may find some cause for alarm. There is no mention of compensation for directing such activities as debate and drama. A national picture of this problem has yet to be drawn.

Teachers of speech, as well as those in other disciplines, will find this book informative and possibly of some value in helping their administrators improve compensation practices.

WILLIAM SEIFRIT
West Virginia Wesleyan College

SELECTIONS FROM SPEECHES (1900-1959) OF MURRAY SEASONGOOD. Compiled with a Foreword and Head Notes by Agnes Seasongood. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1960; pp. xiv+271. \$4.50.

Murray Seasongood received his undergraduate and law school education at Harvard, then practiced in Ohio, and frequently published in legal journals. He was active in civic, education, and legal organizations, and taught law at the University of Cincinnati in a part-time capacity. His notable achievements include delivering the Godkin Lectures at Harvard and serving as Mayor of Cincinnati from 1926 to 1930.

Mr. Seasongood engaged in a wide range of activities, particularly those concerning good local government and law. The speeches reflect the personality of a humanitarian with a keen wit. Each address contains appropriate humor and relevant quotations or anecdotes from either literature or law. For example, at the age of seventy when he became professor emeritus, a friend who was confused about terminology remarked, "Fine! They ought to have given it to you long ago."

The book might have been improved by cutting the number of speeches and increasing their length, since only fragments are presented.

GEORGE W. DELL
University of California, Los Angeles

BRITISH ORATIONS: FROM ETHELBERT TO CHURCHILL. Everyman's 714. New York: E. P. Dutton, 1960; pp. xiv+369. \$2.00.

This collection is a revision, having been published originally in 1915 and last reprinted in 1950 as *British Historical and Political Orations: From the 12th to the 20th Century*. The changes appear to be few. The quaint—rather anachronous—Introduction by "The Member for Barchester" (Ernest Rhys) remains, with some small effort having been made to bring it up to date. One speech, "Ireland and the War" by John Redmond, has been withdrawn, and is replaced by "Extracts from Four Famous Speeches of the Second World War by Winston S. Churchill." Although these extracts fairly represent Churchill's style in 1940, they still are extracts; complete texts of Churchill would be preferable to the less reliable texts of, say, Ethelbert, William of Normandy, and John Ball.

British Orations professes an attempt "to trace the line of national and political events in the speeches they helped to inspire" (p. v). Such a project calls for clear, generous explanatory notes and complete, accurate texts; and there should be clear indications of sources. But the notes in *British Orations* (unchanged from the previous edition) are sporadic, of little worth by the standards of present-day historical scholarship. Although the sketchy bibliography lists nine older anthologies, the book nowhere displays a connection between these entries and the texts; there is not a single meaningful citation of source.

Because it fails in these particulars, *British Orations* is of limited value to the scholar. But since it is the only collection of British speeches now in print, teachers of British public address will welcome the news that the book is again available.

RICHARD SOMER
Hobart and William Smith Colleges

SPEECH: ITS TECHNIQUES AND DISCIPLINES IN A FREE SOCIETY. By William Norwood Brigance. (Second edition.) New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1961; pp. xiv+576. \$5.50.

Completed before but published after Professor Brigance's death, this new edition contains his last rhetorical statement on public speaking. This volume, like its predecessor, is rhetorical; Brigance was a man who felt strongly the importance of speech in a free society. (See especially the first and last chapters, carefully reworked and worth the price of the volume.)

In answering the question, "Why another revision?" Brigrance, in the Preface, pleads a three-fold obligation: (1) to his students ("perishable" references must be changed to convey "living meaning" rather than "embalmed darkness"); (2) to his discipline ("explanation of . . . discoveries recently made on the nature of persuasion"); and (3) to himself ("I can do it better"). All three debts are paid in full.

Brigrance pondered every page. Here a word is changed; there a sentence is recast; paragraphs are rewritten, transposed, added, or deleted; and many new illustrations illuminate traditional concepts. Friends of the first edition will be doubly pleased with the second's familiar format and renewed freshness.

Gifted with incessant energy, Brigrance was never a man to leave well-enough alone. As usual, he has improved it.

ROBERT P. FRIEDMAN
University of Missouri

A MANNER OF SPEAKING FOR EFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION. By Carl B. Cass. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1961; pp. 362. \$4.50.

As a basic text for a course in voice and diction, or as a supplementary source for a fundamentals of speech class, this book will provide informative, readable material. The range is indicated by this list of representative titles: "Physics of Sound"; "The Production of Voice and Speech"; "Ear Training"; "American Standards of Pronunciation"; "The Speech Personality"; "Developing Vocal Flexibility."

Many students enter speech improvement courses sublimely unaware that lasting progress in improving voice, articulation, and tonal communication can be achieved only through understanding the speech mechanism, the speech "personality," and through practice sessions. The author provides background material in psychology, physics, physiology, and phonetics to supply the information needed. The well planned exercises at the conclusion of each chapter can stimulate the practice.

Some instructors may wish that the selections had been chosen on some basis other than that they are in the public domain, but all will be glad for the availability of this fine text.

ROY S. AZARNOFF
Boston University

FUNDAMENTALS OF SPEECH. By Elton Abemathy. Dubuque: Wm. C. Brown, 1959; pp. vi+217. Paper \$3.50.

GUIDEBOOK FOR SPEECH PRACTICE. By Milton Dickens and James H. McBath. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961; pp. x+163. Paper \$1.95.

Fundamentals of Speech is intended to perform the dual functions of textbook and workbook for a course in speech fundamentals. In the one hundred-fifty pages intended as textbook, the author disclaims any attempt at "originality or uniqueness." What he has attempted, and what this reviewer believes he has achieved, is an abbreviated, very readable restatement of familiar materials and ideas. The book has the usual weakness of any abbreviated volume which attempts to treat every aspect of oral communication; it achieves a general thoroughness at the expense of detail in some individual units. The unit on public speaking, particularly the discussion of supporting materials and of audience adaptation, seems sketchy and incomplete. The final sixty-four pages are devoted to detachable assignment and evaluation forms.

Guidebook for Speech Practice is intended as a practical supplement to a fundamentals textbook. The authors list four purposes: "(1) to make more convenient the instructor's task of planning and assigning in advance a series of practice projects; (2) to reduce classroom time needed for making and explaining assignments; (3) to reduce classroom time needed for oral criticism by providing printed forms that facilitate written criticism; and (4) to provide students with a concrete and tangible record of past progress and next immediate goals." The assignment sheets are well written, and they are numerous enough to allow selectivity. Perhaps the most useful contribution of this workbook is its evaluation forms. The authors present educationally sound, carefully constructed evaluation sheets for a variety of speech types and purposes. Some of these sheets are designed for evaluating speeches of others, some for the student's own rhetorical efforts. Public speaking instructors will find this workbook a useful supplement to lectures and textbooks.

W. SCOTT NOBLES
University of Oregon

SHOP TALK

ROBERT L. SCOTT, *Editor*

THE NATIONAL COUNCIL OF TEACHERS OF ENGLISH

Richard Murphy

Forty-seven years ago this Thanksgiving, seventeen members in attendance at the Fourth Annual Convention of the National Council of Teachers of English, in Chicago, decided to have their own organization, to be called The National Association of Academic Teachers of Public Speaking, today known as the Speech Association of America. SAA is now an established society with 8,000 members, and the events of that fateful day in 1914 have been duly recorded (*QJS*, I [April 1915], 51-58; XLV [April 1959], 195-199).

Through the years we have often wondered how fares NCTE, and whether it recovered from the blow of severance. The best way to find out, we decided, was to visit the national headquarters. Since 1960 the Council has been housed in its own building on the University of Illinois campus, so getting to the national office was easily managed by a four-block walk on a pleasant fall afternoon. The main building is a rectangular red brick and glass structure about the size of a twelve-family apartment house. To the right of the main building is a round windowless tower connected by a glassed-in corridor. We entered the

runway and first took a look at the round tower, which turned out to be the library, with bookshelves around the walls and a massive round reading table in the center, illuminated by diffused light from a plexiglass dome. Having satisfied our curiosity on this point, we went back down the corridor to the main building, where we were met by a receptionist and escorted to the Publications Associate, Enid Olson, who doubles in public relations.

As we waited a moment to see the Executive Secretary, Mrs. Olson told us something about him. James R. Squire was called to the office from the University of California, Berkeley, where he was teaching English. He is an expert in matters of English from elementary through college, and has taught at all levels. Although he administers a mass of detail, and travels around the country addressing groups about the Council and English, he manages to give time to the substance of things. He is co-author of *Teaching Language and Literature*, published this year by Harcourt, Brace and World. He has edited a tenth grade literature unit called *Survival*, consisting of 120 paperbound books (\$44.50 for the lot).

Mr. Squire, who is reverentially addressed as "doctor" by the staff, turned out to be a very pleasantly dynamic man in his thirties. We began by remi-

The editor of Shop Talk and the editor of QJS decided to salute SAA's parent upon completion of the first half century. Since the journal editor was on the scene, he got the assignment. ST welcomes back to the column, as a guest, its editor for three years, 1957-59.

niscing about the old days, before our time, and this took us to the tower for a look at records. Although SAA was "founded" in 1914, the first convention was not held until the following Thanksgiving. The new organization held its meetings in the Congress Hotel in Chicago. NCTE was meeting across the street at the Auditorium Hotel, and there was much visiting back and forth. The new group kept Friday afternoon open so they could meet with the public speaking section of NCTE, from which they had sprung. The next year, 1916, the two associations met independently at the Hotel Astor in New York. Again the speech society met an afternoon with the NCTE public speaking section. The two societies never met together again. The speech folk decided to meet during the Christmas holiday in order to have a longer convention. In addition, they thought it was time to move back to Chicago.

In 1960, in Chicago, NCTE held its Golden Anniversary Convention. A section meeting on speech was held, with representatives of SAA on the program. At the convention in Philadelphia this year, there was a section meeting with SAA and AETA. SAA has pretty much kept to the Christmas period for conventions, and the Council has never departed from the Thanksgiving time. We asked Secretary Squire how they managed with a three-day convention, and he replied that they don't. Since the early part of Thanksgiving week is given to workshops, committee and commission meetings and such, the convention really runs a week.

We left the library and inspected the main building. The main floor is raised about three feet above ground level and the entrance stairs, and has an open area with offices along three walls. In the basement are rooms for storage of

journals, mailing rooms, and IBM machines. "We're completely equipped with IBM," said the secretary. As we nosed around, Mr. Squire gave us some details about the building. The land is leased for seventy-five years at a dollar per annum. The building cost \$150,000. We asked how the money was raised, and were told it came right out of the treasury. Back in 1953, the story goes, NCTE set up a "professional" headquarters in space rented from the University of Illinois, with a full-time secretary borrowed from the Department of English. Seven years later, membership had grown from 23,000 to 60,000. In appreciation of the work of the first secretary on the grounds, J. N. Hook, the Research Foundation was established in his honor last year. As a start, the Council put in \$50,000, right out of the treasury.

The size of the organization, the secretary commented, has much to do with its resources. "As you know, in publishing a journal, for example, after a certain point the profits increase sharply." We asked about the membership. "We had a slogan, '60,000 in the sixties,' but we're beyond that now, and by the time you have anything written"—this he said in straight face, evidently with no reflection on your reporter's slowness in setting something down and getting it into print—"we shall have 70,000 members." We asked about adequacy of the new building, as we tripped over a mail bag in the corridor, and were told it's already too small. The Council has bought a house across the street and hopes to use the land for a supplementary building primarily for mailing and storage. "We have thirty staff members in this building," the secretary said. "During the summer, we prepare for mailing 200,000 copies of catalogues and lists, and this place is pretty well filled with stuffed envelopes and mail bags."

NCTE publishes six journals. *College English* supplies articles for the college teacher, with emphasis on classroom use. *College Composition and Communication* is for the freshman college course. *English Journal* emphasizes material for the junior and senior high school. *Elementary English*, started in 1924, carries on in its field, and a new journal, started last year, *Studies in the Mass Media*, carries guides to motion pictures, television, drama, recordings, periodicals, and paperbacks. *Abstracts of English Studies* is for the scholar, and carries summaries of articles selected from about 400 learned journals. Membership dues are \$4.00 for one journal. Additional journals come in combinations of offers, averaging about \$2.00 each.

In addition to the journals, the Council publishes and commissions books, records, and teaching aids. Many of the books, such as Sterling Leonard's *Current English Usage* and C. C. Fries' *American English Grammar*, have become quite famous. The best selling record last year was a 10", 78 rpm, selections from Chaucer, read by Harry M. Ayres—\$1.75 list, \$1.25 to members. If you prefer the contemporary scene, there is e e cummings reading from "nouns to nouns . . . love is more thicker than forget," same price. *Great American Speeches*, with selections from Patrick Henry to William Jennings Bryan, comes in two 12", 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ rpm records at \$11.90 (\$9.50). The teaching aids are various. For example, the printed text of the Chaucer recording, with explanations, is available in bulk quantities. There are literary maps of the states and regions of the world. Brochure "guides" are issued for the college, secondary, and elementary teacher. Most popular of the aids, the secretary told us, are the reading lists,

such as *Books for You*. NCTE lists 400 items in its catalogue.

Although a permanent national headquarters has meant centralization, ramifications go on undiminished. There are 5 commissions, 59 committees, and 154 affiliate associations—councils in cities, states, and regions. The Council issues a *Directory of Officers, Committees, and Affiliates*, which runs to 85 pages. No directory of members, such as SAA issues annually, is attempted—"It would run to the size of a telephone directory." Nor does the Council operate a placement service. State credential regulations for elementary and secondary school teachers vary so, the secretary explained, a national bureau is not feasible. College members use the interviewing services at MLA conventions and the Conference on College Composition and Communication. The Council office receives some requests about placement. In these inquiries, the SAA Teacher Placement Service is sometimes cited as an example of a good professional aid.

The Council is of such size and power now, its influence is felt in the national political scene. Project English, under grant of the U.S. Office of Education, is now in operation. In fact, the secretary had just been in Washington counseling on the project. The fastest growing field at present is teaching English as a second language. The Council has a grant of \$55,000 from the U.S. Information Agency to direct publication of a series of books for use abroad.

By this time we had about all the facts and figures we could retain for one afternoon, and decided not to presume further on the secretary's career. We parted old friends, with various questions of historical fact unresolved, and a determination to clear them up before next meeting. On our way out, we de-

cided we had better sign on right away—dues go up a dollar next year. Now that we had joined, it seemed silly not to take advantage of the cut prices for members, so we headed for supplies. Fries' *American English Grammar* at \$2.50 (list, \$3.75) was a nice saving, and we had put off buying it long enough. While at it we got a Literary Map of Oklahoma at \$4.00 (\$5.00), and a 12" lp recording of Irish Ballads by Siobhan McKenna, \$4.75 (\$5.95).

All in all, it was a very pleasant afternoon. We learned a lot, gathered some necessary supplies, were much cheered to see how NCTE flourishes, and saved \$4.25. As we walked back to our cubicle, we composed an impromptu speech to be delivered at the SAA Council meeting in New York at Christmas on why SAA should have its own permanent headquarters, even if it can't afford a round tower library with a plexiglass dome.

AETA CONVENTION. The American Educational Theatre Association held its Silver Anniversary Convention, August 28-30, at the Waldorf-Astoria Hotel in New York City, with 1,117 members attending. The convention was preceded by meetings of the three AETA divisions: the Children's Theatre Conference, August 24-26; the Secondary School Theatre Conference, August 27; and the American Community Theatre Association, August 27.

The theme of the convention, "Theatre and the Human Bond," was used by Marjorie Dycke, New York High School of the Performing Arts, First Vice-President and program chairman, to correlate the general sessions and the section meetings. The first luncheon program, "Theatre U.S.A.—Do It Yourself," was built around reports on active or proposed theatres in all parts of the country by Norris Houghton, Phoenix Theatre; Nina Vance, Alley Theatre, Houston, Texas; Jules Irving, Actors Workshop, San Francisco; Joseph Papp, New York Shakespeare Festival, New York City; Jose Quintero, Circle in the Square, New York City; and Kenneth L. Graham, University of Minnesota.

Special addresses to the convention were

delivered: The Honorable Abraham A. Ribicoff, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, "The Theatre as Teacher"; Frederick O'Neal, First Vice-President of Actor's Equity, "Theatre and the Human Bond"; and Norman Philbrick, Stanford University, President of AETA, "AETA—Twenty-Five Years."

There were over forty panel sessions on all aspects of the theatre. A sample of these programs may give some idea of the scope offered conventioners. Jack Landau and actors from the American Shakespeare Festival and Academy gave an acting-directing demonstration. McNeil Lowry of the Ford Foundation spoke on "The Arts and the Foundations." Jo Mielziner, Stanley McCandless, and Jean Rosenthal discussed stage lighting. An outstanding section was "Debut," featuring papers by members who had never appeared on a convention program or published an article.

The following awards were presented: The Annual AETA Award of Merit to Rosamond Gilder, United States Center of I.L.I.; The Senior Eaves Award to Frank M. Whiting, University of Minnesota; The Junior Eaves Award to Paul Kozelka, Columbia University Teachers College; and the Theta Alpha Phi Award to Hubert Heffner, Indiana University. The founding members of AETA were given life memberships.

Agnes Haaga, University of Washington, was elected Director of the Children's Theatre Conference; Charlotte K. Motter, U. C. L. A., was elected Director of the Secondary School Theatre Conference; and Robert Telford, Virginia Museum Theatre, was elected Director of the American Community Theatre Association. All of these officers took office immediately.

The following AETA officers were elected to take office January 1, 1962: Marjorie Dycke, New York High School of the Performing Arts, President; A. S. Gillette, University of Iowa, First Vice-President; Kenneth L. Graham, University of Minnesota, Second Vice-President; Joel Rubin, Kliegl Brothers, Administrative Vice-President; and Robert Schneidemann, Northwestern University, Executive Secretary.

The 1962 convention will be held at the University of Oregon, August 20-22.

KENNETH L. GRAHAM
University of Minnesota

INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS. The Fourth International Congress of Phonetic Sciences was held September 4-9 at Helsinki. SAA members attending were: John W. Black, Ohio State University; Lee S. Hultzén, University of Illinois;

Paul Moore, Northwestern University; Elbert R. Moses, Clarion State College; Gordon E. Peterson, University of Michigan. All read papers.

SHOP TALK SPEECH CONVENTION CALENDAR

NATIONAL

Speech Association of America: Statler Hilton, New York, December 27-30; (1962, Cleveland, Sheraton-Cleveland, Dec. 27-30; 1963, Denver, Denver Hilton, Aug. 18-21; 1964, Chicago, Dec. 27-30; 1965, Philadelphia, Dec. 27-30; 1966, Chicago, Dec. 27-30; 1967, Los Angeles, Dec. 27-30; 1968, Chicago, Dec. 27-30; 1969, New York, Dec. 27-30; 1970, Chicago, Dec. 27-30; 1971, San Francisco, Dec. 27-30).

American Educational Theatre Association: University of Oregon, August 20-22; (1963, University of Minnesota, Aug. 26-28; 1964, Chicago, December, with SAA; 1965, Miami Beach, Americana Hotel, Aug. 25-27; 1966, Chicago, December with SAA).

American Speech and Hearing Association: Statler, New York, November 18-21; (1963, Sherman, Chicago, Nov. 3-6).

National Society for the Study of Communication: with SAA in New York.

NUEA Committee on Discussion and Debate Materials: with SAA in New York.

American Forensic Association: with SAA in New York.

REGIONAL

Southern States: Hotel Driskill, Austin, Texas, April 5-6 (High School and College Forensic Meet and Student Congress, April 1-6).

Central States: Hotel Sherman, Chicago, April 6-7; (1963, Morrison Hotel, Chicago, April 5-6).

Eastern States: Henry Hudson Hotel, New York, April 12-14.

NOTES FROM THE CLINICS

The Hunter College Speech and Hearing Center, under the direction of Moe Bergman, has begun an experimental program in cooperation with the New York City Department of Health to develop procedures for mass hearing tests of children from three to five years of age in day care centers.

Pepperdine College has established a Speech and Hearing Clinic which is beginning its first year of operation.

The State University of New York College of Education, Fredonia, has received approval from

the State Education Agency for granting the provisional certificate in speech, and the provisional and permanent certificates in teaching the speech and hearing handicapped. Formerly these programs were "dual" curricula in which the student also received certification in elementary education.

The University of Massachusetts, Amherst, opened a new Speech and Hearing Center this past spring. The Center's facilities, located in Bartlett Hall include four student training rooms, a student reading room, two offices, one large classroom and a smaller room connected by two-way-vision mirrors for observation of individual and group therapy. Rooms for audiometric testing are under construction. Inez Hegarty is director of the Center.

The Public Health Service has approved continuation for the third year of a research grant to Kenneth Scott Wood, University of Oregon, as principal investigator of a research project concerned with the relative effectiveness of speech research methods.

RADIO, TELEVISION, FILM

The radio division of the speech department at Abilene Christian College is now housed in offices and studios in the new Citizenship Center.

Utilizing a grant of equipment from General Electric for the training of teachers, Eastern Michigan University has set up a closed-circuit television system for the instruction of regular college courses. The system includes a film chain, one classroom studio for self-directed television teaching with three TE-6 cameras, and another studio with two TE-3 cameras. The distribution equipment provides a signal to six classrooms. Verne W. Weber is television coordinator.

The campus radio station at Linfield College is now on the air with a thirty hour a week program schedule.

The required freshman speech course at Marietta College is now being taught on closed-circuit television. Additional equipment acquired by the college now enables instruction via television to reach three hundred students. Bernard Russi, Jr., is supervisor of closed-circuit instruction.

The Oberlin College Dramatic Association has established a thirteen week television series which will be carried by KYW-TV, Cleveland.

Pacific Lutheran University held its first summer television workshop this summer. The five week course included studio, technical, and production-direction experiences. Paul Steen supervised the workshop. Four courses, includ-

ing the fundamentals of speech, are now being offered at Pacific Lutheran on closed-circuit television.

Pennsylvania State University has added two new broadcasting courses to its curriculum—broadcasting in the United States and radio-television announcing.

With the cooperation of Los Angeles ABC television officials, Pepperdine College will offer a special television seminar this spring.

The State University of New York College of Education, Oneonta, has initiated courses in educational television this fall under the direction of Muriel G. Kellerhouse.

Texas Christian University's radio station, KTCU, has been remodeled. The university has expanded its television programming in cooperation with station KTVT, Fort Worth. William Hawes is director of radio-television.

Thomas Scheidel, Cornell University, was research consultant for the Oregon Television Project during the summer. He and J. R. Shepherd, University of Oregon, have issued a report, "A Sequence of Proposed Research Designs Relating Program Structure to Resistance to ETV."

A video-tape mobile unit has been placed in operation at WHA-TV, the University of Wisconsin's educational television station. The installation includes a video-tape recorder, three image orthicon cameras, and complete audio and video control equipment. When it is not being used for remote taping, the unit will serve as an additional studio recorder.

READINGS

The Adelphi College Readers' Theatre will present "A New England Voice," composed of selections from the poems of Robert Frost, as a part of the Little Theatre's regular season.

A series of ten reading programs was presented at the University of Colorado's Memorial Center this summer. The programs, sponsored by the department of speech, included readings from the works of Mark Twain, Franz Kafka, James Joyce, Robert Frost, Baudelaire, William Butler Yeats, and Maxwell Anderson.

Illini Readers, University of Illinois, gave a program of readings by the faculty for the first event of the year. Kenneth Burns read from the poetry of Gwendolyn Brooks. Severina Nelson read selections of light verse. Thomas Sloan gave "The Valiant Woman," a short story by J. F. Powers, and Phillip Stevens read a scene from Shakespeare's *King John*. The second program will be a chamber theatre production of

Eudora Welty's short story, "Lily Daw and the Three Ladies."

The University of Pittsburgh Poetry Group will hold its seventh season of reading hours. Pittsburgh authors participating are Sara Henderson Hay, Lawrence Lee, Edwin L. Peterson, and Gladys Schmitt. Co-chairmen for the programs are Aubrey Epstein and Ruth Haun of the Pittsburgh department of speech.

FORENSICS

Attention Tau Kappa Alpha chapters! The offices of the executive secretary of Tau Kappa Alpha are now officially established in Room 313, Speech Building, Ohio University, Athens, Ohio. Please address all correspondence to Paul D. Brandes at this address.

Illinois State Normal University, following practice of some schools, has set up a forensic scholarship fund by soliciting contributions from alumni who participated in forensic activities.

The University of Houston announces that its debate squad will travel this year in a new Falcon station wagon.

Here is an item to be filed under "fascinating debate propositions." William Seifrit, West Virginia Wesleyan College, writes that the National Science Foundation sponsored high school students who studied this summer at Wesleyan debated three questions before an audience of students and faculty: That there is anti-matter in the universe; That there is extra-territorial life; and That the "big bang" theory of the creation of the universe is the only tenable theory. These debates were both recreation and supplements to the students' courses of study.

Jay Ludwig reports the continuation for a second year at Paterson State College in New Jersey of a rather unique Speakers Bureau. In addition to providing audience speaking situations for its panel of students, the bureau serves as a clinic for students and teachers who seek help in learning to meet speaking situations.

THEATRE SCHEDULES

Abilene Christian College: *The Importance of Being Earnest* and *The King and I*.

Adelphi College: *Look Homeward, Angel*; *Guys and Dolls*; *Anne of the Thousand Days*; *Lady Windermere's Fan*.

Allegheny College: *Ring Round the Moon*; *Arms and the Man*; *Look Homeward, Angel*; *The Adding Machine*; *Rashomon*; *Fashion*; *Romanoff and Juliet*.

American University: *The Corn Is Green; The Prodigal; Cymbeline; The Playboy of the Western World; Oh, Kay.*

Bradley University: *Harvey, The Skin of Our Teeth, Trouble in Tahiti, Dark of the Moon, Five Finger Exercise.*

Cornell University: *The Time of Your Life, The Great God Brown, John Brown's Body, The Gondoliers, The Mistress of the Inn.*

Hunter College: *The Prodigal* and a bill of one acts written by students.

Idaho State College: *Where's Charley? Arms and the Man, The Doctor in Spite of Himself, The Beginning of the End and Aria Da Capo, Macbeth, A View from the Bridge, The Fourposter.*

Illinois State Normal University: *J. B., Love's Labour Lost, Fashion;* a children's play, *The Five Little Peppers.*

Indiana University: *Light Up the Sky; Three Men on a Horse; Bus Stop; The Crucible; The Cherry Orchard; Henry IV, Part I; Jordan River Revue; Waiting for Godot.*

Johns Hopkins University: *The Prodigal, London Assurance, My Father's Mantle.*

Kansas State University: *Allegro, Teahouse of the August Moon, Antigone, A Midsummer Night's Dream;* two children's plays, *Hansel and Gretel* and *Heidi.*

Kent State University: *The Time of Your Life, The Adding Machine, A Member of the Wedding, The Legend of Sleepy Hollow, The Little Foxes, Under Milkwood.*

Lamar State College (Texas): *School for Scandal.*

Linfield College: *Androcles and the Lion.*

Mankato State College (Minnesota): *Kind Sir, Command Decision, Guys and Dolls.*

Marietta College: *The Adding Machine* and *The Haunted House.*

Michigan State University: *Born Yesterday, Doctor Faustus, The Good Woman of Setzuan, A Streetcar Named Desire, Brigadoon.*

Nebraska State Teachers College, Kearney: *Othello, Playboy of the Western World, The Crucible, Kiss Me Kate.*

Oberlin College: *The Crucible, The Country Wife, Othello.*

Ohio University: *Thieves' Carnival, The Glass Menagerie, A Single Mountain, The Lady's Not for Burning, South Pacific.*

Oregon State University: *Three Men on a Horse; Knight of the Burning Pestle; Inherit the Wind; The Great Sebastians; The Diary of Anne Frank; Mary, Mary.*

Pacific Lutheran University: *J. B., My Three Angels, A Christmas Carol;* a children's play, *Hansel and Gretel.*

Phoenix College: *The Rivalry, The Boy Friend, The Miser.*

Purdue University: *The Little Foxes, The Madwoman of Chaillot, The Trojan Women, Damn Yankees.*

San Diego State College: *Uncle Vanya* and *Oedipus Rex.*

Smith College: *Six Characters in Search of an Author, A Phoenix Too Frequent, Victims of Duty, The Doctor in Spite of Himself.*

Southwest Texas State College: *The Corn Is Green.*

Texas A & I College: *A Midsummer Night's Dream.*

Towson State Teachers College (Maryland): *The Trojan Women.*

University of Arkansas: *Oedipus Rex; Riders to the Sea; Jane; Fashion; Henry IV, Part II;* a new play, *Love Can Also Die.*

University of Colorado: *Scapin, The Potting Shed, Caesar and Cleopatra, The Marriage of Figaro, The Rainmaker, Kiss Me Kate.*

University of Denver: *The Cold Wind and the Warm, Anna Christie, The Tempest, The Male Animal, Leave It to Jane.*

University of Houston: *The Country Girl.*

University of Illinois: *Summer and Smoke, The Taming of the Shrew, The Father, The Crucible, Time Remembered.*

University of Iowa: *Hotel Paradiso, The Visit, The Caucasian Chalk Circle, Twelfth Night, The Wild Duck.*

University of Miami: *Rashomon, The Cherry Orchard, The Madwoman of Chaillot, Volpone, A Streetcar Named Desire.*

University of Minnesota: *Captain Brassbound's Conversion; Prometheus Bound* and *The Birds; School for Wives; Henry IV, Part I; The Private Life of the Master Race.*

University of Oregon: *The Lady's Not for Burning; Tartuffe; The Climate of Eden; Come Back, Little Sheba.*

University of Pittsburgh: *Julius Caesar; Becket; Ah, Wilderness; The Hairy Ape;* a children's play, *The Seven League Boots.*

University of Wisconsin: *The Merchant of Venice; Ah, Wilderness; The Visit; The Gondoliers; Mister Roberts.*

Wayne State University: *A Country Scandal, King Lear, Where's Charley? The Devil's Disciple, School for Wives, Don Giovanni.*

Western State College of Colorado: *J. B.;* a children's play, *The Elves and the Shoemaker.*

West Virginia University: *Mister Roberts;*

John Brown's Body; Oklahoma; Look Homeward, Angel; Julius Caesar; Tartuffe; The Scarecrow.

THEATRE NOTES

A University of Colorado production of *The Bells Are Ringing*, directed by Seldon Faulkner, toured the Pacific this fall sponsored by AETA and the USO. The troop performed not only before audiences at United States overseas bases, but also before audiences of nationals as part of the State Department's International Cultural Exchange Program.

For the second year the Showboat Majestic (Indiana University) sailed down the Ohio River from Cincinnati, Ohio, to Shawneetown, Illinois. William E. Kinzer served as director aboard, with Duane E. Reed as assistant director, and Lee Norvelle as executive director. Eighty performances of *Peg O' My Heart* and *The Old Soak* were given by the fifteen-student company, followed by the traditional candy sale and variety show.

The Johns Hopkins University Playshop will sponsor three drama evenings this year. Peggy Wood, president of ANTA, will lecture on "The Future of the American Theatre"; Richard A. Macksey, Johns Hopkins, will speak on "Early American Drama"; and Ernst Feise, Johns Hopkins professor emeritus of German, will lecture on "Modern German Theatre."

The Oberlin College Gilbert and Sullivan Players again presented in 1961 a repertory of summer stock. It was their ninth consecutive season on Cape Cod and their fourth at their present location at Highfield, in Falmouth, on the estate of DeWitt Terheun, chairman of the National Council of the Metropolitan Opera Association. The schedule of light opera was composed of *The Gondoliers*, *Iolanthe*, *The Vagabond King*, *The Mikado*, *Utopia Limited*, *La Belle Helene*, and *Martha*. The company of eighty-five performed under the direction of Peter Arnott, University of Iowa; James Ellis, University of Rochester; and Robert A. Gibson, formerly Director of Productions of the D'Oyly Carte Opera Company. W. Hayden Boyers, Oberlin, headed the project as producer.

Ohio University operated two summer theatres again this past summer. The Monomoy Theatre at Chatham, Massachusetts, presented eight plays to audiences which totalled a new record in attendance; the Ohio Valley Summer Theatre at Athens, Ohio, presenting six plays, also broke its attendance record. Students interested in becoming members of either stock

company may procure information from Christopher Lane, Director, Ohio University Theatre, Athens, Ohio.

In addition to its regular schedule, the Kansas State University Theatre will tour with two children's plays in schools in the Manhattan area.

The College Playhouse of Oregon State University has been renamed The Mitchell Playhouse in honor of Charles Buren Mitchell, head of the department of speech from 1920 to 1952.

The deadline for the Second Annual San Diego State College Play Contest is January 5, 1962. Any playwright interested in submitting a script for the \$300 prize is invited to write to the San Diego department for application instructions.

The Vesper Players of Linfield College will take a repertory of short religious plays on tour through eight western states. This will be the twenty-sixth season of touring for the Players.

The Children's Theatre Foundation has voted to give a \$1,000 scholarship for 1962-63 to a person interested in graduate work in children's theatre. Application blanks can be obtained by writing to Albert Mitchell, President, Children's Theatre Foundation, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. The scholarship may be used in any college or university presenting a strong program for the study of children's theatre.

The Northwest Drama Conference will meet February 8-10, on the campus of the University of Oregon.

SUMMER WORKSHOPS AND INSTITUTES

Two summer institutes were held at Indiana University. Fifty-three students in forensics and dramatics attended the Third Annual High School Speech and Theatre Institute under the direction of Eugene K. Bristow and Robert C. Jeffrey. Visiting staff members were: Juanita Shearer, Brazil, Indiana, High School; Donald R. Glancy, Battle Creek, Michigan, High School. The Third Annual Speech Correction Workshop, supported mainly by scholarship grants from Psi Iota Xi, was attended by thirty recent high school graduates who received university credit for an orientation course in speech and hearing therapy. This institute was under the direction of Robert A. Milisen.

Over two hundred high school students participated in a special High School Speech Institute held in three separate two week sessions at Michigan State University. The students received instruction in forensics and dramatics, and participated in a practice debate tournament and the Summer Circle Theatre.

Under the direction of Paul D. Brandes, the Summer Speech Workshop at Ohio University enrolled eighty-nine high school students from seven states. A new feature of the workshop allowed high school forensic directors to receive graduate credit for coaching and working in the program.

The annual University of Hawaii Summer Debate Workshop was attended by ninety-five high school and college students. The sessions were conducted by Donald Klopff, Harry Zavos, James McCroskey, and William Turner. James McBath, University of Southern California, was guest lecturer.

West Virginia University sponsored its first summer High School Speech Institute, with seventy-five students enrolled for the four week's program of courses and workshop activities in voice and diction, public speaking, discussion, debate, acting, and oral interpretation.

CREATIVE WORK WANTED. *Today's Speech* will now accept short stories and poems as well as essays, if they meet editorial standards and have some phase of speech as central themes. Manuscripts should be addressed to William S. Tacey, Editor, 1116 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh 13, Pennsylvania. "Acknowledgement is made within two weeks and publication of material accepted usually follows within six months."

CONVENTION SPECIAL. Richard A. Hildreth, Kansas State Teachers College, reports that the Kansas State Speech Association has chartered a seventy-nine passenger TWA Constellation airliner for the trip to the SAA Convention in New York. The flight will leave Kansas City December 26 and return December 31. They are offering SAA members round-trip transportation at \$90.51. This includes box lunches, stewardesses, and \$25,000.00 worth of life insurance.

CURRICULA

The Greenville College (Illinois) faculty has voted to require a three hour speech course of all students with the exception of those enrolled in engineering or technical programs. The latter will be required to enroll in a two hour course in speech geared to their particular needs. The three hour course will be taught in sections of approximately forty students with common meetings for lectures and sub-sections of twenty for speech practice.

Hunter College is now offering a master of arts program for students in speech pathology and in theatre.

Speech is now a required course for all freshmen students at Idaho State College.

The Public Address Division of the School of Dramatic Art and Speech of Ohio University has recently inaugurated a program in Oral Communication in Business and Industry. The new major study area is designed to prepare students for communications positions with industrial firms. In addition to speech courses the program requires work in psychology, sociology, management, and public relations. Plans are being made to institute the program at the graduate level.

The basic speech course is now required of all students at Pepperdine College. The department has also initiated a course on the graduate level in the history of American public address.

The State Teachers College at Towson, Maryland, was granted permission in June by the Maryland State Department of Education to offer an undergraduate major in speech and dramatics.

PROGRAMS FOR BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY

Paul D. Brandes delivered a series of lectures on communications to the Fourth Annual Institute for Credit Union Personnel held on the campus of Ohio University, August 6-12.

At Oregon State University this summer, Harold M. Livingston participated in instructing the Institute of the National Association of Educational Secretaries.

H. William Simington, Pennsylvania State University, conducted a week-end discussion leadership training program for the Pennsylvania State Center for Continuing Liberal Education at the Treadway Inn in Lebanon, Pennsylvania.

William S. Howell, Ernest Bormann, Paul Cashman, George L. Shapiro, and David M. Berg conducted a week long seminar in communication for management personnel of the Northern States Power Company on the Minneapolis campus of the University of Minnesota last August.

A special course in speech is being offered by the department of West Virginia University for the Bell Telephone Company of Northern West Virginia at the company's district offices in Wheeling.

APPOINTMENTS

Abilene Christian College: Lewis Fulks, associate professor.

Adelphi College: Harvey Jay Gardner, assistant professor.

Eastern Michigan University: Verne W. Weber, television coordinator.

Hunter College: George Haspiel, assistant professor.

Indiana University: Katherine M. Snow, assistant professor; Gail W. Compton and Merle M. Stevens, instructors.

Kansas State University: Elaine Hannah, Austin Perego, Anita Taylor, and Bert Thorne, assistant professors; Betty Cleary and Martha Stout, instructors.

Long Island University: Christine Edwards, assistant professor.

Marietta College: Thomas L. Fernandez, assistant professor.

Michigan State University: William Brandon, associate professor; Anthony Collins, instructor.

Paterson State College (New Jersey): Jane Barry, Sidney Berman, Jay Ludwig, Neil Sheldon, assistant professors.

Pennsylvania State University: Arthur Hunferford, assistant professor; Grace Ferrari, David Jabusch, and Barbara Lieb, instructors.

Pepperdine College: Ted Starnes, instructor. Smith College: Denis Johnston, professor.

South Dakota State College: Robert Litke, director of the speech clinic.

Southwest Texas State College: Ramsey Yelvington, playwright in residence; David Adams, instructor.

State University of New York College of Education, Oneonta: Junius N. Hamblin, director of theatre; Daniel J. Fleischacker and Gentry W. Lovett, instructors.

Temple University: Henry Goehl and Clyde E. Reeves, assistant professors; Aram Aghazarian, Alice Ridge, Bernice Schneyer, instructors.

Texas Christian University: Fred L. Christen, Anita Hale, and Marjorie Moore, instructors.

Towson State College (Maryland): Richard Gillespie, director of theatre.

University of Colorado: James Sandoe, assistant director of theatre.

University of Hawaii: Joyce Higuchi, Loretta Krause, Laura Lynn Shun, Joyce Walker, instructors.

University of Houston: Paul Stephenson, visiting director of theatre; Carolyn Yarbrough, instructor.

University of Kansas: William R. Reardon, associate professor; Donald W. Hansen, instructor.

University of Missouri: O. John Emerson, Ishmael Gardner, Donald MacLennan, Kenneth McGuire, Leon Tilbury, Leonard Wurthman, instructors.

University of Oregon: Lawrence Wismer.

University of New Mexico: Vincent Bevilacqua, instructor.

Washington State University: James R. McDearmon, assistant professor.

Western Illinois University: Robert N. Bostrom, Alfred G. Brooks, and William R. Hodgson, assistant professors.

Western Michigan University: Dorothy Kester, assistant professor.

Western State College of Colorado: Richard Wilson, technical director of theatre.

West Virginia University: William Barnett, Beverly Cortes, Ronald Reed, R. Douglas Stalard, Seyler Thomas, instructors.

William and Mary, Richmond Professional Institute: Thomas R. Long, associate professor; Richard A. Higgins, instructor.

PROMOTIONS

Hunter College: Domis E. Plugge, associate professor; Doris Leberfeld, assistant professor.

Idaho State College: Carl L. Isaacson has become head of the division of communications, and Clark S. Carlile is now chairman of the department; Donald Ashboe, Allen Blomquist, William Corbin, assistant professors.

Illinois State Normal University: George Soderberg, associate professor.

Indiana University: Hubert C. Heffner, distinguished service professor.

Marietta College: Walter L. Hobba, assistant professor.

Oregon State University: Harold M. Livingston, professor; Robert L. Phillips, assistant professor.

Pepperdine College: Warren S. Jones, professor.

Smith College: Vincent C. Brann, assistant professor.

South Dakota State College: Lawrence Stine, associate professor.

Texas Christian University: Dorothy M. Bell, associate professor.

University of Colorado: Margaret Becker, senior instructor.

University of Hawaii: Elizabeth Carr, chairman of the department, succeeding John P. Hoshor who is now assistant dean of the college of arts and sciences.

University of Missouri: Robert P. Friedman and Frances L. McCurdy, associate professors.

Washington State University: Hugh A. Rundell, associate professor.

West Virginia University: Lloyd W. Welden, Sr., professor.

LEAVES

Abilene Christian College: Chapin Ross has been granted a two-year leave to continue his graduate study at the University of Southern California.

Manchester College: Paul Keller, chairman of the department, has been granted a year's leave. He will teach this fall semester at San Jose State College and spend the second semester doing research at Stanford University. Carroll P. Lahman, professor emeritus, Pasadena College, will spend the year as chairman at Manchester.

Marietta College: Arthur L. Buell has been granted a year's leave to complete his doctoral study at Ohio University.

Oberlin College: Paul H. Boase will be on a sabbatical leave during the second semester. Charley A. Leistner will serve as chairman in his absence.

Ohio University: Archie Greer has been granted a year's leave for graduate study at Ohio State University.

Smith College: Denton Snyder has been granted a sabbatical leave for the academic year.

Southwest Texas State College: Willard Booth will be on leave for the year.

State University of New York College of Education, Oneonta: Robert D. Grosshans will be on leave this year doing graduate work at Columbia University. Richard K. Siegfried will spend the year at Western Reserve University doing graduate work.

University of Oregon: Glenn Starlin is on a year's leave to act as television consultant for higher education in the State Education Department of New York. During his absence, Horace W. Robinson will serve as department chairman.

University of Wisconsin: John V. Irwin is spending the first semester doing research in Bethesda, Maryland, sponsored by a grant from the National Institutes of Health. Claude S. Hayes is serving as director of the speech and hearing clinic in his absence.

Western State College of Colorado: E. Martin Hatcher has a year's leave.

RETIREMENTS

Samuel A. Eliot, professor of theatre, retired from Smith College this past June. Next June, Edith Burnett, associate professor of theatre, will retire.

Gayland L. Draegert, associate professor of speech, and director of the speech clinic for the past ten years at South Dakota State Col-

lege, retired this summer. Mr. Draegert is living in the United Retirement Center at Brookings, South Dakota, and will welcome correspondence from former colleagues and friends.

PERSONALS

Samuel L. Becker, University of Iowa, read a paper entitled "Communications and Learning: Implications for Media Research" at the International Seminar on Instructional Television held by Purdue University with the cooperation of UNESCO during October. Representatives from over forty countries attended the conference.

Sam Boyd, Jr., West Virginia University, toured Europe this past summer on a university research grant studying European theatre.

A grant from the Ohio University Research Fund made it possible for Paul D. Brandes and Lloyd I. Watkins to spend a week in September at the Library of Congress doing research in French oratory.

Edward M. Brown has returned to Abilene Christian College after a two year's leave of absence for graduate study at the University of Oklahoma.

Two members of the department of speech at the University of Pittsburgh have had books published by the University of Pittsburgh Press recently: Kalman A. Burnim, *David Garrick, Director*; and Klaus W. Jonas, *The Life of Crown Prince William*.

Theodore Clevenger, Jr., University of Wisconsin, has received a grant from the Graduate School for a study of the effect of certain rate variables on listener comprehension and speaker image.

Everett S. Cortright has returned to Oregon State University from a semester's sabbatical leave which he spent visiting college and community theatres throughout the United States.

The new editor of *The Journal of Communication* will be Frank E. X. Dance of the University of Kansas.

Two persons have left the speech faculty at Western Michigan University to move into other areas of the university's operation. John J. Pruis has been named assistant to the president; he will also continue as director of the summer session. Marvin DeBoer has been appointed an assistant director of field service.

An exchange at the University of Colorado will bring Marion Downs of the Division of Otolaryngology, University Medical School, to the campus to teach courses in audiology, while Milton Valentine does research and clinical work in the Colorado General Hospital.

Robert Dunham, Pennsylvania State University, has been named director of the Pennsylvania High School Speech League.

Charles Elson, Hunter College, has been made a lifetime Fellow of the International Institute of Arts and Letters.

Charles Goetzinger is executive officer of the Bureau of Communication Research of the Institute of Behavioral Sciences at the University of Colorado.

For eleven weeks this past summer, Wallace Gray, Hunter College, directed summer stock at the Newport Playhouse, Newport, Rhode Island.

David H. Grover, Oregon State University, taught in the Naval Post-Graduate School at Monterey, California, this summer.

Major General Harold F. Harding, Professor of Speech, Ohio State University, and commanding general of the 83rd Infantry Division, was principal speaker at the dedication of the Pennington US Army Reserve Center, Marion, Ohio, in September.

Barbara Pearson Lange, director of dramatics at Swarthmore College, has been appointed assistant dean of women.

R. L. Loreman, Marietta College, spent the summer as property master for the Kermit Hunter outdoor drama, *Horn in the West*, at Boone, North Carolina.

Auley B. Luke has returned to the University of Houston after a two year's leave of absence for graduate work at the University of Oklahoma.

The Macmillan Company has published *Recognition of Communist China: A Study in Argument* by Robert Newman, University of Pittsburgh.

Marie Hochmuth Nichols is back at the University of Illinois after a year's leave of absence.

Lowell Perry, director of radio at Abilene Christian College, has recently opened his own FM radio station, KFMN, in Abilene.

Harold J. O'Brien, Pennsylvania State University, has been named assistant to the dean of the Liberal Arts College.

Bernard B. Schlanger, West Virginia University, served as coordinator and lecturer at the University of Miami post graduate course in vocal disorders and esophageal speech sponsored by the United States Office of Vocational Rehabilitation this summer.

H. William Simington, Pennsylvania State

University, has accepted an appointment as Academic Coordinator for Continuing Education in the College of Liberal Arts. He will continue to teach in the speech department.

Luncheon speaker for the Chicago National Convention of the Medical Society Executives Association in August was William S. Tacey, University of Pittsburgh, who spoke on "Bars, Blockades, and Red Lights in Communication."

Charlotte G. Wells, University of Missouri, served as lecturer on cleft lip and palate at the University of Minnesota for a week in June. Later in the summer she was a visiting lecturer at the University of Colorado.

Ruth A. Wilcox has become dean of women at Marietta College.

NEEDED RESEARCH IN SPEECH. A survey of needed research in speech has been completed by William C. Seifrit, West Virginia Wesleyan College (Buckhannon, West Virginia). The survey and copies of the resultant report were financed by a grant from the West Virginia Wesleyan Committee on Research. Copies may be obtained by writing to Mr. Seifrit.

The *Newsletter* of the Undergraduate Speech Instruction Interest Group (Volume 1, Number 2) contains that portion of Mr. Seifrit's work relevant to research in undergraduate instruction. (This newsletter is, incidentally, the first printed interest group publication to reach ST). The survey is divided into sections dealing with public address; radio, television, and film; speech and hearing; oral interpretation; speech education; fundamentals of speech; and theatre.

REVIEW OF RESEARCH. Research on "Speaking" for the three year period 1958-61 was reviewed by J. Jeffery Auer and Raymond G. Smith, Indiana University, in *Review of Educational Research*, XXXI, 2. In the same issue, devoted to the language arts, Sam Duker, Brooklyn College, reviewed research in "Listening."

REORGANIZATION AT SMITH. Effective in September a Department of Theatre and Speech at Smith College was formed to merge courses and activities formerly in two departments. Denis Johnston is serving as department chairman. Charlotte H. Fitch, formerly chairman of the Department of Speech, is director of speech courses in the new department.

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